

The Department of Public Instruction, Bombay.

THE
TARKAKAUMUDI

BEING

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF THE
VAISHESHIKA AND THE NYAYA PHILOSOPHIES,

BY

LAUGĀKSHI BHĀSKARA.

EDITED

WITH VARIOUS READINGS, NOTES CRITICAL AND
EXPLANATORY, AND AN INTRODUCTION,

BY

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PREFACE.

The present text of the Tarkakaumudi is based on two printed and five manuscript* copies of the same, carefully collated with one another. I have divided these into six classes :—

A. The Nirnaya Sāgar press copy—a reprint of the Calcutta edition, the second of the two printed copies referred to above,—very incorrect and careless.

B. A carefully written manuscript kindly lent to me by the celebrated Pandita Gattulālāji of Bombay, giving more or less a correct reading of A.

C. A manuscript from Cambay kindly lent to me by Dr. Peterson from his collection. The whole subject is herein disposed of in a very summary manner—all such portions as are appended for further elucidation being carefully omitted. It may perhaps be an entirely abridged recension of the text, current probably among the Jains.

D. Kindly placed at my service with the two following by Dr. Bhandarkar, from the collection in the Deccan College, Poona. These appear to be very old, two of them being thoroughly trustworthy, as assisting a correct reading of A and B.

E. The same as C, but from a different part of the country, a fact corroborating the supposition of another recension of the text being prevalent.

F. The same as D.

The present text would thus appear, evidently, to be based chiefly on A, B, D, F.

As is usual with regard to such works and their authors, I have been sorely disappointed in my endeavours to glean even what little I can of the author and his history. The colophon of MSS. D, F, tells us that Bhāskara was the son of Mudgala, the son of Rudrakavindra of the Laugakshi family. We further know that he is the author

of a small work on the Mimāṃsā called the Arthasamgraha, lately published in the Benares Sanskrit Series. Here ends all the stock of reliable information we possess about Bhāskara.

Bhāskara will appear to belong to the Northern school of Nyāya, from his mention of Shulapāṇimisra—probably a Bengal Naiyāyika—in his book. If in Shulapāṇimisra we can discover the identity of Shankaramisra, the author of the Upaskāra—this practice of nomenclature not being without a parallel in the Kanabhaksha and Akshapāda of the Sarvadarshanasaṃgraha—we may venture to advance some guess about the date of Bhāskara. Shankaramisra quotes Jagadisa, the author of a commentary on the Dīdhiti of Raghunāth Siromani, the founder of the celebrated school of Nūda, and a contemporary of Chaitanya, the Vaiṣṇava reformer of Bengal.* Chaitanya was born in 1489. Allowing a period of at least 40 years between Raghunāth Siromani and Shankaramisra, and allowing also some time for the acquaintance of our author with the latter, we may fix upon the middle of the sixteenth century as the probable *terminus a quo* of Bhāskara. Further than this I am unable at present to proceed; nor even in the above, which I have advanced with great diffidence, do I pretend to be not open to correction.

I must not allow this occasion to pass without acknowledging my best thanks to Shāstree Bheemāchārya, of Elphinstone College, whose able tuition first encouraged me to undertake an edition of the Tarka Saṃgraha, which circumstances, however, have brought me to replace by that of the Tarka-kāṇmudi. My best thanks are also due to the several gentlemen who have kindly assisted me by a loan of manuscripts and other rare works necessary for the compilation of the text and notes.

M. N. D.

Bhavnagar, 24th August 1886.

* Colebrooke's Essays, Volume II., pp. 282 and 284, note.

INTRODUCTION.

Life has ever been a spur of action to the activity of the human mind. Even among the Hottentots of Africa, and the savages of Fiji this feeling does not fail to manifest itself in one form or another. The inexplicable and the invisible has taxed the resources of the human mind to its utmost limit, and has always attracted all energy towards itself with fresh and increased vigour. Parallel with this research has been the inquiry into the nature of happiness, and the one idea has become blended with the other in such a manner that both have in all countries maintained at all times a kind of intimate relation with each other. The conception of happiness has perceptibly acted on the conception of the invisible, and *vice versa*. This tendency of the human mind results in some form of religion. Before the mysteries of the subjective world become even partially soluble, the wonders of the objective universe press upon the intelligent mind with a force, which ultimately rebounds in the form of some terrible demon, or a propitious deity. The government of a Supreme Providence being established, a multitude of formal worship gathers round the idea, keeping the mind yet far away from a solution of the 'ultimate mystery.' The mind thus disappointed reflects back upon itself, and begins to analyse the nature of the "ego" or "self." If Physics come to its aid, its researches end in materialism and science, if left to itself it loses itself in the sublime regions of metaphysics and philosophy. An assimilation of the two—physics and metaphysics—ought, however, to be the more natural result, but history has unfortunately not yet recorded a single instance of this combination. This is the natural history of Religion; and it is nowhere better illustrated in its entirety than in India.

The Vedic Aryans, worshipping different forms of one Supreme being, came at last to look upon the whole phenomena of nature as one being,* including the observer, the observed, as well as the instruments

* Compare R. V., x. 90, 120, 125, 129, &c.

of observation. This mode of philosophising gave rise to the celebrated school of the Vedānta. Similar constructions put upon different parts of the Vēda produced the other five philosophies or Darshanās. It is impossible to determine when each of these schools of philosophy came into existence, for we can easily detect an under-current of philosophic thought even amidst the turbid flood of primitive formal worship. We can, however, arrange them in the order of their metaphysical accuracy, and thus perceive that they may be current even in one and the same time. It is a fruitless attempt to prove that each of these systems rose upon the ruins of its predecessor,* for there never was a time when any one of them held entire sway over the Aryan mind. It is nevertheless certain that each of these assumed a formal shape only after the enunciation of its principal truths by some great teacher. The truths of each of these philosophies are primarily conveyed to us in the form of sūtras, some of them like those of Panini, others more diffused and therefore recent. Roughly speaking, this branch of literature may be assigned to the latter end of the Sūtra period. We do not find any mention of these formal Darshanās either in Patanjali or in any of the writers preceding him. Evidently, therefore, they are very modern in their formal shape and can, on this ground, claim but a very inferior degree of the respect due to high antiquity. As independent monuments of the power of Aryan intellect they are without a parallel.

The *darshanās* or schools of philosophy—the ultimate results of the Aryan mind deeply engaged in solving the mystery of life—are six in number. The Nyāya of Gautama, the Vaisheshika of Kanāda, the Sāṅkhya of Kapila, the Yoga of Patanjali, the Purva-Mimāṃsā of Jaimini and the Uttara Mimāṃsā of Vyās. All these try to set forth the nature of the Godhead, the soul, the highest happiness (*Moksha*) with the means of acquiring it (*dharma*). We are concerned here with the first two only. Their conclusions on the three principal issues are, in my opinion, comparatively inferior

* As is done by Mr. Taylor in his preface to the Bhagvadgītā.

to those of the other four branches. Still the phraseology of these two systems holds universal sway over the whole range of Indian thought, and we may therefore not inaptly describe them as the grammar of Indian philosophy. It will thus appear that it is a misnomer to identify this branch of Indian philosophy with. Western Logic, for though an investigation of the laws of thought forms the principal bulk of either, still such an inquiry holds but a subordinate place in the general features of the Indian view. We find the name of Gautama mentioned in Manu* and the Mahābhārata,† and that of Kanāda as Kāśyapa in Shankaramisra's Upaskāra,‡ but this information can hardly help us to a conjecture of their respective dates.

Nyāya, or examination by proper instruments of knowledge,§ the work of Gautama opens with postulating the possibility of final beatitude by the proper knowledge of the sixteen things beginning with Pramāna and ending with Nigrahasthāna.|| Final beatitude is defined as absolute freedom from pain (तद्व्यन्तविमोक्षोऽपवर्गः ॥२२॥.) Similarly Kanāda also proposes in his Vaisheshika sutras (rules treating of Visheshas—differentia—which distinguish substances from one another) to examine the nature of *Dharma* (अथातो धर्मे व्याख्यास्यानः ॥ १॥) for the acquisition of *Moksha*, (आत्यन्तिकी दुःखनिवृत्तिः ॥ टीका० वै० सू. ४) which he declares as within reach after a knowledge of the *padārthas*, or substances which are six in number.¶ The Nyāya proceeds by proposing, defining and examining,** the nature of right knowledge and the instruments leading to it. This covers all the ground occupied by formal logic—including Percep-

* III. 16. Col. Essays, p. 280.

† I. 4194. Col. Essays, p. 280.

‡ Col. Essays, p. 280.

§ प्रमाणैरर्थपरीक्षणं ॥ वात्स्यायनभाष्यं ॥

॥ प्रमाणप्रमेयसंशयप्रयोजनदृष्टान्तसिद्धान्तावयवतर्कनिर्णयवाद्दजल्पवितण्डाहिंसाभासच्छल-
जातिनिग्रहस्थानानां तत्त्वज्ञानानिःश्रेयसाधिगमः ॥ गौ० सू० १॥

¶ धर्मविशेषप्रसूताद्ब्रह्मव्यगुणकर्मसामान्यविशेषसमवायानां पदार्थानां साधर्म्यवैधर्म्याभ्यां
तत्त्वज्ञानानिःश्रेयसम् ॥ वै० सू० ४ ॥

** उद्देश, लक्षण, परीक्षा.

tion, Inference, Analogy, Testimony, and the Fallacies together with a description of the mental and sensual apparatus. It touches upon the elements—*Prithvi, Ap, Tejas, Vāyu, Ākāśha*—only casually under a sub-head of *Prameya* or objects to be investigated,* and says nothing noteworthy on the atomic theory of the universe. Vātsyayana in his *Bhāṣya* notices the *Vaisheshika padārthas* but once,† and hence the *Muktāvali* remarks that they are not opposed to the arrangement of the *Naiyāyikas*. Kanāda, on the other hand, devotes himself entirely to an examination of the six heads of predicables, to which later writers have added a seventh—*Abhāva*,—and gives prominence to the atomic theory of the universe. Both agree in acknowledging the existence of a Supreme Being, standing aloof from his creation and governing the whole by his omnipotence and omnipresence. We will thus clearly be able to perceive that the *Nyāya* is 'chiefly occupied with the Metaphysics of logic,' and the *Vaisheshika* with the 'physics.' They may be looked upon as parts of one system, supplying each other's deficiencies. In all later works, which are generally read all over India, we shall find a mixture of both, the *Vaisheshika* ruling the form and arrangement. The great *Bhāṣhā Parichheda* with its commentary the *Muktāvali* is a work founded on both systems. The *Tarka-Samgraha* and the *Tarkakaumudī* are also works of the same class, though the latter is more *Vaisheshika* in its character.

The *Tarkakaumudī* opens with an examination into the nature of the seven categories, a knowledge whereof is, as we have seen, essential to the acquisition of absolute freedom from pain.

Padārthas.—That which can be named is a *padārtha* : the meaning of a word, the 'import of names.' This is substantially an inquiry into the nature of human concepts and their mutual relation with a view to ascertain what is *Moksha*. The *padārthas* are declared to be

* Vide *Sūtras* 9 to 14 I. I.

† अस्त्यन्यदपि द्रव्यगुणकर्मसामान्यविशेषसमवायाः प्रमेयं तद्वेदेन चापरिसंख्येयम्
॥ १.१.९ ॥ वा० भा० ॥

seven in number: Substance, Property, Action, Characteristic Genus, Difference or Individuality, Intimate Relation, and Non-existence.

I. *Substance*.—No property can exist by itself, it must have some substratum. This is substance. The substances are nine in number: *Prithvi, Ap, Tejas, Vāyu, Akāsha, Kāla, Dig, Ātman, Manas*. Of these the first four are either eternal or non-eternal, according as they are in the form of atoms or combined effects. The non-eternal kind is again divided into three kinds: the body that is made of that substance, the sense which cognises the properties of that substance, and the inorganic mass of the same. It is here set forth that creation emanates from infinitesimally small atoms moving at the will of God. The remaining five substances except *Manas* are each eternal, one, and all-pervading.

Ātman and *Manas*.—*Ātman* or the soul, is of two kinds: supreme and inferior. The supreme soul is God, the inferior one individualised soul. Soul is the substratum of so many as fourteen properties. The supreme soul is but one, but the inferior souls are many, as many as there are living organisms, both being indestructible and all-pervading. Knowledge, absolute or relative, is the distinguishing feature between these two kinds of *Ātman*. Knowledge is never possible without the union of mind or *Manas* with *Ātman*. *Manas* is like *Ātman* eternal and numerous, but unlike it, it is merely atomic in form.

II. *Property*.—The properties are in all twenty-four: (1) Form, (2) Taste, (3) Smell, (4) Touch, (5) Number, (6) Dimension, (7) Separateness, (8) Contact, (9) Division, (10) Distance, (11) Proximity, (12) Intellect, (13) Pleasure, (14) Pain, (15) Desire, (16) Hatred, (17) Effort, (18) Gravity, (19) Fluidity, (20) Viscidity, (21) Impression, (22) Merit, (23) Demerit, (24) Sound. These admit, again of a twofold division. The first into developed and undeveloped; and the second into common and particular. The eye, which is an organ of sense made of *Tejas*, ought to show its naturally brilliant white colour, which it does not, and may therefore

be said to possess *undeveloped form*. Similarly properties, which can subsist by themselves in single objects, as form, taste, smell, &c., are 'particular;' those which like 'contact' and others cannot manifest themselves but in more than one object are called 'common.' Of these twenty-four properties 'Intellect' deserves special treatment.

Causation.—Before entering upon a description of Intellect and its divisions, it is necessary to refer to the theory of causation laid down in the text. A cause is defined to be that which precedes the effect, being in constant concomitance with it, and which is not disproved to be a cause by any other circumstance. Cause, thus, is "the *antecedent* or concurrence of *antecedents* on which it (the effect) is *invariably* and *unconditionally* consequent." There is a case of causation which is distinguished from the general description, on account of its not directly contributing to the effect, but fitting something else for the purpose. This is called *karana*, as the axe in the act of felling a tree, the contact of the axe with the wood being the intermediate step. A cause is further described as one of three kinds: Intimate, Non-intimate or Instrumental. The threads and the cloth made of them are intimately and inseparably related; the union of the threads being the non-intimate cause of the cloth; and the weaver's shuttle, &c., instrumental causes in the same act. And lastly, a cause may be common or uncommon. Common causes are those which unavoidably enter into the formation of all knowable things, the uncommon ones being the peculiar factors which make the thing what it is.

Intellect—Intellect is knowledge, the common factor underlying our consciousness.* It divides itself into direct cognition and memory. Direct cognition contributes to memory through the impression which it creates, and which is capable of being called into life at any moment. Direct cognition may be right or wrong, which again may be a false notion, or a doubt. Right knowledge is of four kinds: Perception, Inference, Analogy, Testimony—and the instruments of these kinds of knowledge are also four, Perception, Inference, Simi-

* The *Dipikā* of the *Tarkasaṃgraha*.

larity and Word. The instruments of knowledge thus enumerated are in accordance with the theory of the Nyāya, for the Vaisheshika recognises only the first two. The Chārvākās admit only of Perception, the Bauddhās of Perception and Inference, the Mīmāṃsakas and the Vedāntins of Implication and Absence in addition to the four of the Nyāya. The Nyāya includes Implication* in Inference, and regards Absence† as only a subordinate factor assisting the Perception of the Absence of anything.

Perception.—Direct Perception‡ or Perception is the knowledge produced by the contact of any one of the senses of perception with an external object. This is of two kinds : formal, as this is a post, or general, as of a thing. The instrument contributing to this knowledge, viz., the contact with external objects, is either objective, i.e., consisting of the external senses, or subjective, consisting of the internal mind alone. The first is of six kinds, according as the thing is joined to the sense of perception either directly or indirectly, or according as the object cognised is some positive entity or a negative one. The second has only three divisions, assisting the comprehension of a poet's fancies or of all the things possessing a common attribute from an observation of any single individual of the class, and so on. Among the senses of perception only the eye, the skin, and the mind, can take cognisance of substance; the rule being that a substance becomes perceptible only when it possesses dimension along with some cognisable property answering to the instrument cognising it. And lastly, because the properties of a substance which are related to it by intimate relation, as well as its non-existence, or the common characteristic to be found in it, can all never stand independent of their substratum, it is laid down that that sense of perception which cognises any particular substance, cognises also the characteristic of the class to which the thing belongs, the

* न चतुर्दशैतिह्यार्थापत्तिसम्भवाभावप्रामाण्यात् ॥ २-२-१ ॥ अर्थोदापत्तिः अर्थोपपत्तिः आपत्तिः प्राप्तिः प्रसङ्गः ॥ वा० भा० ॥.

† Vide 2-2-29—38 Nyāya Sūtras.

‡ अक्षस्याक्षस्य प्रतिविषयवृत्तिः प्रत्यक्षम् ।.....मितेन लिङ्गेन अर्थस्य पञ्चान्मानमनुमानम् । उपमानं सांख्यज्ञानम् ।...शब्दः शब्दयतेऽनेनार्थे इति । वा० भा० १-१-३ ॥

intimate relation of the thing with other things or properties, as also its non-existence at any particular place or time.

Inference.—Inference is the ascertainment of the relation between any two objects by the help of a third called the *Hetu*. The thing of which something is to be predicated is called the *paksha*, the thing to be predicated the *Sādhya*. These in Greek logic would correspond to the middle, minor, and major terms of a syllogism, but these and the many other points of similarity between the two systems need not necessarily lead us to believe that the Greeks learnt the lessons of logic at the feet of a Gautama or a Kanāda, or that the Indians borrowed their ideas from the master of Alexander. For, it is quite possible for any two nations to work their way to the same solid truth quite independently of one another. It is, besides, now well-known that “the sciences of logic and of Grammar were, as far as history allows us to judge, invented, or originally conceived by two nations only, by Hindus and Greeks.”* The important step in Indian logic is the establishment of the *Vyāpti* the universal major premis, setting forth the constant invariable relation between the *Hetu* and *Sādhya*. This is a pure process of induction governed by laws answering to the methods of Agreement and Difference enunciated by Mill. It will not do for the *Hetu* and *Sādhya* to be simply found together in a number of instances, but it must conclusively be shown, before enunciating the *Vyāpti*, that their concomitance is not interrupted in any single instance. This being accomplished the deduction is finished in a few steps. We must know that the *Hetu* is on the *Paksha*, and also must have in mind at the same time the *Vyāpti* of this *Hetu* with the *Sādhya*. This is the *Parāmarsa* which leads to the final conclusion.

Modes.—The question of *Modality* also, has not been passed over. The reasoning may take one of three forms: *Kevalānvayi*, *Kevalavyatireki*, *Anvaya vyatireki*. *Anvaya* means the concomitance of the *Hetu* and the *Sādhya* in the form of a universal A proposition;

* Max Muller on Indian Logic.

Vyatireka, the concomitance of the *Abhāva* of the *Sādhyā* and the *Abhāva* of the *Hetu*, corresponding to an A proposition converted *per accidens*.

It may be possible in certain cases to find illustrations to support both these kinds of *Vyāptis*, as in inferring fire from smoke; in others it may be possible to find instances to support a *Vyāpti* only of the one or the other kind, as in inferring namableness from perceptibility or in inferring life from the power of breathing.

Syllogism.—Inference may be for one's own conviction, or for convincing somebody else. In the latter case the five-membered syllogism is put forth. The first part is called *Pratidnyā* the proposition, the second *Hetu* the reason, the third *Udāharana* the instance, the fourth *Upānaya* the assumption, and the fifth *Nigamana* the deduction, *e.g.*:—

The mountain has fire,

Because it has smoke;

All that has smoke has fire, as a culinary hearth;

This is such (*i.e.*, this mountain has smoke),

∴ It has fire.

It is easy to perceive that the first, second, and fourth premises of this, properly speaking, rhetorical syllogism can be reduced to one, and the syllogism made to consist of the three usual premises, as in the case of an inference for one's own conviction. It is believed that the instance in the third member deprives the proposition of its universal character, and therefore vitiates the conclusion. To this it is replied that the instance is not cited to support the proposition, but to indicate the modality of the syllogism.* But we may perhaps justify the instance by arguing that it prevents the syllogism from involving a *petitio principii* by cutting down the major premise to only as much as is actually known by induction. We need not necessarily look upon the proposition as simply particular, because the instance is only one, for that one instance is but one of a class.

Fallacies.—All fallacies in Indian logic are more or less inductive

* Max Müller on Indian Logic.



in their character. The being the subject of such right knowledge as prevents the comprehension of the conclusion or any member of the inference is called a *hetvābhāsa* or fallacy. These are five in number. *Anaikāntika*,* or that which is found in places where the *sādhya* is as well as in places where it is not; *Viruddha*; *Satpratipaksha*; *Asiddha*; and *Bādhita*. The first is of three kinds. *Sādhārana* or that wherein the *hetu* is found in *Sapaksha* (something, the relation of the *sādhya*, with which is already proved) as well as *Vipaksha* (something, wherein the *sādhya* is not to be found). If we say the mountain has smoke because it has fire, we at once have a *hetu* which is found in things with smoke, as well as in things without smoke—a fact which at once constitutes itself into the *hetvābhāsa* by preventing us from comprehending the universal: wherever there is fire there is smoke. This evidently corresponds to the assumption of a false premise. The second division of *Anaikāntika* is *asādhārana*, or uncommon, the *hetu* being found in the *paksha* alone. The third is *Anupasamhāri*, having a *paksha* comprising every known object. For a fuller description of these *vide* note No. 50. The second *Hetvābhāsa* is *Viruddha*. Here we take a *hetu* which always proves the exact opposite of the *sādhya*, as in the argument this is a cow, because it has the qualities of a horse. *Satpratipaksha* is one wherein a rival argument disproves the original *sādhya*. In fact, here, there are two different *hetus* proving two contradictory things of one and the same thing. *Asiddha* is of three kinds. The first is that in which the very substratum of the quality of the *paksha* is a fiction (*Āśrayāsiddha*), as in the argument the sky-lotus is fragrant, because it is a lotus. In the second the *hetu* is not to be found in the *paksha* (*Svarupāsiddha*), as in the argument this lake is a substance, because it has smoke. The third is of a kind with the first, the distinguishing feature of the *hetu* and not of the *paksha*, being false (*Vyāpyatvasiddha*), as in the argument this mountain has fire, because it has golden smoke. In the last *Bādhita*, we prove the opposite of

* एकस्मिन्वन्ते विद्यत इत्येकान्तिकः । विपर्ययादनैकान्तिक उभयान्तव्यापकत्वात् ॥
१-२-४६ वा० भा० ॥

the conclusion not by another *hetu*, but by an instrument of knowledge other than inference. If one should maintain that fire is cold, the best way of proving the contrary will be to place some on his hand and thus verify the falsity of his proposition (by *pratyaksha*). In *Sādhārana* and *Anupasamhāri* the *vyāpti* cannot be enunciated; in the three kinds of *Asiddhi* the *parāmarsha* cannot proceed, and in the rest the very inference is not possible.

Upādhi.—Even an accidental circumstance or *upādhi* vitiates reasoning by suggesting the non-concomitance of the *hetu* and the *sādhya* in certain instances. If the *sādhya* is invariably to be found with the *hetu*, then the *hetu* must invariably be found with any thing that is in constant concomitance with the *sādhya*. If this does not turn out to be true, we can at once perceive that the universal asserting the relation of the *hetu* and *sādhya* is false. Hence the *upādhi* which vitiates the *vyāpti* is an accident concomitant with the *sādhya*, and non-concomitant with the *hetu*. If one should argue that the mountain has smoke because it has fire, the accidental circumstance 'wet-fuel' which is always found with smoke, but never with fire, will at once vitiate the universal 'wherever there is fire, there is smoke,' by showing the non-concomitance of fire and smoke in a heated ball of iron.

Analogy.—Analogy is the knowledge arising from the comparison of one thing with another. If one not knowing a *gavaya* (blue-bull), were told that it is something resembling a cow, and if he should then, seeing the *gavaya*, recognise it as such, his knowledge would be said to proceed from analogy.

Testimony.—The instrument of the knowledge conveyed by words is a word. The knowledge produced by a sentence depends on the meaning of each word and its relation with other words. Words denote objects by a sort of convention among men, which some believe to be eternal, others not eternal. The *Mīmāṃsakas* believe that the meaning of words is always connotative, the individual being understood only as the substratum of the properties connoted. The *Naiyāyikas*,

on the other hand, contend that words are both denotative and connotative, for every word denotes an individual, and connotes some attributes of the same. This meaning of words is comprehended in a variety of ways, chief among which is the usage of persons of wider experience. The sense of a word may thus be principal or implied. The implied sense is, however, dependent on the principal sense. As in the sentence 'the city on the Thames' it is impossible for us to understand the city as standing on the waters of the Thames, we naturally *imply* by the word Thames, the bank of the Thames, which sense, however, is evidently dependent on the principal meaning of the word Thames, inasmuch as it is not far removed from the idea of the waters of the river. The rhetoricians look upon this as an independent sense of words. They add also a third called *Vyanjanū*, which the *Naiyāyika* would include only under inference. A collection of such words can indicate some meaning only when the words are properly related to one another, according to the rules of grammar, when they convey some possible idea, and when they are said one after another without any long pause. Words are divided into three kinds; those conveying an injunction, those giving out a prohibition, and those that merely by various descriptions, &c., enable one to carry out the first or obey the other. In the ordinary course of life only such words can be acted upon as are said by trustworthy persons, but every word of the Veda is law, it being said by the highest authority of all—God. It may be remarked that the *Nyāya* and the *Vaisheshika* assign only this kind of authority to the Veda, whereas the *Mimamsaka* will base his argument for the same on the eternity of *shabda*—a thesis not agreeable to the present system—and the consequent invariable trustworthiness of the sacred scriptures.

Prāmānya.—It is lastly proposed to examine whether in our perception of an object we are rendered conscious of the validity of that perception along with the act of perceiving the thing, or only afterwards. The *Mimamsaka* holds with the *Vedāntin* that both are acts of one and the same consciousness, whereas the followers of *Gautama*

urge that the one act always follows the other, inasmuch as on the original hypothesis, no 'doubt' ought to be possible, which is absurd.

III. *Action*.—Actions are of five kinds: motion upward, motion downward, contraction, expansion, and motion in general.

IV. *Characteristic*.—*Sāmānya* is eternal, one, and found in more than one object. The characteristic of the genus of a class is a *sāmānya* higher than the characteristics of any individual of that class. The highest *sāmānya*—*sattā*—is found in *dravya*, *guna* and *karma* alone. These are supposed to possess the highest *sattā*—existence—inasmuch as they alone are *really* existent—the first of itself, and the other two tangibly and perceptibly through it.

V. *Differentia*.—*Visheshas* or differentiae distinguishing objects from one another are innumerable. They are to be found in eternal substances alone, which are, as described before, the five substances beginning with *Akāsha*, and the atoms of the first four.

VI. *Intimate relation*.—*Samavāya* is always one. Any two things, one of which exists as it were in and of the other, are said to be related by *samavāya*. This kind of relation exists between five sets of things: between properties and substances, actions and substances, a part and its whole, the characteristic of a class and any individual of that class, and differentia and the eternal substances in which it is found.

VII. *Non-entity*.—Distinguished from the foregoing six positive existences, is the seventh negative class of non-entity or *Abhāva*. The direct knowledge of an *Abhāva* is dependent on the knowledge of its counter-entity (*pratiyogi*), as a book in comprehending the absence of the book. A thing may be absent from another in two ways. It may not be *identical* with the thing wherein its absence is cognised, or it may not stand in *contact* with it. That a horse is not a cow is an instance of mutual non-existence, and that a pot is not to be found in this room, that of non-existence by contact. The second kind of *Abhāva* is divided into three kinds with respect to the time of its existence. The first is anterior-non-existence as

of anything before it is produced ; the second ulterior-non-existence as of a thing destroyed ; and the third absolute non-existence as of the horns of a hare or a lotus in the sky.

Conclusion.—Having exhausted the universe of knowledge (*omne scibile*) by an analysis of the whole into these seven categories, it is proposed to shew the utility of such an attempt by setting forth the nature of that final beatitude with an inquiry after which the author began. Before concluding, he explains the meaning and purpose of definitions, for throughout the inquiry he has only named and defined objects without trying (as being useless for mere beginners) to justify the division or the definition.


Definition.—The definition of a name is the enumeration of its peculiar connotations. A definition may be vitiated by being too wide or too narrow or entirely inapplicable. These faults, however, fall under the fallacies. (*Vide* notes Nos. 50 and 51.)

Moksha.—Having thus justified his analysis of the universe, as well as his method of conducting it, the author maintains that an insight into the nature of knowable things and their real essence will ensure that knowledge which will lead to real permanent happiness or *moksha*, which he defines as destruction of pain not taking place at a time when there is possibility of future pain at the place where it occurs.

ERRATA.

- Page 1, line 6, for लोगाक्षि° read लौगाक्षि°
,, 12 ,, 22, ,, सत्त्व ,, सत्त्वं.
,, 14 ,, 11, ,, सत्प्रतिपक्षः ,, सत्प्रतिपक्षः
,, 14 ,, 25, ,, द्वे ,, द्वे
,, 16 ,, 13, ,, शब्दप्रमा° ,, शब्दप्रमा°
,, 20, omit the 25th line.
,, 24, line 39, for No. 8 read No. 9.
,, 59 ,, 58, ,, साध्यभाव ,, साध्याभाव
,, 70 ,, 29, ,, are not required read, are required.

In the notes 'premis' ought to be 'premise.'



अथ

॥ तर्ककौमुदी ॥

श्रीवासुदेवं नवनीरदाभं रमाधरालंकृतपार्श्वभागम्^a ।
मत्स्यादिरूपैः कृतलोकतोषं विद्यानिदानं परमं नमामि ॥
अक्षपादं मुनिं नत्वा कणादं च ततः परम् ।
लोगाक्षिणा भास्करेण नन्यते तर्ककौमुदी¹ ॥

तत्राभिधेयाः^b पदार्थाः² । ते च द्रव्यगुणकर्मसामान्यविशेषसमवा-
याभावाः सप्तैव । तत्र द्रव्याणि³ पृथिव्यग्नेजोवाय्वाकाशकालदिगात्म-
मनांसि नवैव । गुणास्तु रूपरसगन्धस्पर्शसंख्यापरिमाणपृथक्त्वसंयोग-
विभागपरत्वापरत्व^cबुद्धिसुखदुःखेच्छद्वेषप्रयत्नगुरुत्वद्रवत्वस्नेहसंस्कार-
धर्माधर्मशब्दाश्चतुर्विंशतिगुणाः⁴ । कर्माण्युत्क्षेपणापक्षेपणाकुञ्चनप्रसारण-
गमनानि पञ्चैव⁵ । सामान्यं द्विविधं परमपरं⁶ च । नित्यद्रव्याणामा-
नन्त्यात्तद्वृत्तयो विशेषास्त्वनन्ता⁷ एव । समवायस्त्वेक एव । अभावो
द्विविधः संसर्गाभावोन्योन्याभावश्चेति⁸ । द्रव्यत्वसामान्यवद्गुणवद्वा
द्रव्यम्⁹ । गुणत्वसामान्यवान्द्रव्यकर्मभिन्नः सामान्यवान्वागुणः¹⁰ । कर्म-
त्वसामान्यवच्चलात्मकं वा कर्म । नित्यमेकमनेकसमवेतं सामान्यम्¹¹ ।
अयमस्माद्वाच्यवृत्त इति व्यावृत्तिबुद्धिमात्रहेतुर्विशेषः¹² । नित्यसंबन्धः
समवायः । भावभिन्नोभावः¹³ ॥ इति द्रव्यादिसामान्यलक्षणानि ॥

अथ तद्विशेषलक्षणान्युच्यन्ते । - पृथिवीत्वसामान्यवती पृथिवी¹⁴ ।
रूपरसगन्धस्पर्शसंख्यापरिमाणपृथक्त्वसंयोगविभागपरत्वापरत्वगुरुत्व-
द्रवत्वसंस्कारात्मकचतुर्दशगुणवती । सा द्विधा नित्यानित्या च¹⁵ ।
नित्या परमाणुलक्षणानित्या कार्यलक्षणा । सापि त्रिविधा शरीरे-
न्द्रियविषयभेदात् । शरीरमपि द्विविधं यौनिजमयौनिजं च । तत्र

a. B. E. °धननीलकान्तिम् । लक्ष्मीसमालिङ्गितहृत्प्रदेशम्. b. C. E. omit अभि-
धेयाः. c. C. E. °परत्वगुरुत्वद्रवत्वस्नेहशब्दबुद्धिसुख°.

शुक्रशोणितसंनिपातजं योनिजमस्मदादीनां प्रत्यक्षसिद्धम्^a । शुक्रशो-
णितसंनिपातं विना धर्मविशेषसहकृतपरमाणुप्रभवमयोनिजं देवर्षिनार-
दादीनाम्¹⁶ । इन्द्रियं गन्धग्राहकं¹⁷ त्राणं नासाग्रवर्ति । विषयो मृत्पा-
षाणस्थावरभेदान्निविधः । मृत्पाषाणौ प्रसिद्धौ । स्थावरो वृक्षलतादिः ॥

अप्रवसामान्यवत्य आपः । रूपरसस्पर्शसंख्यापरिमाणपृथक्त्वसंयोग-
विभागपरत्वापरत्वगुरुत्वद्रवत्वस्नेहसंस्कारात्मकचतुर्दशगुणवत्यः । ता
अपि द्विविधा नित्या अनित्याश्चेति । नित्याः परमाणुलक्षणा अनित्याः
कार्यलक्षणाः । ता अपि त्रिविधाः शरीरेन्द्रियविषयभेदात् । शरीरम-
योनिजमेव^b वरुणलोके प्रसिद्धम् । इन्द्रियं रसग्राहकं रसनं रसनाग्रवर्ति ।
विषयः सरित्समुद्रादिहिमकरकादिश्च ॥

तेजस्त्वसामान्यवत्तेजः । रूपस्पर्शसंख्यापरिमाणपृथक्त्वसंयोगवि-
भागपरत्वापरत्वद्रवत्वसंस्कारात्मकैकादशगुणवत् । तद्विविधं नित्यम-
नित्यं च । नित्यं परमाणुलक्षणमनित्यं कार्यलक्षणम् । तदपि त्रिवि-
धं शरीरेन्द्रियविषयभेदात् । शरीरमयोनि^cजमेवादित्यलोके प्रसिद्धम् ।
इन्द्रियं रूपग्राहकं चक्षुः कृष्णताराग्रवर्ति । विषयलक्षणं तेजश्चतुर्विधं
भौमादिव्यौदर्याकरजभेदात् । पार्थिवेन्धनं वह्न्यादिकं भौमम् । अविन्ध-
नसौरविद्युद्ब्रह्मवानलादि दिव्यम् । भुक्ताहारपरिणामहेतुर्जडरानलरूप-
मौदर्यम् । सुवर्णरजताद्याकरजम्¹⁸ ॥

वायुत्वसामान्यवान्वायुः । स्पर्शसंख्यापरिमाणपृथक्त्वसंयोगविभाग-
परत्वापरत्वसंस्कारात्मकगुणनवकवान् । स द्विविधो नित्योऽनित्यश्च ।
नित्यः परमाणुलक्षणोऽनित्यः कार्यलक्षणः । अनित्यश्चतुर्विधः शरी-
रेन्द्रियविषयप्राणभेदात् । शरीरमयोनि^dजमेव वायुलोके प्रसिद्धम् ।
इन्द्रियं स्पर्शग्राहकं सर्वशरीरव्यापि त्वक् । विषयो महावाय्वादिः ।
शरीरान्तःसंचारी वायुः प्राणः^e । स^f एव क्रियाभेदात्प्राणापानव्यानोदा-
नसमानसंज्ञां लभते न तु शरीरे पञ्च वायवो^gभूतानां समानदेशताविरो-
धात्¹⁹ ॥

a. C. E. read शरीरमस्मदादीनां प्रत्यक्षसिद्धम् । इन्द्रियं, &c. b. C. E. read
शरीरं वरुणलोके प्रसिद्धम्. B. adds °लोके पुराणप्रसिद्धम्. c. C. and E. omit
अयोनिजम्. d. C. and E. omit अयोनिजम्. e. A. B. read after प्राणः “ हृदि
प्राणो गुदेऽपानः समानौ नाभिसंस्थितः । उदानः कण्ठदेशस्थो व्यानः सर्वशरीरगः ॥ ”
f. E. omits from स एव क्रियाभेदात्, &c., to सधनं विषयः in the next para.
g. A. B. E. omit वायवो.

मूर्तत्वे सति निरवयवः परमाणुः । स चातीन्द्रिय एव । तदुक्तम् ।
जालान्तरस्थसूर्याशौ यत्सूक्ष्मं दृश्यते रजः । भागस्तस्य च षष्ठो यः
परमाणुः स उच्यते ॥ कारणपञ्चाङ्गावि कार्यम् । तच्च द्व्यणुकत्र्यणु-
कादिभेदेनानन्तविधम् । तत्र द्वयोः परमाण्वोः संयोगाद्व्यणुकम् । त्रयाणां
द्व्यणुकानां संयोगाच्च्यणुकम् । चतुर्णां त्र्यणुकानां संयोगाच्चतुरणुकम् ।
एवं पञ्चाणुकादिभोगायतनमन्त्यावयवि शरीरम् । सुखदुःखान्यतर-
साक्षात्कारो भोगः । द्रव्यानारम्भकं कार्यद्रव्यमन्त्यावयवि । शरीरसं-
युक्तं ज्ञानकरणमतीन्द्रियमिन्द्रियम् । ज्ञायमानत्वे सति भोगसाधनं
विषयः^{२०} इति ॥

शब्दसमवायिकारणमाकाशः । शब्दसंख्यापरिमाणपृथक्त्वसंयोगवि-
भागगुणषट्कवान् । स च लाघवादेकः सर्वत्र कार्योपलम्भाद्विभुर्विभु-
त्वाच्च नित्यः^a । तथापि कर्णशष्कुल्यवच्छिन्नः सञ्शब्दग्राहकभ्रोत्रे-
न्द्रियात्मकः^{२१} ॥

ज्येष्ठत्वकनिष्ठत्वज्ञानाधीनपरत्वापरत्वानुमेयः कालः । संख्यापरिमा-
णपृथक्त्वसंयोगविभागगुणपञ्चकवान् । सोप्येको विभुर्नित्यश्च । तथा-
प्युपाधिभेदान्निविधो^bऽतीतोनागतो वर्तमानश्चेति । तद्व्यक्तिध्वंसविशिष्टः
कालस्तद्व्यक्तेरतीतकालः । तद्व्यक्तिप्रागभावविशिष्टः कालस्तद्व्यक्ते-
रनागतकालः । तद्व्यक्तिध्वंसप्रागभावानवच्छिन्नः^{२२} कालस्तद्व्यक्तेर्व-
र्तमानकालः ॥

दूरत्वसंनिहितत्वज्ञानाधीनपरत्वापरत्वानुमेया दिक् । संख्यापरिमा-
णपृथक्त्वसंयोगविभागगुणपञ्चकवती । साप्येका^d विभ्वी नित्या च ।
तथाप्युपाधिभेदान्निविधो प्राची प्रतीच्युदीची दक्षिणा चेति । उदयाच-
लसंनिहिता दिक्प्राची । अस्ताचलसंनिहिता दिक्प्रतीची । सुमेरुसंनिहिता
दिग्गुदीची । सुमेरुव्यवहिता दक्षिणा च ॥

आत्मत्वसामान्यवानात्मा । स द्विविधो जीवेश्वरभेदात् । अनित्य-
ज्ञानादिमाञ्जीवः । संख्यापरिमाणपृथक्त्वसंयोगविभागबुद्धिसुखदुःखे-
च्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नधर्माधर्मसंस्कारगुणचतुर्दशवान् । स च सुखदुःखादिवैचि-

a. C. E. read स चैक एव विभुर्नित्यश्च, and omit from तथापि to आत्मकः.

b. C. E. read स च वस्तुगत्यैकोऽप्युपाधिः. c. C. E. तद्व्यक्तिविशिष्टः. d. C. E. सां च वस्तुगत्यैकाप्युपाधिः.

व्यात्यतिशरीरं भिन्नः । नित्यज्ञानादिमानीश्वरः । संख्यापरिमाणपृथक्त्व-
संयोगविभागबुद्धीच्छाप्रयत्नगुणाष्टकवान् । स चैक एव शरीररहितश्च
शरीरहेत्वदृष्टाभावात् । यद्वा सोऽपि शरीरी पुरुषादृष्टेन कान्ताशरी-
रस्येवास्मदीयादृष्टेन तच्छरीरस्य जननसंभवात् । न चास्मदीयादृष्टेन
मुक्तस्यापि शरीरोत्पादः स्यादिति वाच्यम् । शरीरहेतोरिच्छादेस्तत्राभा-
वात् । अत एव चतुर्भुजत्वादिश्रवणं "स्मृत्यादौ संगच्छते"²³ । द्विविधोऽ-
प्यात्मा विभूर्नित्यश्च^b ॥

मनस्त्वसामान्यवन्मनः । संख्यापरिमाणपृथक्त्वसंयोगविभागपरत्वा-
परत्वसंस्कारगुणाष्टकवत् । तदेव सुखाद्युपलब्धिसाधनमिन्द्रियं प्रति-
जीवं भिन्नमगु नित्यं च²⁴ ॥ इति द्रव्यविशेषलक्षणानि ॥

अथ गुणविशेषलक्षणान्युच्यन्ते—बधुर्मात्रग्राह्यजातिमान्गुणो^c रू-
पम् । गुणपदं प्रभावारणाय²⁵ । तच्छुक्लकृष्णपीतरक्तहरितकपिलभेदात्प-
द्विधम्^d । शुक्लादि षड्विधं^e पृथिव्यामेव । शुक्लं स्वच्छं जले । शुक्लभा-
स्वरं तेजसि ॥

रसनामात्रग्राह्यजातिमान्मनसः । स च मधुरतिक्तकटुकषायाऽम्ललव-
णभेदात्षड्विधः । षड्विधोऽपि रसः पृथिव्यामेव । मधुर एव जले ॥

प्राणमात्रग्राह्यजातिमान्गन्धः । स द्विविधः सुरभिरसुरभिश्च । द्विवि-
धोऽपि गन्धः पृथिव्यामेव ॥

त्वङ्मात्रग्राह्यजातिमान्स्पर्शः । स त्रिविधः शीतोष्णानुष्णशीतभेदात्
शीतो जल उष्णस्तेजस्यनुष्णशीतः पृथिवीवाय्वौ ॥

द्विविधायामपि पृथिव्यां रूपादयश्चत्वारोऽप्यनित्याः पाकजाश्च । तत्र
हि तेजःसंयोगात्पूर्वदयामादिनिवृत्तौ रक्ताद्युत्पाददर्शनात् । तत्रापि पूर्व-
रूपादिनाशकरूपाद्यन्तरोत्पादकः पाकः परमाणुष्वेवेति वैशेषिकमतम् ।
इद्यगुकाद्यवयविन्यपीति नैयायिकाः । जलतेजोवायुषु च नित्यगता रू-
पादयो नित्या अनित्यगताश्चानित्याः²⁶ । उद्भूतानुद्भूतभेदेनापि रूपादय-
श्चत्वारो द्विविधाः । प्राणरसनचक्षुस्त्वग्गदावनुद्भूताः । उद्भूतास्तु²⁷ योग्य-
पृथिव्याद्यारम्भकपरमाणुइद्यगुकत्र्यगुकादौ । चित्वाचित्रभेदेनापि ते द्वि-

a. A. B. omit स्मृत्यादौ. b. C. E. omit this clause. c. C. F. जातिमद्रूपम्;
and omit गुणपदं प्रभावारणाय. d. C. E. °कपिलचित्रभेदात् सतवि°. e. C. E. °सप्त°

विधा इत्यपि केचित् । नीलपीतादिमधुरतिक्तादिखुरभ्यखुरभ्यादिखु-
मारकठिनाद्यवयवारब्धपटादिषु चित्राः । अन्यत्राचित्राः^a ॥

गणनाव्यवहारासाधारणं कारणं संख्या । सा द्विविधैकानेकवृत्ति-
भेदात् । तत्रैकत्वमेकवृत्ति^b । तच्च नित्यगतं नित्यमनित्यगतमनित्य-
मेव । द्वित्वादिकमनेकवृत्ति । तच्च नानैकत्वविषयापेक्षाबुद्धिजन्यं तन्ना-
शनादयं चेत्यनित्यमेव^c । परमाणुद्व्यणुकादावतीन्द्रिये तु भगवदपेक्षाबु-
द्धिजन्यमदृष्टनाशनादयम्^d ॥

मानव्यवहारासाधारणं कारणं परिमाणम् । तच्चतुर्विधमणु ह्रस्वं
महद्दीर्घं चेति । अणुह्रस्वपरिमाणे परमाणुद्व्यणुकयोः । महद्दीर्घपरिमा-
णे^e त्र्यणुकचतुरणुकादौ^f । चतुर्विधमपि द्विविधं नित्यमनित्यं च ।
नित्यगतं नित्यमनित्यगतमनित्यम् । तन्निविधं संख्याजन्यं परिमा-
णजन्यं^g प्रचयजन्यं चेति । तत्र द्व्यणुकपरिमाणं परमाणुद्वित्वसंख्याज-
न्यं त्र्यणुकपरिमाणं च द्व्यणुकत्रित्वसंख्याजन्यम् । तन्नावयवगताणु-
परिमाणस्यासमवायित्वे तस्याणुतरत्वप्रसङ्गात् परिमाणस्य 'स्वसमा-
नजातीयोत्कृष्टजनकत्वनियमात्'^h । चतुरणुकादिपरिमाणं 'परिमाणज-
न्यमवयवगतमहत्त्वस्यैव तत्रासमवायित्वात् । तूलपिण्डपरिमाणं प्रच-
यजन्यम् । अवयवानां प्राशितिलः संयोगः प्रचयस्तस्यैव तत्रासमवा-
यित्वात्'ⁱ ॥

पृथग्व्यवहारासाधारणं कारणं पृथक्त्वम् । तदपि द्विविधमेका-
नेकवृत्तिभेदात् । तत्रैकपृथक्त्वमेकवृत्ति । इदं च नित्यगतं नित्यम-
नित्यगतमनित्यम्^j । द्विपृथक्त्वाद्यनेकवृत्ति । तच्च नानैकपृथक्त्वविष-
यापेक्षाबुद्धिजन्यं तन्नाशनादयम्^k ॥

संयुक्तव्यवहारासाधारणं कारणं संयोगः । स द्विविधः कर्मजः संयो-
गश्चेति । कर्मजोऽपि द्विविधोऽन्यतरकर्मज उभयकर्मजश्च । आद्यः

a. C. E. omit from तत्र हि तेजःसंयोगात्, &c., to अचित्राः. b. C. E. add
द्वित्वादिकमनेकवृत्ति तच्चापेक्षाबुद्धिजन्यं तन्नाशनादयम्. and omit from तच्च नित्यगतं,
&c., to 'नाशनादयम्'. c. A. B. C. E. omit from द्वित्वादि^o to 'नित्य-
मेव. d. C. E. घटपटादौ. e. A. प्रमाणः. f. D. omits स्व. g. A. प्रमाणः.
h. C. E. omit from चतुर्विधमपि द्विविधम् to 'समवायित्वात्. i. C. E. omit
from इदं च to 'नित्यम्. j. C. E. omit from तच्च to नादयम्.

श्येनशैलयोर्द्वितीयस्तु मेषयोर्मल्लयोर्वा । हस्ततरुसंयोगात्कायतरुसं-
योगः संयोगजः ॥

विभक्तव्यवहारासाधारणं कारणं विभागः । सोऽपि द्विविधः कर्मजो
विभागजश्चेति । कर्मजोऽपि द्विविधोऽन्यतरकर्मज उभयकर्मजश्चेति ।
आद्यः श्येनशैलयोर्द्वितीयस्तु मेषयोर्मल्लयोर्वा । हस्ततरुविभागात्कायतरु-
विभागो विभागजः³¹ । संख्यादयः पञ्च सर्वद्रव्यवृत्तयः ॥

परव्यवहारासाधारणं कारणं परत्वम् । अपरव्यवहारासाधारणं का-
रणमपरत्वम् । ते द्विविधे दिक्कृते कालकृते चेति । यो यदपेक्षया ज्ये-
ष्ठस्तत्र तदवधिकं परत्वं कालकृतम् । यो यदपेक्षया कनिष्ठस्तत्र तदव-
धिकमपरत्वं कालकृतम् । अत्र कालपिण्डसंयोगोऽसमवायी ज्येष्ठत्व-
कनिष्ठत्वज्ञानं निमित्तं तन्नाशश्च तन्नाशनिमित्तम्^a । एतेऽनित्यद्रव्य^b
एव । यो यदपेक्षया दूरस्थस्तत्र तदवधिकं परत्वं दिक्कृतम् । यो यदपे-
क्षया सनिहितस्तत्र तदवधिकमपरत्वं दिक्कृतम् । अत्र दिक्पिण्डसंयो-
गोऽसमवायी दूरत्वसंनिहितत्वज्ञानं निमित्तं तन्नाशश्च तन्नाशनिमि-
त्तम्^c । एते मूर्तद्रव्य^d एव ॥

बुद्धित्वसामान्यवती बुद्धिः³² । सा द्विविधा स्मृतिरनुभवश्च । संस्का-
रजन्य^e ज्ञानं स्मृतिः³³ । यथा सा^f मणिकर्णिका स विश्वेश्वर इत्यादि ।
तत्र पूर्वानुभवः कारणं संस्कारो व्यापारः । न च सोऽयं देवदत्त इति
प्रत्यभिज्ञायामतिव्याप्तिः । तत्र संस्कारजनिततत्ता^g स्मृतिरेवं हेतुर्न तु
संस्कारोऽपीत्यतिव्याप्तिविरहात् । स्मृतिभिन्नं ज्ञानमनुभवत्वं जातिमान्वा-
नुभवः^h । स द्विविधः प्रमाप्रमा चेति । प्रमाणाभासजन्योऽयथार्थानु-
भवोऽप्रमा । सोऽपि द्वेधा भ्रमसंशयभेदात् । विपरीतⁱ निर्णयो भ्रमः ।

- a. E. omits from अत्र to निमित्तम् and C. omits from अत्र to द्रव्य एव.
b. D. जन्यद्रव्य^o; E. जन्यद्रव्यमात्र^o. c. C. E. omit from अत्र to निमित्तम्.
d. E. 'द्रव्यमात्र^o'. e. C. E., here follows a description of गुरुत्व, द्रवत्व, स्नेह
and शब्द, but the order in the text and in A. B. D. F. is in accord-
ance with the *Vaisheshika Sutra*, vide note No. 4. f. A. B. D.
add अर्थप्रकाशो वा^o. g. A. B. C. E. read संस्कारमात्र^o. h. D. omits सा.
i. A. तन्नाश^o. j. C. E. omit from न च सोऽयं, &c. to विरहात् h. C. B.
omit अनुभवत्वजातिमान्वा. l. E. here adds स चतुर्विधः, &c., and proceeds
with a short explanation of प्रत्यक्ष, &c. m. E. विपर्ययज्ञानं भ्रमः.

यथा पीतः शङ्खः लोहितः स्फटिकः । एकस्मिन्धर्मिणि विरुद्धनानाको-
टिकं ज्ञानं संशयः । यथा दूरवर्तिन्युच्चैस्तरेऽयं स्थाणुर्वा पुरुषो वेति ।
यथार्थानुभवः प्रमा । फलवत्प्रवृत्तिजननयोग्यत्वं च यथार्थत्वम् । स्मृ-
त्यनुभवसाधारणं प्रमाकरणं प्रमाणम्⁵⁴ ॥

व्यापारवत्कारणं कारणम् । यथा छिदिक्रियां प्रति कुटारः । तज्ज-
न्यत्वे सति तज्जन्यजनको व्यापारः । यथा कुटारदारुसंयोगः । अन-
न्यथासिद्धनियतपूर्ववृत्ति^d कारणम्⁵⁵ । यथा तन्त्रादिकं पटस्य कपा-
लादिकं घटस्य । अन्यथासिद्धिशून्यमनन्यथासिद्धम् । अन्यथासिद्धि-
स्त्रिविधा । येन सहैव यस्य यं प्रति पूर्वभावोऽवगम्यते तेन तस्य तं
प्रत्यन्यथासिद्धिराद्या । यथा घटं प्रति दण्डेन दण्डरूपस्य दण्डत्वस्य च ।
दण्डेन सहैव दण्डरूपस्य दण्डत्वस्य वा घटं प्रति पूर्वभावग्रहात् । अन्यं
प्रति पूर्ववृत्तित्वे ज्ञात एव यस्य यं प्रति पूर्ववृत्तित्वं^e गृह्यते तं प्रति
तस्यान्यथासिद्धिर्द्वितीया । यथा घटं प्रत्याकाशस्य कुलालपितृश्च । आ-
काशस्य ह्याकाशत्वेन घटं प्रति पूर्ववृत्तित्वं^f ग्राह्यम् । आकाशत्वं च
शब्दसमवायिकारणत्वम् । तच्च शब्दनियतपूर्ववृत्ति^gत्वघटितम् । तथा
च शब्दं प्रति पूर्ववृत्तित्वे^h ज्ञात एव घटं प्रति पूर्ववृत्तिⁱत्वग्रहाद्वटं प्र-
त्याकाशोऽन्यथासिद्धः । एवं कुलालपितुरपि कुलालपितृत्वेन घटं प्रति
पूर्ववृत्तित्वं^j ग्राह्यम् । कुलालपितृत्वं च कुलालजनकपुंस्त्वम् । तच्च कु-
लालनियतपूर्ववृत्तित्वघटितम् । तथा च कुलालं प्रति पूर्ववृत्ति^kत्वे ज्ञात
एव घटं प्रति पूर्ववृत्ति^lत्वग्रहाद्वटं प्रति कुलालपितृत्वादन्यथासिद्धः । अन्यत्र
कृतनियतपूर्ववृत्ति^mन एव कार्यसंभवे तत्सहभूतत्वमन्यथासिद्धिस्तृतीया ।
यथा घटविशेषं प्रति दैवादागतरासभस्य । घटविशेषादन्यत्र घटान्तरे
कृतनियतपूर्ववृत्तिⁿदण्डचक्रादेरेव घटविशेषस्यापि संभवे दण्डचक्रादि-
सहभूतो दैवादागतरासभोऽन्यथासिद्धः । रासभसामान्यस्य घटसामान्यं प्र-
ति हेतुत्ववारणाय नियतपूर्ववृत्ति^oत्तियत्र नियतपदम् । तत्र यथोक्तान्य-
थासिद्धेरभावात् । न हि घटसामान्यादन्यत्र पटादौ कृतनियतपूर्ववृत्ति

a. E. omits दूरवर्तिन्युच्चैस्तरेयम्. b. C. E. omit the whole clause.
c. C. E. omit स्मृत्यनुभवसाधारणम्. d. F. वर्ति. e. F. वर्ति. f. F. वर्ति.
g. F. वर्तित्वं. h. F. वर्ति. i. F. वर्तित्वे. j. F. वर्तित्व. k. F. वर्तित्वं. l. F. वर्तित्व.
m. F. वर्तित्व. n. F. वर्तित्व. o. F. वर्तिन. p. F. वर्ति. q. F. वर्ति. r. A. °अन्यपटः.

तन्तुवेमादेर्घटसामान्यस्य संभवो येन यथोक्तान्यथासिद्धिः स्यात् । नि-
यतपूर्ववृत्तित्वं चाव्यवहितपूर्वकालावच्छेदेन कार्यदेशे सत्त्वम् । न चेदं
रासभसामान्येऽस्त्यतो नातिव्याप्तिरिति संक्षेपः ॥

तच्च कारणं त्रिविधं समवाय्यसमवायिनिमित्तभेदात् । तत्र यत्स-
मवेतं कार्यं^b तत्समवायिकारणम् । यथा तन्त्रः पटस्य कपालानि घ-
टस्य पटघटादिश्च^c स्वगतरूपादेः । समवायिकारणप्रत्यासन्नं^d कारणमस-
मवायिकारणम्^e । यथा तन्तुसंयोगः पटस्य । तस्य पटसमवायिकार-
णेषु तन्तुषु प्रत्यासन्नत्वात्कारणत्वाच्च । एवं तन्तुरूपादि पटरूपादेः ।
तस्यापि पटरूपादि समवायिकारणे पटे स्वाश्रयसमवेतत्वेन प्रत्यासन्न-
त्वात्कारणत्वाच्च । समवाय्यसमवायिकारणतातिरिक्तकारणतावन्निमि-
त्तकारणम् । यथा तुरीवेमादिकं पटस्य दण्डचक्रादिकं घटस्य ॥

तच्च प्रमाणं^f द्विविधं प्रत्यक्षानुमानभेदात् । शब्दादेश्वानुमानविध-
यैव प्रामाण्यमिति वैशेषिकमतम् । चतुर्विधमिति नैयायिकाः^g । तदुक्तं
सूत्रकृता—प्रत्यक्षानुमानोपमानशब्दाः प्रमाणानीति । प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणकरणं
प्रत्यक्षम् । तच्चेन्द्रियात्मकम् । इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षोत्पन्नं ज्ञानं प्रत्य-
क्षम्^h । तद्विविधं सविकल्पकनिर्विकल्पकभेदात् । विशेषणविशेष्य-
संबन्धावगाहि प्रत्यक्षं सविकल्पकम् । यथायं घट इत्यादि । विशेषण-
विशेष्यसंबन्धानवगाहि प्रत्यक्षं निर्विकल्पकम् । तच्च घटघटत्व इत्याका-
रकमतीन्द्रियम्ⁱ । न त्वत्र मानाभावः । तदसत्त्वे क्षुप्तोत्थितस्यायं घट
इति विशिष्टज्ञानं न स्याद्विशेषणीभूतस्य घटत्वस्याज्ञानात् । विशे-
षणज्ञानं विना विशिष्टज्ञानानुदयेन तस्य तद्धेतुत्वात् । प्रत्यक्षं^j पुनरपि
द्विविधं लौकिकालौकिकभेदात् । तत्र लौकिकप्रत्यक्षहेतुः सन्निकर्षः
षड्विधः । संयोगः संयुक्तसमवायः संयुक्तसमवेतसमवायः समवायः स-
मवेतसमवायो विशेषणता^k चेति । तत्र संयोगेन द्रव्यग्रहः । इह घटो-
ऽस्तीति चक्षुरादेर्घटादिना संयोगसत्त्वात् । एवं मनसा संयोगेनात्मग्रहो-
हमस्मीति^l । संयुक्तसमवायेन गुणकर्मद्रव्यगतजातिग्रहः^m । इह घटे

a. E. omits अव्यवहित. b. A. B. कार्यमुत्पद्यते. c. C. omits पटघटादिश्च, &c.
d. A. B. 'सन्नकार'. e. C. E. read तच्च प्रमाणं चतुर्विधम् । तदुक्तं, &c., and omit
the rest. f. C. E. इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षो द्विविधः. g. A. B. C. add 'विशेष्यता'.
h. C. E. omit एवं मनसा to इति. i. C. E. omit this. E. is extremely
incorrect at this point and is difficult to be followed.

रूपं चलनं द्रव्यत्वादिकमस्ति चक्षुरादिसंयुक्ते घटे रूपादीनां समवायात् । संयुक्तसमवेतसमवायेन गुणकर्मजातिग्रहः । घटगतरूपे रूपत्वादिकमस्ति घटगतचलने कर्मत्वादिकमस्तीति चक्षुरादिसंयुक्ते घटे समवेतं रूपादिचलनं च तत्र रूपत्वादेः कर्मत्वादेश्च समवायात् । समवायेन शब्दग्रहः । इह वीणाशब्दोस्तीति । कर्णशब्दकुल्यवच्छिन्नं नभः श्रोत्रम् । तत्र शब्दस्य समवायात् । समवेतसमवायेन शब्दत्वादियग्रहः । इह शब्दे^a शब्दत्वगुणत्वादिकमस्तीति श्रोत्रसमवेते शब्दे शब्दत्वादेः समवायात् । विशेषणतया समवायाभावयोर्ग्रहः । तथाहि । विशेषणता द्विविधा । इन्द्रियविशेषणतेन्द्रियसंबद्धविशेषणता चेति । तत्रेन्द्रियविशेषणतया शब्दसमवायस्य शब्दाभावस्य च ग्रहः । इह शब्दसमवायोऽस्तीह शब्दो नास्तीति श्रोत्रेन्द्रिये शब्दसमवायस्य शब्दाभावस्य च विशेषणत्वात् । इन्द्रियसंबद्धविशेषणतया घटादिसमवायस्य घटाभावस्य च ग्रहः । इह कपाले घटसमवायोऽस्तीह भूतले घटो नास्तीति चक्षुरादिसंयुक्ते कपाले घटसमवायस्य भूतले च घटाभावस्य विशेषणत्वात् । समवायस्य प्रत्यक्षवर्णनं न्यायमतेन । वैशेषिकमते तु समवायोऽस्तीन्द्रियः ॥

अलौकिकप्रत्यक्षे हेतुः संनिकर्षस्त्रिविधः । सामान्यलक्षणो ज्ञानलक्षणो योगजधर्मश्चेति¹¹ । एतत्त्रितयसंनिकर्षः षडिन्द्रियसहकारीति संप्रदायविदः । मनस एव सहकारीति शूलपाणिमिश्राः^b । तत्र सामान्यं ज्ञायमानमेव स्वाश्रयाणां संनिकर्षः । ज्ञायमानघटत्वसंनिकर्षेण^c घटा इत्याकारकं सकलघटानां प्रत्यक्षं मनसा^d जन्यते । ज्ञानलक्षणसंनिकर्षेण तु तद्विषयीभूततत्तत्पदार्थानां प्रत्यक्षं मनसा^e जन्यते । कथमन्यथा कविकाव्यमूलभूततत्तत्पदार्थसंसर्गज्ञानं । एवं सुरभि चन्दनमिति चाक्षुषे सौरभस्यापि भानं ज्ञानसंनिकर्षेण । सौरभस्य चक्षुरयोग्यत्वेन चक्षुःसंयुक्तचन्दनसमवायस्य तत्र सत्त्वेऽप्यप्रयोजकत्वात् । योगजधर्मसंनिकर्षेण च योगिनां वस्तुमात्रस्य प्रत्यक्षं मनसा^f जन्यते ॥

तच्च¹² प्रत्यक्षं षड्विधं प्राणरसनचक्षुःश्रोत्रत्वङ्गनोभेदात् । गन्धप्र-

a. D. omits शब्दे. b. C. omits एतत्त्रितय to मिश्रा; and F. reads एतत्त्रितयसंनिकर्षो मनस एव सहकारी. c. F. B. ज्ञायमानघटत्वेन संनिकर्षेण घट इ० d. A. C. D. omit मनसा. e. A. C. D. omit मनसा. f. A. C. D. omit मनसा.

त्यक्षासाधारणं कारणं प्राणम् । रसप्रत्यक्षासाधारणं कारणं रसनम् । रूप-
प्रत्यक्षासाधारणं कारणं चक्षुः । शब्दप्रत्यक्षासाधारणं कारणं श्रोत्रम् ।
सुखादिप्रत्यक्षासाधारणं कारणं मनः । प्राणादिलक्षणेऽसाधारणपदमा-
त्मादिवारणाय । गन्धादिप्रत्यक्षं च चन्दने सौरभं गुडे मधुरो रसो
घटे रक्तो वर्णी जले शीतस्पर्शो वने सिंहनादो मयि सुखमित्याद्याका-
रकम् । तत्र^b करणीभूतस्य प्राणादेर्व्यापारो प्राणादिमनःसंयोगो मन-
सस्त्वात्ममनःसंयोगः । न च ¹³प्राणादेर्गन्धादिप्रत्यक्षजनकत्वे परमाणुम-
ण्यादिगन्धादेशपि प्रत्यक्षं स्यादिति वाच्यम् । यतो गन्धादयो महत्त्वस-
मानाधिकरणोद्भूता एव प्राणादियोग्याः । परमाणुगन्धादयश्च न महत्त्व-
समानाधिकरणाः । मण्यादिगन्धादयश्च नोद्भूता इति न तत्प्रत्यक्षम् । एवं
भेर्यादिदेश^d उत्पन्नशब्दाद्वीचीतरंगन्यायेन कदम्बगोलकन्यायेन वा श्रोत्र-
देश उत्पन्नः शब्दः श्रोत्रयोग्यस्तस्यैव श्रोत्रसंबन्धसंभवात् । अत्र प्राण-
रसनश्रोत्राणि द्रव्याग्राहकाणि चक्षुस्त्वङ्मनांसि द्रव्याग्राहकाणि । महत्त्वो-
द्भूतरूपवद्द्रव्यं चक्षुषो योग्यम् । एवं महत्त्वोद्भूतस्पर्शवद्द्रव्यं त्वचो यो-
ग्यम् । अत एव परमाणुवायुपिशाचादयश्चक्षुषा न गृह्यन्ते पर-
माणौ महत्त्वाभावाद्वायौ रूपाभावात्पिशाचादानुद्भूतरूपाभावात् । अत
एव प्रभापि त्वचा न गृह्यते तत्रोद्भूतस्पर्शाभावात् । एवं योग्यद्रव्यसम-
वेता द्रव्यत्वादिसामान्यकर्मसंख्यापरिमाणपृथक्त्वसंयोगविभागपरत्वा-
परत्वद्रवत्वस्नेहवेगास्तत्समवायस्तदभावश्च चक्षुषस्त्वचोऽपि योग्याः ।
जीवात्मलक्षणं द्रव्यं मनोयोग्यं तत्समवेता आत्मत्वादिसामान्यबुद्धिसु-
खदुःखेच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नास्तत्समवायस्तदभावश्च मनोयोग्याः । येनेन्द्रियेण
यद्गृह्यते तेनेन्द्रियेण तद्वत्तं सामान्यं तत्समवायस्तदभावश्च गृह्यत इति
नियमादिति व्याख्यातं प्रत्यक्षम् ॥

अथानुमानं निरूप्यते । -अनुमितिकारणमनुमानम्⁴¹ । तच्च धूमो व-
ह्निव्याप्य इति व्याप्तिज्ञानम्⁴² । वह्निव्याप्यधूमवानयमिति तृतीयलिङ्गपरा-
मर्शो व्यापारः । तृतीयत्वं कथमस्येति चेदुच्यते । महानसादौ दृष्टान्ते

a. C. E. F. °पदं मनोवारणाय । मनोलक्षणे च तत्पदमात्मवारणाय । b. B. तत्त-
त्करणी°. A. तत्र कारणी°. c. A. B. C. omit मनः. d. C. omits भेर्यादिदेश
उत्पन्नशब्दान्. e. C. omits this clause. f. C. अनुमितिप्रमा°. g. C. E.
read very differently here.

वह्निधूमर्योर्भूयः सहचारदर्शनाद्व्याप्यत्वेन धूमज्ञानं प्रथमम् । ततः पर्व-
तादौ धूमं दृष्ट्वा व्याप्यत्वेन तत्स्मरणं द्वितीयम् । ततस्तत्रैव व्याप्यत्वेन
धूमस्य परामर्शो वह्निव्याप्यधूमवानयमित्येवं रूपो जायत इति तृतीय-
त्वं तस्येति बोध्यम् । लिङ्गज्ञानजन्यं लिङ्गज्ञानमनुमितिः । यथा पर्वता-
दौ धूमज्ञानानन्तरं पर्वतो वह्निमानिति ज्ञानम् । व्याप्तिपक्षधर्मतावल्लिङ्गम् ।
^{4.5} ननु केयं व्याप्तिरिति चेदुच्यते । अव्यभिचारितसाध्य^aसामानाधिकरण्यं
व्याप्तिः । अस्ति चेदं पर्वतो वह्निमान्धूमवत्त्वादित्यादिसद्देतौ यत्र यत्र
धूमस्तत्र तत्र^b वह्निरिति नियमस्य सत्त्वात् । नास्ति चेदं पर्वतो धूमवान्व-
ह्निमत्त्वादित्याद्यसद्देतौ यत्र यत्र वह्निस्तत्र तत्र धूम इति नियमस्यास-
त्त्वात् । तत्रायः^cपिण्डे वह्निस^dत्वेऽपि धूमासत्त्वात् । व्यभिचारज्ञानविरह-
सहकृतं हेतुसाध्यसहचारदर्शनं व्याप्तिग्राहकम् । कथमेतदिति चेदित्थम्^e ।
हेतोः साध्याभाववद्भूतित्वं व्यभिचारस्तज्ज्ञाने सति व्याप्तिग्राहभावात्तद-
भावस्तत्र कारणम् । हेतुसाध्यसहचारदर्शनं त्वन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां तत्र
कारणम् । का पुनः पक्षधर्मता^{4.6} । पक्षाश्रयवृत्तित्वं पक्षधर्मता पक्षता^fचा-
नुमित्साविरहविशिष्टसाध्यनिश्चयाभावः । अस्ति चेदं पर्वतादौ पक्षेऽनु-
मित्साविरहविशिष्टसाध्यनिश्चयस्य^h तत्राभावात्पर्वतादौ साध्यनिश्चये स-
त्यपि सत्यां चानुमित्सायां पर्वतो वह्निमान्धूमादित्यनुमानसंभवात् । तत्र
पक्षतासंपत्तयेऽनुमित्साविरहविशिष्टत्वं साध्यनिश्चयविशेषणम् । तथा चा-
नुमित्साविरहविशिष्टसाध्यनिश्चयस्य तत्राभावात्पक्षता ॥

तच्चानुमानं त्रिविधम्^{4.7} । केवलान्वयि केवलव्यतिरेक्यन्वयव्यतिरे-
कि चेति । यत्रान्वयव्याप्तिरेवास्ति तत्केवलान्वयि । यथा घटोऽभिधेयः
प्रमेयत्वादिति । अत्र घटः पक्षस्तस्याभिधेयत्वं साध्यम् । प्रमेयत्वं हेतुः ।
तस्मिन्यत्र यत्र प्रमेयत्वं तत्र तत्राभिधेयत्वं यथा पटः^g इत्यन्वयव्या-
प्तिरेवास्ति । न तु यत्र यत्र साध्याभावस्तत्र तत्र हेत्वभाव इति व्यतिरे-
कव्याप्तिः । अभिधेयस्य प्रमेयत्वस्य च सर्वत्र^h सत्त्वात्साध्याभावादेरेवा-
प्रसिद्धत्वात् । यत्र व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिरेवास्ति तत्केवलव्यतिरेकि । यथा

a. A. B. om. साध्य. b. D. reads this clause after °इत्यायसद्देतौ.
c. A. B. नियमत्वात्. d. A. तथायः. e. A. B. मत्त्वे. f. D. उच्यते. g. A. B.
C. om. चा. h. A. °स्तेतरत्रा°. i. A. B. C. E. °विशिष्टसाध्य°. j. A. घट.
k. C. E. om. अभिधेयस्य.....सत्त्वात्.

जीवच्छरीरं^a सात्मकं प्राणादिमत्त्वादित्यादि । अत्र जीवच्छरीरं पक्ष-
स्तस्य सात्मकत्वं साध्यं प्राणादिमत्त्वं हेतुस्तस्मिन् यत्र सात्मक-
त्वाभावस्तत्र तत्र प्राणादिमत्त्वाभावो यथा घटादाविति व्यतिरेकव्याप्ति-
रेवास्ति । न तु यत्र यत्र प्राणादिमत्त्वं तत्र सात्मकत्वमित्यन्वयव्याप्ति-
र्दृष्टान्ताभावाज्जीवच्छरीरमात्रस्य पक्षीकरणात् । अन्यत्र च हेतुसाध्य-
योरेवासत्त्वात्^b । यत्रान्वयव्याप्तिर्व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिश्च निगद्यते तदन्वयव्य-
तिरेकि । यथा पर्वतो वह्निमान्धूमादित्यादि । अत्र च पर्वतः पक्षस्तस्य
वह्निमत्त्वं साध्यं धूमादिति हेतुस्तस्मिन् यत्र यत्र धूमस्तत्र तत्र
वह्निर्यथा महानसादाविडित्यन्वयव्याप्तिः । एवं^c यत्र यत्र वह्न्यभा-
वस्तत्र तत्र धूमाभावो यथा जलमहाद्गदादाविति व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिश्चा-
स्ति । अन्वये साधनं व्याप्यं साध्यं व्यापकमित्येते । साध्याभावोऽन्य-
था^d व्याप्यो व्यापकः साधनात्ययः । व्याप्यस्य वचनं पूर्वं व्यापकस्य
ततः परम् । एवं परीक्षिता व्याप्तिः स्फुटीभवति तत्त्वत इति । त्रयाणां
मध्ये योऽन्वयव्यतिरेकी स पञ्चरूपोपपन्न^e एव स्वसाध्यं साधयति ।
तानि पञ्चरूपाणि । पक्षधर्मत्वम् । सपक्षे सत्त्वम् । विपक्षाद्व्यावृत्तिः । अबा-
धितविषयत्वम् । असत्प्रतिपक्षत्वं चेति । पक्षताश्रयवृत्तित्वं पक्षधर्मत्वम् ।
निश्चितसाध्यवान्सपक्षः । तत्र विद्यमानत्वं सपक्षसत्त्वम् । निश्चितसा-
ध्याभाववान्विपक्षः । तत्राविद्यमानत्वं विपक्षाद्व्यावृत्तिः^f । प्रमाणान्त-
रेणाप्रमितसाध्याभावकत्वमबाधितविषयत्वम् । साध्याभावसाधकहे-
त्वन्तरशून्यत्वमसत्प्रतिपक्षत्वम् । एतानि पञ्चरूपाणि वह्निसाधकधू-
मादावन्वयव्यतिरेकिणि विद्यन्ते । केवलान्वयिनि विपक्षाद्व्यावृत्ति-
र्नास्ति विपक्षाप्रसिद्धेः । केवलव्यतिरेकिणि सपक्षे सत्त्व नास्ति
सपक्षासिद्धेः ॥

त्रिविधमप्यनुमानं द्विविधम् । स्वार्थं परार्थं चेति । स्वस्यैवानुमिति-
हेतुः स्वार्थम् । स्वयं धूमादग्निमनुमाय परं बोधयितुं पञ्चावयवोपेतमनु-
मानवाक्यं प्रयुङ्क्ते तत्परार्थम्^g । पञ्चावयवास्तु प्रतिज्ञाहेतूदाहरणोपन-
यनिगमनानि । तत्र पक्षे साध्यनिर्देशः प्रतिज्ञा । यथा पर्वतो वह्निमा-

^a. A. जीवशरीरम् for जीवच्छरीरम् throughout. ^b. D. omits from जीवच्छ-
रीरं to सत्त्वात्; and C. from अन्यत्र to सत्त्वात्. ^c. A. om. एवम्. ^d. A. B.
अन्यत्र. ^e. A. °वृत्तित्वं प्रमाण°. ^f. A. °भावत्वम्°. ^g. D. परार्थानुमानम्.

निति । पञ्चम्यन्तं हेतुप्रतिपादकं वाक्यं हेत्ववयवः । यथा धूमादिति ।
व्याप्तिप्रतिपादकं वचनमुदाहरणम् । यथा यो यो धूमवान्स स वह्नि-
मान् यथा महानस इति । व्याप्तिविशिष्टस्य हेतोः पक्षधर्मताप्रतिपादकं
वचनमुपनयः । यथा वह्निव्याप्यधूमवांश्चायमिति । अबाधितत्वासत्य-
तिपक्षितत्वतात्पर्यकं वाक्यं निगमनं यथा तस्माद्वह्निमानिति । तथा^a
चायमित्युपनयस्य तस्मात्तथेति निगमनस्य शरीरमिति प्राञ्चः । व्य-
तिरेकिणि प्रतिज्ञाहेतू तुल्यावेवोदाहरणोपनयनिगमनानि तु भिद्यन्ते ।
यथा जीवच्छरीरं सात्मकं प्राणादिमत्त्वादित्यत्र यत्सात्मकं न भवति
तत्प्राणादिमन्न भवति यथा घटः । न चेदं जीवच्छरीरं प्राणादिमन्न
भवति तस्मान्न तथेति ॥

अथ हेत्वाभासाः—अनुमितितत्करण्यतरप्रतिबन्धकज्ञानविषय-
धर्मो हेत्वाभासत्वोपाधिस्तद्वान्हेत्वाभासः⁴⁹ । ते चानैकान्तिकविरु-
द्धसत्यतिपक्षासिद्धवाधिताः पञ्च । तत्र सव्याभिचारो नैकान्तिकः । स⁵⁰
त्रिविधः साधारणोऽसाधारणोऽनुपसंहारी चेति । तत्र सपक्षविपक्षवृत्तिः
साधारणः । यथा पर्वतो धूमवान्वह्नेरिति । वह्निर्हि सपक्षे महानसे वि-
पक्षे तत्प्रायःपिण्डे च वर्ततेऽतः साधारणः । एतज्ज्ञानं च विपक्षवृत्तित्व-
रूपव्याभिचारविषयकत्वाद्वाच्यमभिचारज्ञानविषया^c व्याप्तिग्रहे प्रतिबन्ध-
कम् । व्याभिचारज्ञाने सति व्याप्तिग्रहानुदयस्य सुप्रसिद्धत्वात् । सपक्षवि-
पक्षव्यावृत्तत्वे सति पक्षवृत्तिरसाधारणः । यथा शब्दो नित्यः शब्दत्वा-
दिति । शब्दत्वं हि सपक्षाद्गनादेर्विपक्षाच्च घटादेर्व्यावृत्तं पक्षे शब्दे च
वर्तते इत्यसाधारणम् । एतज्ज्ञानं च साक्षादनुमितिप्रतिबन्धकम् । क-
थमिति चेदित्थम् । शब्दत्वं हि नान्वयी हेतुर्वृष्टान्ताभावात् । किं तु
व्यतिरेकी । तथा च यो हेतुर्यद्धर्मवतो^d व्यावृत्तः स स्वाश्रये तद्धर्मा-
भावं^e साधयति । यथा धूमो वह्न्यभाववतो जलहृदादेर्व्यावृत्तः स्वाश्र-
ये पर्वतादौ वह्न्यभावभावं वह्निं^f साधयति । तथा शब्दत्वं नित्यत्वव-
तो गगनादेः सपक्षाद्वावृत्तमिति स्वाश्रये शब्दे नित्यत्वाभावमनित्यत्वं
साधयेत् । एवं नित्यत्वाभाववतो घटादेर्विपक्षाद्वावृत्तमिति स्वाश्रये

a. A. यथा. b. E. F. °तोपाधिः. c. C. विषयतया. d. A. B. D. यो यद्धतो
व्यावृत्तः. e. A. B. D. तदभावम्. f. A. B. D. om. वह्निम्.

शब्दे नित्यत्वाभावाभावं^a नित्यत्वमपि साधयेत् । न चैकत्र शब्दे नित्यत्वानित्यत्वयोः संभवस्तयोर्विरोधात्^b । तस्माच्छब्दत्वेऽसाधारणत्वज्ञाने सति न साध्यानुमितिरिति । वस्तुमात्रपक्षकोनुपसंहारी । यथा सर्व नित्यं प्रमेयत्वादिति । अत्र सर्वस्यैव पक्षत्वात्प्रमेयत्वं हेतुरनुपसंहारी । एतज्ज्ञानमपि व्याप्तिग्रहे प्रतिबन्धकम् । सर्वस्य पक्षत्वे व्याप्तिग्राहकसहचारदर्शनस्थलाभावेन सहचारनिश्चयाभावे सति व्याप्तेरनिश्चयात् । साध्याभावव्याप्तौ हेतुर्विरुद्धः^c । यथायं गौरद्वत्वादिति । अत्र च यत्र यत्राद्वत्वं तत्र तत्र गोत्वाभाव इति साध्याभावव्याप्तेः सत्त्वादद्वत्वं हेतुर्विरुद्धः । एतज्ज्ञानं च साक्षादनुमितिप्रतिबन्धकं^d पक्षे गोत्वाभावव्याप्याद्वत्त्ववत्ताज्ञाने सति गोत्वनिश्चयासंभवात् । साध्याभावसाधकहेत्वन्तरं प्रतिपक्षः । तद्वान्तप्रतिपक्षः । यथा पर्वतो वह्निमान्धूमान्महानसवत् । स वह्न्यभाववान्पाषाणमयत्वात्कुड्यवदिति । अत्र च द्वयोरपि हेत्वोः परस्परसाध्याभावसाधकत्वान्निमित्तः सत्यप्रतिपक्षत्वम् । एतज्ज्ञानं च साक्षादनुमितिप्रतिबन्धकम् । वह्निव्याप्यधूमवान्वह्न्यभावव्याप्यापाषाणमयत्ववांश्च पर्वत इति द्विविधपरामर्शे सत्येकस्मादप्यनुमितेरभावात्परस्परं प्रतिबन्धात् । परामर्शप्रतिबन्धकज्ञानविषयधर्मोऽसिद्धिस्तद्वानसिद्धः^e । स त्रिविधः । आश्रयासिद्धः स्वरूपासिद्धो व्याप्यत्वासिद्धश्चेति । तत्र पक्षतावच्छेदकाभाववत्पक्षक आश्रयासिद्धः । यथा गगनारविन्दं सुरभ्यरविन्दत्वात्सरोजारविन्दवदिति । अत्र चारविन्दे पक्षे गगनीयत्वं पक्षतावच्छेदकं^f नास्तीत्यरविन्दत्वं हेतुराश्रयासिद्धः । एतज्ज्ञानं परामर्शप्रतिबन्धकम् । अरविन्दे गगनीयत्वं नास्तीति ज्ञाने सुरभित्वव्याप्यारविन्दत्ववद्गगनारविन्दमिति परामर्शासंभवात् । एतस्यारविन्दे गगनीयत्वसंबन्धावगाहित्वात् । पक्षनिष्ठाभावप्रतियोगी स्वरूपासिद्धः । यथा हृदो द्रव्यं धूमादिति । अत्र च पक्षे दे धूमस्याभावोऽस्तीति धूमो हेतुः स्वरूपासिद्धः । एतज्ज्ञानमपि परा-

^a. A. नित्यत्वाभावम्. B. अनित्यत्वाभावम्. D. om. एवं नित्यत्वाभाववतो घटादे^o to नित्यत्वमपि साधयेत्. E. C. साध्याभावाभावम्. ^b. C. E. प्रतियोग्यभावयोरैकत्र विरोधात्. ^c. C. E. निश्चायक. ^d. A. B. D. F. om. पक्षे. ^e. A. D. F. व्याप्या. ^f. A. B. D. F. om. पाषाणमयत्वं. ^g. A. °वच्छेदके. ^h. A. °नीयत्वहेत्वसं^o D. °नीयसं^o.

मर्शप्रतिबन्धकम् । हृदे धूमो नास्तीति ज्ञाने सति द्रव्यत्वव्याप्यधूमवान्-
द इति परामर्शसंभवात् । एतस्य हृदे धूमसंबन्धावगाहित्वात् । व्या-
प्यतावच्छेदकाभाववान्हेतुर्व्याप्यत्वासिद्धः । यथा पर्वतो वह्निमान्काञ्च-
नमयधूमादिति । अत्र च धूमे व्याप्यत्वावच्छेदकत्वेनाभिमतं काञ्चनम-
यत्वं नास्तीति धूमो हेतुर्व्याप्यत्वासिद्धः । एतज्ज्ञानमपि परामर्शप्रति-
बन्धकम् । धूमे काञ्चनमयत्वं नास्तीति ज्ञाने सति वह्निव्याप्यकाञ्चनम-
यधूमवान्पर्वत इति परामर्शसंभवात् । एतस्य धूमे काञ्चनमयत्वसंब-
न्धावगाहित्वात् । साध्याभाववत्पक्षको वाधितः^{५३} । यथा वह्निरनुष्णः पदा-
र्थत्वाज्जलवदिति । अत्र च वन्तौ पक्षेऽनुष्णत्वाभावस्योष्णत्वस्य त्वगि-
न्द्रियेण निश्चयात्पदार्थत्वं हेतुर्वाधितः । एतज्ज्ञानं साक्षादनुमितिप्रतिब-
न्धकम् । वह्नावनुष्णत्वं नास्तीति ज्ञाने सति वह्निरनुष्ण इत्यनुमितेरसं-
भवात्तदभावलौकिकनिर्णयस्य तद्वत्ताज्ञाने प्रतिबन्धकत्वात् । इति
हेत्वाभासाः ॥

ननूपाधेरपि हेतुदोषत्वात्सोपाधिकोऽपि हेत्वाभासोऽस्तीति कथं पञ्चै-
व त इति चेन्न । व्यभिचारादिज्ञानस्यैवोपाधिज्ञानस्यानुमितितत्करणान्य-
तरप्रतिबन्धकताभावेनोपाधेर्हेतुदोषत्वाभावात् । कथं तर्हि वाय्वनुमान
उपाधिरुपन्यस्यत इति चेद्व्यभिचारज्ञानप्रयोजकत्वेन तत्र तदुपन्या-
सः । अथ कोऽयमुपाधिरिति^{५४} चेदुच्यते । साध्यव्यापकत्वे सति
साधनाव्यापक^{५५}उपाधिः । यथा धूमवान्वह्नेरित्यत्रार्द्रेन्धनम् । भवति च
तत्साध्यस्य धूमस्य व्यापकं यत्र यत्र धूमस्तत्र तत्रार्द्रेन्धनमिति सत्त्वा-
त् । भवति च साधनस्य^{५६} वह्नेरव्यापकं यत्र वह्निस्तत्रार्द्रेन्धनमित्यस-
त्त्वात् । तत्रायःपिण्डे वह्निसत्त्वेऽप्यार्द्रेन्धनाभावात् । एवं यागीया पशु-
हिंसाधर्मसाधनं हिंसात्वात्क्रतुबाह्यहिंसावदित्यत्र निषिद्धत्वमुपाधिः ।
भवति च तदधर्मसाधनस्य^{५७} साध्यस्य व्यापकं यत्र यत्रार्द्रधर्मसाध-
नत्वं तत्र तत्र निषिद्धत्वमिति सत्त्वात्साधनत्वस्य हिंसात्वस्याव्यापकं
यत्र यत्र हिंसात्वं तत्र तत्र निषिद्धत्वमित्यसत्त्वात् । पक्षीकृतहिंसायां
हिंसात्वसत्त्वेऽपि निषिद्धत्वस्यासत्त्वात् । एवं गर्भस्थो मित्रातनयः श्यामो

a. E. om. लौकिक. b. A. °कत्वमुपाधिः. c. E. omits from भवति च तत्सा-
ध्यस्य &c. to इति सत्त्वात् d. E. साधनवह्नेः. e. A. °त्वम् । साध्य°. D. °न त्वसाध्य°. f. E. om. from साधनत्वस्य &c. to निषिद्धत्वस्यासत्त्वात्.

मित्रातनयत्वाद्दृश्यमानमित्रातनयषट्त्वदित्यत्र शाकपाकजत्वमुपाधिः ।
न च श्यामत्वस्य काकादौ सत्त्वे शाकपाकजत्वाभावात्साध्याव्या-
पकत्वं काकादिव्यावृत्तदयामत्वस्यैवात्र साध्यत्वात्^b । इत्यनुमाननि-
रूपणम् ॥

अथोपमानं निरूप्यते ।—तत्रोपमितिकरणमुपमानम् । तच्च सादृ-
श्यज्ञानात्मकम् । उपमितित्वजातिमित्युपमितिः । कथमियमुत्पद्यत
इति चेदुच्यते । गवयमजानन्कश्चिन्नागरिकः कंचिद्वनेचरं कीदृशो
गवयपदवाच्य इति पृच्छति । ततस्तेनोक्तो गोसदृशो गवयपदवा-
च्य इत्युत्तरितः स कदाचिद्वनं गतो गोसदृशं पिण्डं पश्यन्प्रागुक्ता-
तिदेशवाक्यार्थं स्मृत्वासौ गवयपदवाच्य इति प्रतिपद्यते सोपमितिः ।
अत्र गोसादृश्यज्ञानं करणम् । अतिदेशवाक्यार्थस्मरणं व्यापारः । इत्यु-
पमाननिरूपणम् ॥

अथ शब्दो निरूप्यते ।—शब्दप्रमाकरणज्ञानविषयः शब्दः⁵⁵ । यथा
गदीतीरे पञ्च फलानि सन्तीत्यादि । वाक्यार्थगोचरं यथार्थज्ञानं शब्द-
प्रमा । अत्र^d पदज्ञानं करणम् । पदजन्यपदार्थोपस्थितिर्व्यापारः । पदोप-
स्थितानां मिथः संसर्गो वाक्यार्थः । पदसमूहो वाक्यम् । अर्थवाचकं^e
पदम् । तद्विविधं मुख्यगौणभेदात् । यच्छक्तिवृत्त्या यमर्थमुपस्थाप-
यति तत्तस्मिन्नर्थे मुख्यम् । यथा गोघटादिव्यक्त्युपस्थापकं गोघटादि-
पदम् । अस्माच्छब्दादयमर्थो बोद्धव्य इत्याकारकोज्जादिसंकेतः शक्तिः ।
यल्लक्षणावृत्त्या यमर्थमुपस्थापयति तत्तस्मिन्नर्थे गौणं लाक्षणिकमित्युच्य-
ते । यथा गङ्गायां घोष इत्यत्र तीरोपस्थापकं गङ्गापदम् । शक्यसंबन्धो ल-
क्षणा । यथा गङ्गापदशक्यप्रवहज्जलौघस्य तीरे संयोगसंबन्धो गङ्गापदल-
क्षणा । तस्य च शब्दस्याकाङ्क्षायोग्यतासंनिधयः सहकारिणः । यस्य
पदस्य येन पदेन विनान्वयानुभवजनकत्वं नास्ति तस्य पदस्य तेन पदेन
समभिव्याहारः आकाङ्क्षा⁵⁶ । घटमानयेत्यादौ कारकपदस्य क्रियापदेन

a. E. नरविशिष्टमित्रा°. b. B. E. om. from न च श्यामत्वस्य &c. to साध्यत्वात्.

c. E. and C. read quite differently the whole subject of उपमान. d. C. omits from अत्र पद to गङ्गापदलक्षणा and agrees with B. e. E. प्रतिपादकम्.

B. शक्तं लाक्षणिकम् । गङ्गायां घोष इत्यादौ गङ्गापदं तीरे लाक्षणिकम् । गङ्गापदश-
क्यप्रवहत्°. g. A. D. हारादा°.

विना घटकर्मकमित्यन्वयानुभवजनकत्वाभावात्कारकपदस्य क्रियापदेन
 सहाकाङ्क्षा । एवं क्रियापदस्य कारकपदेनापि सह बोध्या । अत एव
 गौरवः पुरुषो हस्तीत्यादौ नान्वयबोध आकाङ्क्षुविरहात् । एकपदार्थ-
 उपरपदार्थसंसर्गो योग्यता । यथा पयसा सिञ्चतीत्यादौ पयःपदार्थे सेक-
 संसर्गस्य कार्यकारणभावलक्षणस्य सत्त्वाद्योग्यता । अत एव वह्निना सि-
 ञ्चतीत्यादौ नान्वयबोधो योग्यताविरहात् । पदानामव्यवधानं संनिधिः ।
 यथा गामानयेत्यादौ पदानामविलम्बेनोच्चारणात्संनिधिः । अत एवैकैकशः
 प्रहरे प्रहरेऽसहोच्चारिते गामानयेत्यादौ नान्वयबोधः संनिधेरभावात् ।
 सोऽयं शब्दस्त्रिविधो विधिनिषेधार्थवादभेदात् । तत्र प्रवृत्तिपरं वाक्यं
 विधिः^a । यथा ज्योतिष्टोमेन स्वर्गकामो यजेतौदनकामस्तण्डुलं पचे-
 तेत्यादि । ज्योतिष्टोमनामको यागः स्वर्गरूपेष्टसाधनं तण्डुलकर्मकपाक
 ओदनरूपेष्टसाधनमित्युभयवाक्यार्थः । यजेत पचेतेत्यादिविधिप्रत्ययेनेष्ट-
 साधनत्वोपस्थापनात् । निवृत्तिपरं^b वाक्यं निषेधः । यथा न कलञ्जं भ-
 क्षयेदिति । कलञ्जभक्षणं नेष्टविशेषसाधनमित्यर्थः । इष्टविशेषश्चात्र
 पापानुत्पत्तिरेव । तथैव वाक्यतात्पर्यात् । विधिनिषेधभिन्नः शब्दोऽर्थवादः ।
 यथादित्यो यूषं^c इत्यादिः । स चायं शब्दो लोके वेदे च समानः । इयां-
 स्तु विशेषः किञ्चिदेव लौकिकं वाक्यं प्रमाणं यदाप्तोक्तं वेदवाक्यं तु सर्व-
 मपि प्रमाणं परमात्मेन भगवता कृतत्वात् । इति शब्दनिरूपणम् ॥

अर्थापत्तिस्तु^d न प्रमाणान्तरम् । पीनो देवदत्तो दिवा न भुङ्क्त इति
 दृष्टे श्रुते वा दिवाभोजिनो रात्रिभोजनमन्तरेण पीनत्वमनुपपन्नमिति
 ज्ञानानन्तरं देवदत्तो रात्रौ भुङ्क्त इति निर्णयते तस्य व्यतिरेकिसाध्य-
 त्वात् । तथा हि । देवदत्तो रात्रौ भुङ्क्ते दिवाभुञ्जानत्वे सति पीनत्वात् ।
 यस्तु रात्रौ न भुङ्क्ते स दिवाभुञ्जानत्वे सति पीनोऽपि न भवति । यथा
 दिवा रात्रौ चाभोजीति । अर्थापत्तिरित्यपि व्यतिरेकिण एव नामान्तर-
 मिति । घटोपलब्धौ घटाभावाग्रहात्प्रतियोग्यनुपलब्धिर्भावग्रहे^e प्रत्य-

^a. E. C. बलवदनिष्टाननुबन्धित्वेष्टसाधनत्वाभिधायकप्रत्ययघटितं वाक्यं विधिः and so forth. ^b. E. C. नञ्घटितं वा^o and omitting from यथा न कलञ्जं, &c., to तात्पर्यात् read इह भूतले घटो नास्तीत्यादौ लौकिको निषेधः. ^c. A. B. add अग्नि-
 हिमस्य मेषजम् वज्रहस्तः पुरंदरः. and E. reads for the whole यजमानः प्रस्तरः सिंहो
 माणवक इत्यादि. ^d. C. E omit from अर्थापत्तिस्तु, &c., to ^oआयजलज्ञानवदिति.

क्षस्यैव सहकारिणी नतु प्रमाणान्तरं प्रत्यक्षेणैवाभावग्रहोपपत्तेः । अन्य-
थेह घटो नास्तीति निर्णयानन्तरमिह घटाभावं साक्षात्करोमीति प्रती-
त्यनुपपत्तेः ॥

प्रामाण्यं स्वतो ग्राह्यं परतो वेति विचार्यते^{५३a} । दूरात्प्रत्यक्षेण जला-
दिज्ञाने जाते तत्र स्वत एव यथार्थज्ञानत्वरूपप्रामाण्यमवधार्य जलार्था
प्रवर्तते ज्ञानग्रहे^{५३} तद्वत्प्रामाण्यस्यापि ग्रहात्प्रामाण्यस्य यावज्ज्ञानग्राहक-
ग्राह्यत्वरूपस्वतस्त्वोपगमादिति मीमांसकास्तन्न । स्वत एव प्रामाण्यग्रहे
ज्ञानग्रहानन्तरं कचिज्जातं मे जलज्ञानं प्रमा न वेति प्रामाण्यसंशयो न
स्यान्निश्चिते संशयायोगात् । न च संशयस्थले ज्ञानग्रहोऽपि नास्तीति वा-
च्यम् । ज्ञानाग्रहे ज्ञानधर्मिकप्रामाण्यतदभावकोटिकसंशयानुपपत्तेः । संशये
धर्मिज्ञानस्य हेतुत्वात् । न हि पुरोर्वर्तिन्युच्चैस्तरे धर्मिण्यज्ञातेऽयं स्थाणुः
पुरुषो वेति संशयो भवति । तस्माज्ज्ञाने परत एव प्रामाण्यमवधार्यते ।
तथा हि । अनभ्यासदशापन्नजलादिज्ञाने जाते तत्र प्रामाण्यसंशये सत्य-
पि पुरुषः प्रवर्तते । ततो जलप्रतिलम्भे सति जातं मे^{५३} जलज्ञानं प्रमा
समर्थप्रवृत्तिजनकत्वात् । यत्प्रमा न भवति तत्समर्थप्रवृत्तिजनकं न
भवति । यथा जलभ्रम इति व्यतिरेकेणानभ्यासदशापन्नज्ञानप्रामाण्यं
निश्चीयत इति । अभ्यासदशापन्नजलादिज्ञानेषु प्रवृत्तेः पूर्वमप्यन्वयिना
प्रामाण्यमवधार्यते । तत्रैव द्वितीयादिजलज्ञानं प्रमा समर्थप्रवृत्तिजनक-
जातीयत्वादाद्यजलज्ञानवदिति ॥

धर्मप्रभवं सुखम्^{५३} । अधर्मप्रभवं दुःखम् ॥ इच्छात्वसामान्यवतीच्छा ।
सापि द्वेधा फलविषयिणी तत्साधनविषयिणी चेति । सुखं दुःखाभावश्च
फलम् । तदिच्छां प्रति फलज्ञानमात्रं^{५३} कारणम् । साधनेच्छां प्रति तु फ-
लसाधनताज्ञानं कारणम्^{५३} ॥ द्वेषत्वसामान्यवान्प्रज्वलनात्मको वा द्वे-
षः । स द्विविधः दुःखविषयस्तत्साधनविषयश्च । दुःखद्वेषं प्रति दुःखज्ञा-
नमात्रं कारणम्^{५३} । साधनद्वेषं प्रति तु दुःखसाधनताज्ञानं कारणम्^{५३} ॥ प्रय-
त्नत्वसामान्यवानुत्साहरूपश्च प्रयत्नः । स त्रिविधः प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिजीव-

a. D. F. omit this clause. b. D. F. °त्वस्वरू°. c. D. °ग्रहे तु तद्वत्°. d. A.
ते. e. C. E. सुखसाधनभिन्नत्वे सति धर्मे° and also दुःखसाधनभिन्नत्वे सति अधर्मे°.
f. C. E. उपायज्ञान°. g. C. E. कारणम्. h. C. E. कारणम्. i. j. C. E. कारणम्.

नयोनिभेदात् । चिकीर्षाजन्यो यत्नः प्रवृत्तिः । द्वेषसाधनताज्ञानजन्यो यत्नो निवृत्तिः । द्वासप्रदवासहेतुर्यत्नो जीवनयोनिः । स चातीन्द्रियः ॥ बुद्धीच्छाप्रयत्ना आत्ममात्रसमवेताः । तत्रेश्वरगता नित्या जीवगता अनित्याः^b ॥ आद्यपतनासमवायिकारणं गुरुत्वम्^c । तच्च भूजलमात्रवृत्तिः । आद्यस्यन्दनासमवायिकारणं द्रवत्वम् । तद्विविधं सांसिद्धिकं नैमित्तिकं चेति । अग्निसंयोगानपेक्ष्यं द्रवत्वं सांसिद्धिकम् । तज्जलमात्रवृत्तिः । अग्निसंयोगापेक्ष्यं द्रवत्वं नैमित्तिकम् । तद्वृत्तादिरूपायां भुवि सुवर्णादिरूपे च तेजसि तदुभयत्रैव वह्निसंयोगाद्भवत्वोत्पत्तेः ॥ स्नेहत्वजातिमांश्विकण्ठारूपः स्नेहः । स च जलमात्रवृत्तिः । चणकचूर्णादिव्यङ्ग्यः । घृततैलादौ स्नेहोपलम्भस्तु जलोपाधिकः ॥ गुरुत्वद्रवत्वस्नेहाः परमाणुगता नित्याः कार्यगता अनित्याः ॥ श्रोत्रग्राह्यो गुणः शब्दः । स त्रिविधः संयोगजो विभागजः शब्दजश्चेति । भेर्यामभिहन्यमानायां यः शब्दः स संयोगजः । तत्र भेर्याकाशसंयोगोऽसमवायिकारणम् । भेरीदण्डसंयोगो निमित्तकारणम् । वंश उत्पाट्यमाने यश्चटचटाशब्दः स विभागजः । तत्र वंशदलद्वयाकाशविभागोऽसमवायिकारणम् । वंशदलद्वयविभागो निमित्तकारणम् । वीचीतरंगन्यायेन कदम्बगोलकन्यायेन वा ये द्वितीयादयः शब्दास्ते शब्दजाः^d । तत्रोत्तरोत्तरशब्दे पूर्वपूर्वशब्दोऽसमवायिकारणम् । अनुकूलवातादिकं निमित्तकारणम् । पुनरपि शब्दो द्विविधो वर्णात्मको ध्वनिश्च । ताल्वादिव्यापारप्रभवो वर्णात्मकः । मृदङ्गादिप्रभवो ध्वनिः । सर्वोऽपि शब्द आकाशमात्रसमवेतः ॥ जीवात्मसमवेतबुद्धिसुखदुःखेच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नाः शब्दश्च द्विक्षणावस्थायिनस्तृतीयक्षणे नश्यन्ति । योग्यविभुविशेषगुणानां स्वद्वितीयक्षणोत्पन्नानश्यत्^e नियमात्^f ॥ विहितक्रियासाध्यो धर्मो निषिद्धक्रियासाध्योऽधर्मः । एतौ जीवमात्रसमवेतौ भोगप्रायश्चित्तादिनाश्यौ च ॥ संस्कारत्वजातिमान्संस्कारः । स त्रिविधो वेगः स्थितिस्थापको भावना चेति । वेगत्वजातिमान्वेगः । स मूर्तद्रव्यमात्रसमवेतः । आश्रयपूर्वावस्थापादकः संस्कारः स्थितिस्थापकः । स पृथिव्यादिचतुष्टयवृत्तिः । आकृष्टतरुशाखादौ पुनस्त-

a. C. E. द्विष्ट. b. C. E. om. from बुद्धीच्छा, &c., to °अनित्याः.

c. A. °द्रव्यपयोघृत°. d. C. E. F. omit from जीवात्मसमवेत, &c., to °त्वनियमात्.

e. C. E. बुद्ध्यादयोऽवात्ममात्रसमवेताः.

त्स्थानस्थितिं जनयति । इमौ द्वौ क्रियाजन्यौ स्वजन्यक्रियानादयौ च ।
पूर्वानुभवजन्यः स्मृतिहेतुः संस्कारो भावना । स जीवमात्रवृत्तिः ।
त्रिविधसंस्कारोऽनित्य एव । इति गुणनिरूपणम् ॥

ऊर्ध्वदेशसंयोगहेतुः कर्मोत्क्षेपणम् । अधोदेशसंयोगहेतुः कर्मपक्षे-
 पणम् । स्वसंनिकृष्टसंयोगहेतुः कर्माकुञ्चनम् । स्वविप्रकृष्टसंयोगहेतुः कर्म
 प्रसारणम् । अन्यत्सर्वं कर्म गमनम् । पञ्चविधमपि कर्म मूर्तद्रव्यमात्र-
 समवेतमानित्यमेव । उत्तरसंयोगात्कदाचिदाश्रयनाशाच्च नश्यति । इति
 कर्मनिरूपणम् ॥

अधिकदेशवृत्ति सामान्यं परम् । यथा सत्ताया द्रव्यादिविवयवृत्ति-
 त्वेनेतरसामान्यापेक्षयाधिकदेशवृत्तित्वम् । अल्पदेशवृत्ति सामान्यम-
 परम् । यथा द्रव्यत्वगुणत्वकर्मत्वादि । सत्तापेक्षयाल्पदेशवृत्तित्वात् ।
 पुनः सामान्यं द्विविधं जातिरूपमुपाधिरूपं च । साक्षात्संबद्धं सामान्यं
 जातिरूपम् । यथा सत्ताद्रव्यत्वादि । परंपरासंबद्धं सामान्यमुपाधिः^{६२} । यथा
 प्रमेयत्वज्ञेयत्वादिर्दण्डत्वकुण्डलित्वादिश्च । प्रमात्वमेव हि परंपरासंब-
 न्धेन घटादिनिष्ठं प्रमेयत्वमित्यादि बोध्यम् । इति सामान्यनिरूपणम् ॥

नित्यद्रव्यवृत्तिविशेषाणां सामान्यस्थ च विशेषतो विभागाभावात्सा-
 मान्यलक्षणमेव पूर्वोक्तमवसेयं । परंतु^b विशेषानभ्युपगमे समानजातिगु-
 णक्रियावतां परमाणूनां परस्परव्यावृत्तिबुद्धिर्न स्यात् । तत्रेष्टापत्तौ यो-
 गिनोपि तादृशपरमाणूनां ज्ञानसंकरः स्यादिति । एवं युतसिद्धयोः सं-
 योग इवायुतसिद्धयोः समवायोवदयः^c । ययोर्द्वयोर्मध्ये एकमविन-
 श्यदपराश्रितमेवावतिष्ठते तावयुतसिद्धौ^{६३} । एतौ पञ्चविधावयववा-
 यविनौ गुणगुणिनौ क्रियाक्रियावन्तौ जातिव्यक्ती विशेषनित्यद्रव्ये चे-
 ति । अवयव्यादयो ह्यविनश्यन्तोवयवाद्याश्रिता एवावतिष्ठन्ते । अव-
 यवादिनाशानन्तरं विनश्यन्तस्तु क्षणमात्रं निराश्रिता एवावतिष्ठन्ते ।
 अवयवादिनाशानन्तरं विनश्यन्तस्तु क्षणमात्रं निराश्रिता एवावतिष्ठन्ते ।
 इति विशेषसमवाययोर्निरूपणम्^d ॥

a. A. °यात्मदे°. b. C. E. substitute for the clause up to परंतु, विशेषश्च
 प्रतिव्यक्तिभिन्न एव । and add विशेषनिरूपणम् after ज्ञानसंकरः स्यादिति.
 c. E. breaks off at this point. d. C. omits from अवयवादयो to the end.

तादात्म्यसंबन्धावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकोऽभावोऽन्योन्याभावः⁶⁴ । स च घटः पटो नेत्यादिप्रत्ययप्रसिद्धः । अन्योन्याभावभिन्नोऽभावः संसर्गाभावः । स त्रिविधः प्रागभावः प्रध्वंसभावोऽत्यन्ताभावश्चेति । उत्पत्तेः प्राक्समवायिकारणे कार्यस्य संसर्गाभावः प्रागभावः । स चेह कपाले घटो भविष्यतीति प्रत्ययप्रसिद्धः । उत्पत्तेरनन्तरं समवायिकारणे कार्यस्य संसर्गाभावः प्रध्वंसः । स चेह कपाले घटो ध्वस्त इति प्रत्ययप्रसिद्धः । त्रैकालिकः संसर्गाभावोऽत्यन्ताभावः । स चेह भूतले घटो नास्तीत्यादिप्रत्ययप्रसिद्धः । एवमन्येषामत्रैवान्तर्भावः । यथान्धकारस्यालोकाभावे यत्रालोको नास्ति तत्रैवान्धकारव्यवहारात् ॥

लक्षणदोषाणामव्याप्त्यतिव्याप्त्यसंभवानां तु यथासंभवं हेत्वाभासेष्वन्तर्भावः⁶⁵ । लक्ष्यैकदेशे लक्षणस्यावर्तनमव्याप्तिः । यथा शिखासूत्रवान्ब्राह्मण इत्यस्य संन्यासिन्यव्याप्तिस्तस्य शिखासूत्रवत्त्वाभावात् । अलक्ष्ये लक्षणगमनमतिव्याप्तिः । यथा मनुष्यो ब्राह्मण इति लक्षणस्य शूद्रेऽतिव्याप्तिस्तस्यापि मनुष्यत्वात् । लक्ष्ये क्वापि लक्षणस्यावर्तनमसंभवः । यथा शुण्डदण्डवान्ब्राह्मण इति लक्षणस्यासंभवः कस्यापि ब्राह्मणस्य शुण्डदण्डाभावात् । एतद्दोषरहितं तल्लक्षणम् । विशुद्धमातापितृजन्यत्ववान्ब्राह्मण⁶⁶ इति । विशुद्धत्वं च पट्टर्माधिकारवत्त्वम् ॥

इयता प्रबन्धेन सर्वेषां पदार्थानामुद्देशलक्षणे कृते बालानुपयोगाच्च परीक्षा न कृता । लक्ष्यतावच्छेदकमात्रेण लक्ष्यसंकीर्तनमुद्देशः । असाधारणधर्मो लक्षणम् । उद्देशलक्षणयोरुपपत्त्यनुपपत्त्यन्यतरफलको विचारः परीक्षा । ननु निःप्रयोजनमात्मेतरपदार्थनिरूपणं तज्जन्यपदार्थतत्त्वज्ञानस्य सुखदुःखाभावतत्साधनेतरत्वेन प्रयोजनत्वाभावादिति चेन्न । पदार्थतत्त्वज्ञानस्यात्मतत्त्वज्ञानद्वारा मोक्षसाधनत्वात् । आत्यन्तिकदुःखध्वंसो मोक्षः । स च स्वसमानाधिकरणदुःखप्रागभावासमानकालीनदुःखध्वंसः⁶⁶ । संसारकालीनदुःखध्वंसस्य मोक्षत्ववार्णाय कालीनान्तं

a. A. °त्वाद्ब्राह्म° . b. A. D. °मेतत्° . c. D. °भाववत्° . d. D. om. स्व. e. D. दुःखासमान.

दुःखध्वंसविशेषणम् । अस्मदीयदुःखसमानकालीनशुक्रमोक्षेऽव्याप्तिवार-
णाय "स्वसमानाधिकरणेतिदुःखविशेषणमिति सर्वं" शिवम् ॥

विद्मद्भास्करशर्मा यो बालव्युत्पत्तिसिद्धये ।

यथा कणादसिद्धान्तमकरोत्तर्ककौमुदीम् ॥

श्रीवासुदेवं सुरवैरिभङ्गं रमाधरालिङ्गितसुन्दराङ्गम् ।

पादाब्जसंभूतपवित्रगङ्गं नमामि तं वारितदोषसङ्गम् ॥

इति लौगाक्षिभास्करशर्मविरचिता तर्ककौमुदी समाप्ता^a ।

^a. D. om. स्व. ^b. C. मोक्षश्च चरमदुःखध्वंसः । इदानीं तदुःखस्य चरमताभावात्
तद्वृत्तेऽतिव्याप्तिः । चरमदुःखं च स्वसमानाधिकरणदुःखप्रागभावासमानकालीनदुःखम् । स्वं
चरमदुःखत्वेनाभिमतम् । तत्समानाधिकरणं दुःखं तत्पूर्वकालीनमेव । तत्प्रागभावासमानका-
लीनं चरमदुःखमिति त्रैवीयचरमदुःखस्यापि त्रैवीयदुःखप्रागभावसमानकालीनत्वादसंभव
इत्यतः स्वसमानाधिकरणत्वं दुःखविशेषणम् । एव च स्वसमानाधिकरणदुःख &c. as in
the text. ^c. D. F. om. this verse. ^d. D. F. इति श्रीमन्महोपाध्यायलौगा-
क्षिरुद्रकवीन्द्रात्मजविद्वन्मुद्रलसुनुना भास्करेण रचिता तर्ककौमुदी संपूर्णा ॥

NOTES.

1. तर्काणां कौमुदीव प्रकाशिकेति तर्ककौमुदी. तर्क is defined in the *Dīpikā* of the *Tarkasamgraha* as तर्क्यन्ते प्रतिपाद्यन्त इति तर्का द्रव्यादिसप्त पदार्थाः. It may, hence, be described as that which is discussed and established, i.e., results obtained by an analytical process of classification. Compare, "If we attempt to proceed further in the same path, that is, to analyse any further, the import of propositions, we find forced upon us, as a subject of previous consideration, the import of Names, Now what we do, what passes in our mind, when we affirm or deny two names of one another, must depend on what they are names of, since it is with reference to that, and not to the names themselves that we make the affirmation or denial." Mill's Logic, Vol. I., p. 21.

2. अभिधेयत्वं पदार्थसामान्यलक्षणम्. A *padārtha* is anything namable. These according to the author are seven. It may be noticed that all namable things are capable, at the outset, of being divided from the conception of existence they imply, into existences positive (भाव), and negative (अभाव): the भाव things again being divided into 6. अत्र सप्तमस्याभावत्वकथनादेव षण्णां भावत्वं प्राप्तं तेन भावत्वेन पृथगुपन्यासो न कृतः ॥ मुक्ता० ॥ *Kanāda*, according to whom the enumeration of substances is here given, appears originally to accept only six classes of objects, and not seven: तत्र द्रव्यगुणकर्मसामान्यविशेषसमवायाभावा इति षडेव पदार्थाः ॥ सर्व० सं० औ० ६० ॥ There are, again others, who look upon शक्ति, सादृश्य, &c., as so many *padārthas*, but they are shown to be included in the heads already given. ननु कथमेत एव पदार्थाः शक्तिसादृश्यादीनामप्यतिरिक्तपदार्थत्वात् । तथाहि । मण्यादिसमवहितेन बह्विना दाहो न जन्यते तच्छून्येन तु जन्यते । तत्र मण्यादिना बह्वौ दाहानुकूला शक्तिर्नाश्यते । उक्तेजकेन मण्याद्यपसारणेन च जन्यत इति कल्प्यते । एवं सादृश्यमप्यतिरिक्तः पदार्थः । तद्धि न षडसु भावेस्वन्तर्भवति सामान्येऽपि सत्त्वात् । यथा गोत्वं नित्यं तथाश्वत्वमिति सादृश्यप्रतीतिः । नाप्यभावे सत्त्वेन प्रतीयमानत्वादिति चेन्न । मण्याद्यभावविशिष्टवन्हादिर्हादिकं प्रति स्वातन्त्र्येण मप्यभावादेरेव वा हेतुत्वं कल्प्यते । अनेनैव सामञ्जस्येऽनन्तशक्तितत्प्रागभावध्वंसकल्पनानौचित्यात् । न चोक्तेजके सति प्रतिबन्धकसद्भावेऽपि कथं दाह इति वाच्यम् । उक्तेजकाभावविशिष्टमप्यभावस्य कारणत्वात् । सादृश्यमपि न पदार्थान्तरम् । किन्तु तद्विन्नत्वे सति तद्वत्तुभूयोधर्मवत्त्वं । यथा चन्द्रभिन्नत्वे सति चन्द्रगताह्लादकत्वादिसत्त्वं मुख्ये

चन्द्रसादृश्यमिति ॥ मुक्ता० ॥ On the classification of namable things further compare, "A proposition is discourse which affirms or denies something of some other thing. This is one step. There must, it seems, be two things concerned in every act of belief. But what are these things?.....If, therefore, we knew what all names signify, we should know everything which in the existing state of human knowledge, is capable of being made a subject of affirmation or denial, or being itself affirmed or denied of a subject.....We have now carried this survey far enough to be able to take an account of its results, and to exhibit an enumeration of all kinds of things which are capable of being made predicates, or of having anything predicated of them." Mill's Logic, Vol. I., p. 49. And further, "The necessity of an enumeration of existences, as the basis of logic, did not escape the attention of the schoolmen, and of their master, Aristotle..... The categories or predicaments.....were believed to be an enumeration of all things capable of being named." These are ten in number, and constitute "a mere catalogue of distinctions rudely marked out by the language of familiar life, with little or no attempt to penetrate, by philosophic analysis, to the rationale even of these common distinctions." Idem, p. 50. Another able writer, however, justifies this classification, in the words, "they seem to have been rather intended as a generalisation of predicates, an analysis of the final import of predication." Bain's Logic, Vol. I., p. 265.

3. Some include तमस् or darkness among the *dravyas*. It is said न च कूटद्रव्येष्वन्तर्भावात्कृतो दशमद्रव्यत्वमिति वाच्यम् । आकाशादिपञ्चकस्य नीरूपत्वाद्वायोश्च नीरूपत्वान्न तेष्वन्तर्भावः । जलतेजसोः शीतोष्णस्पर्शविरहान्न तेष्वन्तर्भावः । तमसो निर्गन्धत्वान्न पृथिव्यामन्तर्भावः । तस्मात्तमसो दशमद्रव्यत्वं सिद्धमिति चेन्न । तेजोऽभावेनैवोपपत्तावतिरिक्तकल्पनायां मानाभावात् । न च विनिगमनाभावात्तेजस एव तमोऽभावरूपतास्त्विति वाच्यम् । तेजसोऽभावस्वरूपत्वे सर्वाणुभूतोष्णस्पर्शाश्रयद्रव्यान्तरकल्पने गौरवात् । उष्णस्पर्शरूपगुणाश्रयतया तेजसो द्रव्यत्वं सिद्धम् । तमसि रूपप्रतीतिस्तु भ्रान्तिरेव । दीपापसरणक्रियाया एव तत्र भानात् ॥ न्या० बो० ॥ A *dravya* is defined as that which is the *substratum* of गुण, or क्रिया, or is capable of becoming the समवायिकारण of some effect. गुणवत्त्वं कर्मवत्त्वं समवायिकारणत्वं वा द्रव्यसामान्यलक्षणम् ॥ If a property or action can be predicated of a thing, that thing may be called a *dravya*. By saying that तमस् is dark, and that it can move, we can include it among the *dravyas*, but it could be shown to be included in mere अभाव, and not among the *dravyas*, as is done in the passage quoted above. Vide Note No. 8.

4. The *Gunas* enumerated in the *Vaisheshika sutras* are only 17 in number. रूपरसगन्धस्पर्शाः सङ्ख्यापरिमाणे पृथक्त्वं संयोगविभागौ परत्वापरत्व-बुद्ध्यः सुखदुःखेच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नाश्च । The *Siddhānta chandrodaya* adds चेति वैशेषिकसूत्रस्थचकारस्यानुक्तसमुच्चायकत्वान्नात्र सूत्रविरोधः ।

5. Some argue that several *karmas*, such as भ्रमण and रेचन, &c., are not taken into account, and therefore the classification is faulty ; but the *Muktāvali* says भ्रमणं रेचनं स्पन्दनोर्ध्वज्वलनमेव च । तिर्यग्गमनमप्यत्र समनादेव लभ्यते ।

6. It is difficult to translate the word सामान्य into genus, inas-
much as the word does not exactly indicate a class higher than any
other given class, as animal and man ; but it rather refers to the
common characteristic running through all the members of a class,
e.g., द्रव्यत्व in द्रव्य. परसामान्य refers, therefore, to the characteristic
of the genus of a given class, and अपरसामान्य to the characteristic of
the class itself, *e.g.* in the case of पृथिवी, द्रव्यत्व is the परसामान्य, with
reference to which पृथिवीत्व is अपरसामान्य. Thus though पर and
अपरसामान्य are merely relative conceptions, the *Naiyāyikas* recognise,
as it were, an absolute or supreme *Sāmānya*, which they distinguish
by the name सत्ता. This is supposed to reside in द्रव्य, गुण and कर्म
only. सामान्यं द्विविधं प्रोक्तं परं चापरमेव च । द्रव्यादिविकवृत्तिस्तु सत्ता
परतयोच्यते ॥ परत्वमधिकदेशवृत्तित्वमपरत्वमल्पदेशवृत्तित्वं । सकलजात्यपेक्षया
सत्ताया अधिकदेशवृत्तित्वापरत्वं तदपेक्षया चान्यथां जातीनामपरत्वम् ॥ मुक्ता ॥
This tenet is peculiar to the *Naiyāyikas*, for several other schools of
philosophy have not only not recognised it, but some like the *Bud-
dhists* have tried to actually refute it ; *vide Sarvadarshana Samgraha*
on the philosophy of the *Bauddhas*. The meaning of the word जाति
may here be casually noticed in connection with the theory of सामान्य-
जाति means the characteristic of a class, and is opposed to व्यक्ति
or an individual of that class, *e.g.*, द्रव्यत्व and पृथिवी or तेजस्, &c.
Among the *Padārthas* सामान्य, विशेष, समवाय and अभाव can have no
जाति. As सामान्य is itself a जाति, it is impossible for it to have any
fresh जाति, for such an arrangement will involve us in confusion
ad infinitum (अनवस्था or स्थिति). On this point compare, "If every
general conception, instead of being the one in the many, were consi-
dered to be as many different conceptions as there are things to which
it is applicable, there would be no such thing as general language."
Mill's Logic, Vol. I., footnote, p. 204. विशेष or differentia always
distinguish one thing from another. As thus no two *Vesheshas* can
be alike, it is impossible to find out a *common likeness* in a group of

unlikes (*रूपहानिः). समवाय being a particular kind of relation must always be one, and as such must be *sui generes* (व्यक्तेरभेदः). It is a rule, as will be seen later on, that जाति and व्यक्ति are related to one another by the relation called समवाय. It will also be seen that अभाव is not related to anything by this kind of relation. Hence अभाव can have no जाति (असंबन्ध). Udayanācharya thus summarises the objections in the way of making a Jāti: व्यक्तेरभेदः (1) तुल्यत्वं, (2) संकरो, (3) इय-अनवस्थितिः (4) रूपहानिः (5) असंबन्धः (6) जातिबाधकसंयहः ॥ कुसु० ॥ We have seen instances of 4, 5, 6 and 1. तुल्यत्व stands in the way when all the different names we intend to generalise a जाति from, are but different expressions of one and the same idea, e.g., शशी, चन्द्र, विद्यु, &c. संकर (परस्परव्यतिरिक्तभावसमानाधिकरणयोर्यथैकत्र समावेशः ॥ सि० चं० ॥) or confusion arises from each of the confused Jātis existing somewhere independently of the other (with which the first has got in confusion), and by both of them existing somewhere else entirely together, e.g. The *Murtadravyas* are पृथिवी, अप्, तेजस्, वायु and मनस्. The *Bhutadravyas* are the first four and आकाश. Now any one of the two Jātis, मूर्तत्व or भूतत्व gets into confusion with the other; because, one of them, भूतत्व for example, exists in आकाश without the other—मूर्तत्व, which again is found in मनस् without its second—भूतत्व, both finally being seen together in द्रव्य. Hence भूतत्व or मूर्तत्व can be no जाति.

7. *Nityadravyas* are the five dravyas beginning with आकाश, and the *Paramānus* of the first four. These being without number, there can be no limit to the marks that distinguish them from one another. घटादीनां द्व्यणुकपर्यन्तानां तत्तदवयवभेदात्परस्परं भेदः। परमाणूनां परस्परं भेदको विशेष एव। स तु स्वत एव व्यावृत्तस्तेन तत्र विशेषान्तरापेक्षा नास्तीत्यर्थः ॥ मुक्ता० ॥

8. Non-existence can be divided into two kinds: a thing is not *at* or *upon* a particular thing, or *in* a particular thing. In the first instance the thing does not exist *in contact with* (संसर्ग) the thing before our eyes, in the second it is not *identical* with it (सादृश्य). e.g., इह भूतले घटो नास्ति and अयं घटः पटो न. The first conception modified by the three conditions of time—futurity, past time, and eternity—yields three kinds of अभाव—प्रागभाव, प्रध्वंसाभाव and अत्यन्ताभाव. The second is called अन्योन्याभाव.

9. The *Siddhānta śāndrodāya* has द्रव्यत्वसामान्यवत्त्वं गुणवत्त्वं सम-

* विशेष is sometimes defined as सामान्यभिन्नत्वे सति सामान्यशून्यत्वे सति समवेतत्वम्।

वायिकारणत्वं वा द्रव्यसामान्यलक्षणम्. If we make the जाति-द्रव्यत्व-
the definition of a द्रव्य, it may be asked how before knowing द्रव्य
we come to द्रव्यत्व. द्रव्यत्वजाताविदं द्रव्यमिति प्रत्यक्षम् (the identical
consciousness—this is द्रव्य—produced every time we see an object
of the class called द्रव्य, is *direct* proof of some common character-
istic as द्रव्यत्व running through the whole class, in order to *present*
all the individuals in the same *form*) द्रव्यवृत्तियों कारणता सा किञ्चि-
द्धर्मावच्छिन्ना कारणतात्वाद्दण्डवदित्यनुमानं वा मानम् (or the same can be
arrived at by an inference). If द्रव्य can become the समवायिकारण of
some effect, the कारणता must reside in the द्रव्य. This कारणता must
be distinguishable by some description of attributes (say द्रव्यत्व) as
in the case of a दण्ड (which is distinguished by दण्डत्व, as the कारण
of a घट). This कारणता, to continue, must be किञ्चिद्धर्मावच्छिन्ना,
distinguishable by certain attributes as said above. But this concise
yet pregnant phraseology of *Nyāya* means that the कारणता in the
द्रव्य must be *co-extensive* and *co-existent* with the attributes (धर्म) of
the द्रव्य; otherwise it can never be comprehended as existing in the
द्रव्य. In other words, the कारणता must be shown to be concomi-
tant with the धर्म of the द्रव्य, in the form, wherever the धर्म is, there
कारणता exists; wherever the धर्म is not the कारणता also is not.
Such a धर्म of द्रव्य is evidently none other than द्रव्यत्व. Thus a द्रव्य
may finally be described as that which is possessed of the properties
of the genus द्रव्यत्व; or which is the site or substratum of qualities;
or which is capable of becoming the समवायिकारण of some effect.

Before leaving the subject of definition it is necessary to advert
to two very important considerations at the beginning. We must try
to know what makes a true definition, and what faults vitiate its cha-
racter as such. Definition or लक्षण is defined at the end of the book,
as असाधारणधर्मो लक्षणम्; and the three faults to which a definition is
open are enumerated as लक्ष्यैकदेशो लक्षणस्यावर्तनमव्याप्तिः । अलक्ष्ये लक्ष-
णगमनमव्याप्तिः । लक्ष्ये क्वापि लक्षणस्यावर्तनमसंभवः । If we define the
term *Brāhmana*, as शिखामूत्रवान्, one having a शिखा and सूत्र, we
shall leave out from the denotation of the term *Brāhmana*, all
Sanyāsins who wear no thread and bear no hair on their head, and
are yet *Brāhmans* to all intents and purposes. The असाधारणधर्म
or peculiar property (connotation) of the term *Brāhmana* in this
instance, being thus found to exclude a part of the thing defined
(लक्ष्य), the definition is vitiated by the fault called अव्याप्ति. Again
if we define the term ब्राह्मण as “any one who is a man,” such an

असाधारणधर्म will include things not intended to be defined (अलक्ष्य). The definition will, in this instance, be faulty on account of its involving an अतिव्याप्ति. If, in the last instance, we were to define the term as शुण्डदण्डवान्, such an असाधारणधर्म, will not describe any member of the class defined. The definition is here vitiated by असंबन्ध. In fact, whenever we find that a definition has any of these faults in it, we at once perceive that the enumeration of the connotation of the term is not exhaustive or precise. The *Dīpikā* of the *Tarkasamgraha*, therefore, has : एतद्दूषणत्रयरहितो धर्मो लक्षणम् । स एवासाधारणधर्म इत्युच्यते. So also our book एतद्दोषरहितं लक्षणम्. It should, however, be carefully noticed that a धर्म may be असाधारण, i.e., may not be साधारण or common to the लक्ष्य as well as अलक्ष्य ; and yet it may be open to the दोष called अव्याप्ति. It is therefore necessary to see whether असाधारण means simply other than साधारण or something else. ननु साधारणस्य लक्ष्यालक्ष्यवृत्तित्वरूपतया तदभावरूपासाधारणत्वस्याव्याप्त्यादि-दोषप्रसक्तधर्मेऽपि सत्त्वात् कथं दोषत्रयरहित एवासाधारणधर्म इत्याशंकां परिजि-हिर्षुरसाधारणमन्यादृशं निर्वन्क्ति । लक्ष्यतावच्छेदकव्यापकत्वे सति लक्ष्यतावच्छे-दकव्याप्यत्वम् (असाधारणत्वम्) ॥ नील० ॥ असाधारण accordingly means the being the व्यापक as well as the व्याप्य of the लक्ष्यतावच्छेदक. Let us analyse an instance. In the definition विशुद्धमातापितृजन्यत्वव-न्ब्राह्मणः the असाधारणधर्म is विशुद्धमातापितृजन्यत्ववत्त्वम्. Here the लक्ष्य being ब्राह्मण, the लक्ष्यता covers the same ground as that term. The धर्म or property, which can exactly describe the term ब्राह्मण can be none other than ब्राह्मणत्व, for this connotation of the term is exactly co-existent and co-extensive with the whole of its denotation. (लक्ष्यता ऽन्यूनानतिप्रसक्तधर्मस्यैव लक्ष्यतावच्छेदकत्वम् ॥ न्या० को० ॥). In other words, the असाधारणधर्म—जन्यत्ववत्त्वम् must be shown to be constantly concomitant (व्यापक and व्याप्य) with the लक्ष्यतावच्छेदक—ब्राह्मणत्व in the form where there is ब्राह्मणत्व there is जन्यत्ववत्त्वम्, where there is जन्यत्ववत्त्वम् there is ब्राह्मणत्वम्. In fine, there must exist a convertible kind of concomitance between the term and its collective connotations. “It is only necessary that the definition thus formed should be convertible with the name which it professes to define, i.e., should be exactly co-extensive with it, being predicable of everything of which it is predicable, and of nothing of which it is not predicable.” Mill’s Logic, Vol. I., p. 157. To sum up, then, the definition of a name is the enumeration of that peculiar or essential connotation or connotations of it, which as it were denoted nothing more nor less than the name of which it is the connotation. “The only ade-

quate definition of a name is that which declares the facts, and the whole of the facts which the name involves in its signification." Idem, p. 155. When we look upon a definition as "declaring the whole of the facts" implied by the name, we are at once confronted with the almost insurmountable difficulty of enunciating any correct definition at all, inasmuch as we *know* very little of the whole of the facts of a name. This is the second point to be noticed in this connection. The one great advantage of such definitions as गुणत्ववान् गुणः । द्रव्यत्ववद्द्रव्यम्, and the like, consists, though at the apparent sacrifice of clearness, in the fact that they remain unaltered even with our increasing knowledge of the connotations of the name defined. *Nilkantha* substantially says the same thing: यद्यपि लक्षणलक्ष्यतावच्छेदकयोरभेदस्तथापि लक्षणेनैतरभेदे साध्ये हेतौ साध्यसामानाधिकरण्यानिश्चयेऽपि हेतुधर्मितावच्छेदकसाध्यनिश्चयस्यापि नियतत्वाभिप्रायेणेदमिति संक्षेपः ॥

10. It will be remembered that those *Padārthas* which have a *Sāmānya Jāti* are द्रव्य, गुण and कर्म only.

11. अनेकसमवेतत्वं संयोगादीनामप्यस्तीत्यत उक्तं नित्यत्वे सतीति । नित्यत्वे सति समवेतत्वं गगनपरिमाण्वादीनामप्यस्त्यत उक्तमनेकेति । नित्यत्वे सत्यनेकवृत्तित्वमत्यन्ताभावस्याप्यस्तीत्यतो वृत्तित्वसामान्यं विहाय समवेतेत्युक्तम् । एकव्यक्तित्वावृत्तिस्तु न जातिः ॥ मुक्ता० ॥

12. The word मात्र is inserted to exclude रूप, &c., which are a cause of enabling us to separate objects from one another (व्यावृत्तिः); but which are not the cause of this sense of distinction only, i.e., they do not produce this kind of sense of distinction only, but they contribute to several other things besides, such as प्रत्यक्ष, &c.

13. अभावसामान्यलक्षणं तु भावभिन्नत्वम् ॥ वाक्य० ॥ इदमिह नास्ति इदमिदं न भवतीति प्रतीतिनियामको भावाभावसाधारणः स्वरूपसंबन्धविशेषः । न्या० को० दीधि० ॥ प्रतियोगिज्ञानाधीनज्ञानविषयत्वम् ॥ सि० च० ॥ According to the last definition, that is called अभाव, whose knowledge is dependent on the knowledge of its प्रतियोगी or counter-entity. For example, घटाभाव becomes comprehensible only by our knowledge of घट, which is the प्रतियोगी of its own non-existence.

14. पृथिवी is often defined as गन्धवती. It must be remembered that though पृथिवी possesses many *gunas* in common with अग्नि and others, the quality of गन्ध is peculiar to itself. So among the other *dravyas* each though possessing many qualities besides the one by which it is distinguished, is generally described by that peculiar quality alone. तत्र क्षितिर्गन्धहेतुर्नानारूपवती मता । गन्धहेतुरिति । गन्धसमवायिकारणमित्यर्थः ॥ मुक्ता० ॥ गन्धवत्त्वं समवायेन बोध्यम् । तेन कालिक-

संबन्धेन काले दैशिकसंबन्धेन दिशि गन्धवत्त्वस्य सत्त्वेऽपि न क्षतिः । सि० च० ॥ The *guna* set forth in the definition must be understood to be related to the thing defined by समवायसंबन्ध otherwise the definition might include काल and दिक्—the common limiting cause of all perceptions—which may appear impregnated with गन्ध (but only by *contact* and not by समवायसंबन्ध). The student must guard himself against the common error of confounding the term पृथिवी with his conceptions of “earth.” In the philosophical analysis of a number of objects, every thinker has the right to choose his own name for that class of attributes which he, as it were, supposes to constitute the *fundamentum divisionis* of his classification. It is sufficient if he uniformly keeps to his own definitions and follows them faithfully throughout his enquiry.

15. नित्यत्वं प्रागभावप्रतियोगित्वे सति ध्वंसाप्रतियोगित्वम् । अनित्यत्वं प्रागभावप्रतियोगित्वध्वंसप्रतियोगित्वान्यतरत्वं बोध्यम् । वाक्य० ॥

16. *Ayonija sharira* is that which is produced from an aggregation of *Paramānus* brought about (सहकृत) by some special act of merit (धर्म).

17. *Vide* Note No. 20, for the definitions of an इन्द्रिय, शरीर and विषय.

18. ननु सुवर्णस्य तैजसत्वे किं मानमिति चेन्न । सुवर्णं तैजसमसति प्रातिबन्धकं ऽत्यन्तानलसंयोगेऽनुच्छिद्यमानद्रवत्वात् । यन्नैवं तन्नैवं यथा पृथिवी । &c. ॥ मुक्ता० ॥

19. If the वायु known by different names as प्राण, &c., were not one and uniform, but five different *Vāyus*, as प्राण, अपान, &c., each pervading the whole body, then, says the author as each of these will be a मूर्तद्रव्य (being वायु which is a मूर्तद्रव्य—क्रियावद्द्रव्यं मूर्तद्रव्यम्—न्या० को०), they all cannot without conflicting with one another occupy the same place, viz., the body. It is therefore clear that the various names प्राण, &c., are given to वायु in accordance with the various offices it has to perform. Hence हृदि प्राणो गुदेऽपानः समानो नाभिसंस्थितः । उदानः कण्ठदेशस्थो व्यानः सर्वशरीरगः ॥ also मुखनिर्गमनादिक्रियाभेदेनापि पञ्चसंज्ञां लभते । उद्गारे नाग आख्यातः कूर्म उन्मीलने स्मृतः । कृकरः क्षुत्करो ज्ञेयो देवदत्तो विजृम्भणे । न जहाति मृतं चापि सर्वव्यापी धनंजयः ॥ सि० च० ॥

20. शरीर is defined to be that अन्त्यावयवि—final product, so to speak,—which is the place for experiencing भोग or fruition consisting of pleasure and pain. It may be briefly stated that the *paramānus* which are eternal things with “no parts and no magnitude,” as well

as the *Dryanukas* or diads, the immediate result of *paramānus* combining together for creation, through the desire of God, are not amenable to the senses. It is only when the diads form themselves into triads that they become cognizable by the senses. Thus are evolved the great पृथिवी, अप्, &c., combinations whereof result in the formation of certain vehicles or abodes for the fruition of pleasure or pain (by the so circumscribed soul). These are शरीर, which are अन्त्यावयवि as being incapable of producing any further द्रव्य, and transitory in their nature (द्रव्यानारम्भक, and कार्यद्रव्य). If अन्त्यावयवि were defined merely as द्रव्यानारम्भकम्, आकाश and other *dravyas* which are not द्रव्यारम्भक (these being पृथिवी, अप्, तेजस्, and वायु only) will be included in the definition. They are excluded by the words कार्यद्रव्यम् in the definition, for they are not कार्य—अनित्य—द्रव्य, but नित्य. If the words द्रव्यानारम्भकम् were omitted, then all अनित्यद्रव्य will come to be शरीर, which is absurd. It may be remarked that the definition of शरीर as that where pleasure and pain are experienced involves the idea of an experiencer or conscious agent, viz., the soul; and hence it is often defined by other writers as यद्वच्छिन्नात्मनि भोगो जायते तच्छरीरम्, i.e., that in constant concomitance wherewith the soul experiences pleasure or pain is called शरीर.

That which is in contact with the body and is the करण (understanding it merely in the sense फलायोगव्यवच्छिन्नं कारणम्) of ज्ञान, being itself अतीन्द्रिय, is an इन्द्रिय. If अतीन्द्रिय were left out, आत्मा, the external covering—the vehicle of the internal sense of perception—or any tangible object in contact with the body will be included in the definition; if ज्ञानकरणम् were omitted, काल, दिक्, &c., which are शरीरसंयुक्त and अतीन्द्रिय will be included; and if the word, शरीरसंयुक्तम् were not put in, all निर्विकल्पकज्ञान which is अतीन्द्रिय, and which is the immediate cause of all सविकल्पकज्ञान will be included. For this explanation of the use of the words शरीरसंयुक्तम् I am indebted to Shāstree Bheemāchārya of Elphinstone College, who also says that शरीरसंयुक्तम् indicates, perhaps, the fact that इन्द्रिय becomes a ज्ञानकरण only if in the body, for चक्षुस् and others cannot without the body (in their native form of तेजस्, &c.,) produce any knowledge whatever. इन्द्रियत्व is also defined as शब्देतरोद्भूतविशेषगुणानाश्रयत्वे सति ज्ञानकारणमनः-संयोगाश्रयत्वम् ॥ शब्देतरे य उद्भूता विशेषगुणा घटनिष्ठरूपादयस्तदनाश्रयत्वं ज्ञानस्य कारणभूतो यो मनःसंयोगस्तदाश्रयत्वं च चक्षुरादावस्तीति लक्षणसमन्वयः । भवत्येवेन्द्रियमनःसंयोगस्तथाप्यात्मा मनसा युज्यते मन इन्द्रियेणेन्द्रियमर्थेन ततः प्रत्यक्षम् । आत्मवारणाय सत्यन्तम् । कालवारणाय विशेष्यम् । श्रीबे० व्यासिवा-

णाय शब्देतर इति । चक्षुरादावतुद्भूतरूपसत्त्वाद्द्वयासिवारणाद्योद्भूतेति । संयोगस्य द्विनिष्ठत्वेनेन्द्रियाद्येसंयोगाश्रयत्वस्य चक्षुरादौ सत्त्वाद्द्विशेषगुण इति । स्वध्वंसकारणीभूतकालमनःसंयोगस्तदाश्रयत्वं काल इति ज्ञानपदम् । प्राचां मत इन्द्रियावयवार्थावयवयोः संनिकर्षोऽपि ज्ञानकारणं तदाश्रयत्वं चेन्द्रियावयवे गतमतो मनःपदम् । यद्वा काले रूपं नास्तीति प्रत्यक्षं प्रति चक्षुःसंयुक्तविशेषणतायाः कारणत्वेन तद्वद्वर्तीभूतसंयोगाश्रयत्वं काले गतमतो मनःपदम् ॥ सि० च० ॥ न चात्मान्यत्वे सतीत्यनेनैवात्मन्यादिव्यासिवारणसम्भवे किं गुरुतरशब्देतरत्यादिविशेषणेनेति वाच्यम् । तथा च सति चर्ममनःसंयोगस्य ज्ञानमात्रं प्रति हेतुत्वमते तत्रातिव्याप्तेरित्यलमतिविस्तरेण ॥ नील० ॥

A विषय or mass is defined as ज्ञायमानत्वे सति भोगसाधनम् *i.e.*, that which contributes to भोग, on being known, as such, is a विषय. The words ज्ञायमानत्व exclude शरीर and इन्द्रिय, for though they are भोगसाधन, they do not contribute to भोग on being known, but merely by their own *existence*. In sleep, for example, the actions of शरीर and इन्द्रिय are not suspended, but a विषय is certainly useless then, for it cannot be grasped (it can have no ज्ञायमानत्व) in the time of sleep.

The *Vākyavritti* accordingly defines विषयत्वम् as शरीरेन्द्रियभिन्नत्वे सति भोगसाधनत्वम्.

21. If we take आकाश to be multiform we will be involved in confusion *ad infinitum*, inasmuch as there would be no end of different *ākāśas*, all divided from one another without any known differentia. Hence for the natural uniqueness of reasoning (लाघव) *ākāśa* must be accepted as one and uniform. It is विशु—all pervading—inasmuch as it is found in all *kārya dravyas*; (विभुत्व being defined as *सर्वमूर्तद्रव्यसंयोगित्वम् ॥ वाक्य० ॥. As, finally, it is one and all-pervading it must be नित्य also. Though आकाश is thus one and eternal, it *appears* as many through its being joined with certain accidents. नन्वाकाशं लाघवादेकं सिद्धम् । श्रोत्रं पुरुषभेदाद्भिन्नं कथमाकाशं स्यादिति चेत्तत्रापि—इन्द्रियं तु भवेच्छ्रोत्रमेकः सन्नयुपाधित इति आकाश एकः सन्नयुपाधेः कर्णशङ्कुलीभेदाद्भिन्नः श्रोत्रात्मको भवति ॥ मुक्ता० ॥ We know that शब्द is the गुण of आकाश, but this manifests itself only at places (अविच्छन्न) where the tympanum and other accessories are available. Hence though the श्रोत्रेन्द्रिय is one uniform आकाश—the latter appears as if it were many in consequence of the difference in the कर्णशङ्कुली, &c., of different beings.

22. अतीत or past time (of a thing), is that period of time which is qualified by the destruction of that thing. The future is that period of time which is qualified by the anterior non-existence of

that thing. That period of time which is not अवच्छिन्न (accompanied—limited) by the destruction or anterior non-existence of a thing is called its present time.

23. From the definitions अनित्यज्ञानादिमाञ्जीवः and नित्यज्ञानादि-मान्धिरः it follows that आत्मा is ज्ञानवान् or possessing ज्ञान as a property; and that it may therefore be defined as ज्ञानाधिकरणमात्मा (तर्क० सं०). It is here maintained, it will be observed, against the doctrine* of *Shankarāchārya* and the *Vedānta* in general, that ज्ञान resides in आत्मा as a गुण; and that therefore a greater or smaller degree of knowledge forms the principle of dividing आत्मा into जीवात्मा and परमात्मा. For further discussion *vide Muktvāli* verses 48 and 49, and *Panchadasi* chap. VI. The जाति—आत्मत्व—which means सुखदुःखगदितमवाधिकारणतावच्छेदकत्वम् (मुक्ता०) can be shown good of जीवात्मा, but as it is difficult to show it good in the case of ईश्वर without the attempt tending to annihilate the distinction between the two, (viz., जीवात्मा and परमात्मा) the *naiyāyikas* substitute another argument for establishing the existence of an extra-cosmic creator. करणं हि सकर्तृकम् ॥ वास्त्यादीनां छिदाकरणानां कर्तारमन्तरेण फलानुपधानं दृष्टम् । एवं चक्षुरादीनां ज्ञानकरणानामपि फलोपधानं कर्तारमन्तरेण नोपपद्यत इत्यतिरिक्तः कर्ता ज्ञायते ॥ i.e., in other words, the existence of an extra-cosmic God is inferrible from the celebrated argument of design. Compare also कार्यायोजनधृत्यादेः पक्षप्रत्ययतः श्रुतेः । वाक्यात्सङ्ख्याविशेषाच्च साध्यो विश्वविद्वयः ॥ कुसु० ५. १ ॥ After effecting this, as it were, quantitative difference in आत्मा, the *naiyāyikas* create a qualitative difference also, by attributing नित्य or permanent ज्ञान to ईश्वर and अनित्यज्ञान to जीव.

It is further proposed to examine whether ईश्वर has a शरीर? Our text says he has none inasmuch as अदृष्ट (the cause of the bodies of the created world) is not to be found in his case: or he may have a शरीर, if not by His own अदृष्ट, by that of ours—by the अदृष्ट of the creation he sends forth (for creation implies a creator). Just as in the case of a woman, the अदृष्ट of the man, who will take her to be his wife, must be accepted as a cause in the particular make of her body, &c., so the अदृष्ट of created beings may be a cause of the creator having a शरीर. It may, on this latter supposition, be doubted that this line of reasoning will invest even मुक्त persons (those whose connection with the body, the cause of fruition, is so severed as not

* विज्ञानमानन्द ब्रह्म. I. 1-12 (Brahma Sūtras).

to be resumed at any future moment) with a body; but this is not possible inasmuch as persons absolved have lost all इच्छा, whereas God possesses it as a विशेषगुण. Thus ईश्वर being proved to be with a body, the Smritis in which he is described as having four hands, &c., become at once comprehensible.

24. तथा चैकैकात्मन एकैकमनस आवश्यकत्वेनात्मनामनन्तत्वान्मनसोऽप्यनन्तत्वमिति भावः । नन्वाकाशादिवन्मनसो विभुत्वे विभुद्वयसंयोगानङ्गीकारेण ज्ञानोत्पत्तिर्न स्यात् । ज्ञानासमवायिकारणाप्रसिद्धेः । अत आह (परम) अणुरूपमिति । तथाच मनसोऽणुत्वेनात्ममनःसंयोगः संभवत्येवेति भावः । मीमांसकास्तु मनो विभु स्पर्शरहितद्रव्यत्वादाकाशवदित्यनुमानेन विभुत्वं सिद्धयति विभुद्वयसंयोगोप्यस्तीत्याहुः । नैतत् । तादृशसंयोगस्य नित्यत्वापत्त्या सर्वदा ज्ञानोत्पत्तिप्रसंगेन सुषुप्त्यभावापत्तेः । मनस्तु यदा मनः पुरिततिप्रविशति तदा सुषुप्तिर्यथा निःसरति तदा ज्ञानोत्पत्तिः । पुरिततिबहिर्देशावच्छिन्नात्ममनःसंयोगस्यैव ज्ञानकारणत्वात् । अत एव ज्ञानमात्रे त्वङ्मनःसंयोगः कारणमिति मतं निराकुर्वन्ति नट्याः (vide note No. 20, quotation from *Nīlakantha*). ननु मनसोऽणुत्वेऽष्टावधानीनां कथं युगपज्ज्ञानोत्पत्तिर्मनसश्चक्षुरिन्द्रियसंयोगकाले त्वगिन्द्रियादीनां संयोगासंभवदिति चेन्न । मनसोतिशयवेगशालित्वेन क्षणविलम्बेनैवेन्द्रियसत्त्वबुद्धं सद्व्याप्तिविशेषशाल्यष्टावधानीनां ज्ञानोत्पादनाद्युपपदभवामीति प्रत्ययो भ्रमः । तथा च न्यायसूत्रम् । युगपज्ज्ञानानुत्पत्तिर्मनसो लिङ्गमिति ॥ सि० चं० ॥ also साक्षात्कारे सुखादीनां करणं मन उच्यते । अयौगपद्याज्ज्ञानानां तस्याणुत्वमिहोच्यते ॥ तथाहि । सुखसाक्षात्कारः सकरणको जन्यसाक्षात्कारत्वाच्चाक्षुषसाक्षात्कारवदित्यनुमानेन मनसः करणत्वसिद्धिः । तत्र मनसोऽणुत्वे प्रमाणमाह । अयौगपद्यादिति । ज्ञानानां चाक्षुषराक्षणादीनामयौगपद्यमेककालोत्पत्तिर्नास्तीत्यनुभवसिद्धम् । तत्र नानिन्द्रियाणां स्वस्थिपि विषयसंनिधाने यत्संबन्धादेकेनेन्द्रियेण ज्ञानं जन्यते यत्संबन्धाच्च परैर्ज्ञानं नोत्पाद्यते तन्मनसो विभुत्वे चासंनिधानं न संभवतीति न विभु मनः । नच मनसः संकोचविकाशशालित्वादुभयोपपत्तिरिति वाच्यम् । नानावयवतन्नाशादिकल्पने गौरवात् ॥ मुक्ता० ॥ The substance of all this may be thus briefly expressed. There must be some instrument like the mind for the experience of our daily pleasure and pain; and this must be atomic and eternal. The mind must be अणु for if it were विभु, no knowledge will be possible, there being no संयोग between आत्मा and मनस् (necessary for knowledge in general) for two विभु things cannot unite. If, however, it may be assumed with the *Mīmāṃsakas* that two विभु things can unite, then there would be no cessation of knowledge, as in sleep; the union of आत्मा and मनस् being indissoluble. Thus either way the mind cannot be विभु. It cannot be even as large as the body, for then it will be liable to be destroyed with the body and therefore अनित्य, which we cannot assume it to be, for the retainer of the impressions of acts done in this life being anni-

hilated by death there will be nothing to account for the inequality of birth (कृतनाश), which must then be assumed to arise without any reason (अकृताभ्यागम)—a *reductio ad absurdum*. The mind must therefore be atomic. Though it will be in constant union with the soul which pervades the whole body, still the *naiyāyika* will now be able to account for the phenomena of sleep by saying that when the mind enters a particular region in the body called पुरितति capable of neutralising the effect of आत्ममनःसंयोग, sleep is produced. It must be atomic, again, for the reason that multifarious and simultaneous perception is never possible. If, lastly, it were suggested that the mind may be त्रिभु and may receive impressions or not according as its various parts expand or contract, the atomist will content himself with his *simpler* explanations than accept the *cumbrous* theory of assuming so many little parts as developing, and so many as contracting, &c. Thus the mind is shown to be अणु and नित्य.

25. यद्यपि चक्षुर्मात्रग्राह्यत्वं (ग्राह्यजातिमत्त्वम्) चक्षुरितराग्राह्यत्वे सति चक्षुर्ग्राह्यत्वं तच्च रूपे न संभवति तथापि त्वग्निन्द्रियाग्राह्यत्वे सति चक्षुर्ग्राह्यत्वं तदिति ध्येयम् । त्वग्नाग्राह्यगुणविभाजकधर्मवत्त्वपर्यवसानेनादोषात् । अत एव न परमाणुरूपादावव्याप्तिरिति बोध्यम् ॥ नील० ॥ The words चक्षुर्मात्र, &c., may seem to mean that *guna* which possesses a जाति not cognizable by any organ of sense other than the eye. Such an interpretation of the definition will, however, hardly allow it to include even the thing defined (असंभव), viz., रूप, which is cognizable not by the eye alone, but by the mind and soul as well. In trying then to find the usefulness of the word मात्र in the definition, the commentator fixes upon सद्द्रव्या and such other *gunas* as the only ones meant to be excluded. Because सद्द्रव्या is cognizable by the *skin* as also by the eye, the word मात्र excludes सद्द्रव्या by making the definition to mean that *guna* which has that जाति in it, which is cognizable not by the skin but by the eye. If the words जातिमान् were omitted, the definition will not extend (अव्याप्ति) to the रूप of परमाणु, for, it is always invisible. But with the word जातिमान् in the definition, the रूप of a परमाणु, though invisible can be imagined as possessing the जाति—चक्षुर्मात्रग्राह्यत्व (*i.e.*, चक्षुर्ग्राह्यत्वग्राह्यगुणविभाजकधर्म), and hence included in the definition. The word गुण prevents the definition from including रूपत्व (a जाति) as also प्रभा or light (a द्रव्य), which both are चक्षुर्मात्रग्राह्यजातिमान्. The definition, however, includes (अतिव्याप्ति) प्रभाभित्तिसंयोग; for the union of light with a wall, satisfies the necessary conditions by not

being cognizable by the skin, but by the eye. To obviate this अति-व्याप्ति, the word गुण must be understood as meaning विशेषगुण,* and thus excluding संयोग which is not one. With this explanation the word मात्र will now appear to be superfluous, for सङ्ख्या which is meant to be excluded by it, is at once excluded by the word गुण meaning a विशेषगुण, which सङ्ख्या is not. Further analysis will, however, show that मात्र is still required to exclude सांसिद्धिकद्रवत्व which is a विशेषगुण, but which is not त्वगन्नाद्यचक्षुर्ग्राह्य &c. Similar terms used in the following definitions must be similarly explained. For example, the word मात्र in the definitions of रस and गन्ध prevents द्रव्य and कर्म from being included in them through सत्ता. सत्ता is already described to be a kind of परसामान्य or supreme जाति residing only in द्रव्य, गुण, and कर्म; and if we define any गुण say गन्ध as प्राणग्राह्यजातिमान् there will be nothing to prevent this from becoming a definition of पृथिवी, for it has in it a जाति, viz., सत्ता cognizable by the प्राण (according to the rule येनेन्द्रियेण या व्यक्तियुह्यते तेनेन्द्रियेण तद्ज्ञाताजातिस्तद्भावस्तत्समवायश्च गृह्यते). This सत्ता being, however, cognizable not by the nose or the tongue alone, but by the eye as well, is excluded by the word मात्र.

26. एतेषां (रूपरसगन्धस्पर्शानाम्) पाकजत्वं तु क्षितौ नान्यत्र कुत्रचित् । तत्रापि परमाणौ स्यात्पाको वैशेषिके नये ॥ १०५ ॥ नैयायिकानां तु नये द्व्यणुकादावपीष्यते । and note पृथिव्यां हि रूपरसगन्धस्पर्शपरावृत्तिरग्निसंयोगादुपलभ्यते । नहि शतधापि ध्यायमाने जले रूपादिकं परिवर्तते । नीरे सौरभमौषध्यं चान्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यामौपाधिकमेवेति निर्णयिते । पवनपृथिव्योः शीतस्पर्शादिवत् । तत्रापि पृथिवीष्वपि मध्ये परमाणवेव रूपादीनां पाक इति वैशेषिका वदन्ति । तेषामयमाशयः । अवयविनावष्टब्धेष्ववयवेषु पाको न संभवति । परन्तु वह्निसंयोगेनावयवेषु विनष्टेषु स्वतन्त्रेषु परमाणुषु पाकः पुनश्च पक्षपरमाणुसंयोगाद्द्व्यणुकादिक्रमेण पुनर्नहावयवपर्यन्तमुत्पत्तिस्तेजसामतिशयितवेगवशात्पूर्वव्यूहनाशो व्यूहान्तरोत्पत्तिश्चेति । नैयायिकानां मते द्व्यणुकादावयवविन्यपि पाको भवति । तेषामयमाशयः । अवयविनां सच्छिद्रत्वाद्बह्वैः सूक्ष्मावयवैरन्तःप्रविष्टैरवयवैर्व्यवष्टब्धेष्वपि पाको न विरुध्यते । अनन्तावयवितन्नाशकल्पने गौरवात् । इत्थं च सोऽयं घट इत्यादिप्रत्यभिज्ञापि संगच्छते । यत्र तु न प्रत्यभिज्ञा तत्रावयविनाशोपि स्वीक्रियत इति ॥ मुक्ता ० ॥ With reference to the first four qualities the *Naiyāyikas* as well as the *Vaisheshikas* believe that in the case of पृथिवी of both kinds (i.e., नित्य as well as अनित्य) they are always अनित्य, and are capable of being produced by the application of heat (पाकः=तेजःसंयोगः) ; and that in the case of जल and the other two

* Such *gunas* as are capable of standing by themselves in any particular thing, i.e., which are not produced like संयोग by the union of two things (द्विनिष्ठ).

dravyas they are not produced by the application of heat, but are *नित्य* or *अनित्य* according as they are found in the final atoms of these substances (*नित्य*), or in the combinations of these atoms (*अनित्य*). The heat (*उष्णस्पर्श*) felt at times in water or in the air they explain, as owing entirely to the presence of particles of *तेजस्* in the water or the air. Thus *पृथिवी* alone being admitted as subject to the change of form, taste, smell, and touch at a certain degree of temperature, opinions differ as to the way in which heat acts on any given mass of *पृथिवी*. A jar of earth being placed in fire, the *Vaisheshikas* maintain that the heat first reduces it to its component atoms which begin to change their form, &c.; and then forms these prepared atoms into the baked jar we see—for the heat cannot act on the atoms held together in the *form* of a jar, which, if it at all is to change its form, &c., must allow the atoms to be affected first. The *Naiyāyikas*, on the contrary, maintain that, under similar circumstances, the *jar* (form) is not at all destroyed, but heat acts on the whole up to its very atoms through the porosity of matter; for if it were not so it will be difficult to account for the food that is daily being cooked in earthen pots, or for our recognition of the baked pot, in the form “this is the same jar once placed in fire.”

27. *योग्य* = *प्रत्यक्षविषय* = capable of being directly cognised. The four *gunas* *रूप*, &c., may be either developed or undeveloped. In the eye which is a *तेजस इन्द्रिय*, as the *रूप* which ought to be *भास्वरशुक्ल* is not visible, it is assumed to be *अनुद्भूत* or undeveloped. Developed *रूप*, &c., are found in that combination of atoms which produce *पृथिवी*, &c., capable of being directly cognised.

28. The word *असाधारण* excludes all *साधारण* or common causes of things in general. ईश्वर, ईश्वरेच्छा, ईश्वरज्ञान, ईश्वरकृति, प्रागभाव, दिक्, काल, अद्भुत, and प्रतिबंधकाभाव are so many common causes in the formation of a thing. That therefore, which, over and above these, becomes the immediate special cause of the intercourse about numbers is called *सङ्ख्या*. गणना व्यवहारे तु हेतुः सङ्ख्याभिधीयते ॥ १०६ ॥ नित्येषु नित्यमेकत्वमनित्येऽनित्यमिव्यते । द्वित्वाद्यः परार्थान्ता अपेक्षाबुद्धिर्जा मताः ॥ १०७ ॥अपेक्षाबुद्धिनाशाच्च नाशस्तेषां निरूपितः ॥ १०८ ॥ अनेकैकत्वबुद्धिर्या सापेक्षाबुद्धिरिव्यते ॥प्रथममपेक्षाबुद्धिस्ततोद्वित्वोत्पत्तिस्ततोविशेषगज्ञानं द्वित्वत्वनिर्विकल्पात्मकं ततो द्वित्वविशिष्टप्रत्यक्षमपेक्षाबुद्धिनाशश्च ततो द्वित्वनाश इतिअयमेकौयमेक इत्याकारिका (अपेक्षाबुद्धिः) इत्यर्थः ॥ मुक्ता ॥ The number “one” is *नित्य* or *अनित्य* according as it is found in *नित्य* things or *अनित्य* things; but all the remaining num-

bers from two upwards are अनित्य, they being the products of अपेक्षाबुद्धि or sense of comparison. The mind can cognise but one thing at a time. When we see a group of things our knowledge of the various members of that group begins in a sort of comparison or differentiation of the several objects, with or from one another: in the form, this is one, this is one, and so on; the result being expressed by saying these are so many, or so many. The numbers two, three, and so on are various symbols of expressing the result of this act of comparison, and are अनित्य, being the products of this cause. These compound numbers are destroyed by the cessation of the action of the sense which produced them, viz., अपेक्षाबुद्धि. The passage from the *Muktavali* describes how these numbers are produced and destroyed. It may be noticed by the way that the *Vaisheshikas* look upon द्वित्व &c., as नित्य and not अनित्य.

29. It will be seen further on that महत्त्व or dimension is one of the causes of our direct perception of things. Hence महत् and दीर्घपरिमाण must exist in things, which are directly perceptible. It may be noticed that according to the evolution of the *Nyāya*, *paramānus* and *deyanukas* are not accessible to direct perception, which becomes possible only from *tryanuka*, and upwards.

30. We take द्व्यणुकपरिमाण as an instance of that परिमाण which is produced by सङ्ख्या, which, therefore, becomes its cause (असंकारण). If instead of (the अणुनिष्ठ) सङ्ख्या we assume अणुपरिमाण (to be found in the परमाणु which forms the द्व्यणुक) as the असमवायिकारण, we shall be involved in the necessity of believing the द्व्यणुक to be smaller (अणुतरपरिमाणवत्) than the परमाणु in dimension; in accordance with the rule: one dimension always produces another finer in kind than itself. This, however, is absurd. सङ्ख्या, therefore, must be accepted as the असंकारण of द्व्यणुक, &c.

31. Hence a वैशेषिक is described in the *Sarvadarshana Samgraha* as:—

द्वित्वे (note No. 28) च पाकजोत्पत्तौ (26) विभागे च विभागजे ।
यस्य न स्थलिता बुद्धिस्तं वै वैशेषिकं विदुः ॥

32. That which has the जाति—बुद्धि is *Buddhi*. In the *Tarkasamgraha* *Buddhi* is defined as सर्वव्यवहारहेतुर्ज्ञानं बुद्धिः । जानामीत्यनुव्यवसायगम्यज्ञानत्वमेव बुद्धेरलक्षणमित्यर्थः । on which *Nīlakantha* ज्ञानत्वमात्रं लक्षणम् । जानामीत्यनुव्यवसायगम्यत्वं तु ज्ञानत्वस्य प्रमाणसिद्धत्वसूचनाय । यत् जानामीत्यनुव्यवसायस्यानुगतधर्मंतरानुपपन्नत्वेन तस्य स्वीकर्तव्यतया लाघवाज्जादित्वसिद्धिः । इत्थं च मूले सर्वव्यवहारहेतुरिति । बुद्धेरलक्षणं

स्वरूपकथनमेव ॥ नील० ॥ As all intercourse depends on knowledge which is the function of बुद्धि, ज्ञानत्व will be the correct and precise definition of the term. How we arrive at this जाति, ज्ञानत्व is described in the words जानामीत्यनुव्यवसाय, &c. In all our perceptions we have the general consciousness of knowledge in the form I know this, I know that, and so on. As without this common consciousness, all perception will be rendered impossible, we describe that important factor by a general name ज्ञानत्व. Thus the व्यवसाय or, as it were, primary consciousness is ज्ञानत्व inferrible (गम्य) from the अनुव्यवसाय or secondary consciousness जानामि, which is identical in all perception.

33. Knowledge can be of two kinds: immediate or mediate. Immediate cognition is called अनुभव, and mediate cognition is called स्मृति. All direct cognition leaves some *impression* (संस्कार) on the mind, capable of being recalled into life at any moment. Hence that knowledge which is produced by संस्कार is स्मृति. Here the previous अनुभव acts through the संस्कार (*vide* note No. 35). The word ज्ञान in the definition prevents its अतिव्याप्ति to संस्कारध्वंस, for by the rule स्वध्वंसे प्रति स्वस्य कारणत्वम्, संस्कार is a cause of संस्कारध्वंस which is thus संस्कारजन्य, but is excluded not being ज्ञान. Nor should it be imagined that the definition still extends (अतिव्याप्ति) to प्रत्यभिज्ञा, a kind of direct cognition helped by memory in the form this is the same man I saw the other day: (सोऽयं देवदत्तः). It can easily be seen that this knowledge is produced by अनुभव, plus something; the अनुभव contributing to the इदंत्व expressed as अयं (देवदत्तः) in the act of cognition, and the additional factor in question contributing to the तत्ता expressed as स; in the same. If here the additional factor contributing to the तत्ता were संस्कार, the cognition called प्रत्यभिज्ञा will become संस्कारजन्य, and will be included in the definition of स्मृति. It is with this view of प्रत्यभिज्ञा that certain writers insert the word मात्र after संस्कार in the definition of स्मृति. But as, here, the remembrance (स्मृति) of the तत्ता produced by the previous संस्कार is the factor in question, प्रत्यभिज्ञा is not संस्कारजन्य, and cannot, therefore, be included in the definition (अतिव्याप्तिविरहात्).

34. All knowledge that is not स्मृति is अनुभव, which is of two kinds: प्रमा or यथार्थानुभव and अप्रमा or अयथार्थानुभव. अप्रमा or false cognition is produced by that which has only the semblance of an instrument of right knowledge. This, again, is of two kinds: भ्रम and संशय. The actual cognition of a thing as entirely different from

its real nature is *भ्रम* (or *विपर्यय* as it is often called); and the recognition of various attributes opposed to one another in one and the same thing is *संशय*. *एकस्मिन् धर्मिणि एकस्मिन्नेव पुरोवर्तिनि पदार्थे विरुद्धा व्यधिकरणा ये धर्माः स्थाणुत्वपुरुषत्वादयस्तेषां च वैशिष्ट्यं संबंधस्तद्वगाहि (कोटिकं) तद्विषयकं ज्ञानं संशयः*. The word *एकस्मिन्* in the definition excludes such collective knowledge (*समूहावलंबनज्ञान*) as *इनौ घटपटौ स्तः*, predicated of a collection of *घट* and *पट*, which certainly is no *संशय* but *प्रमा*. The word *विरुद्ध* prevents the definition from including all cases of such ordinary definitions as *घटो द्रव्यम् (घटत्वद्रव्यत्व-विशिष्टोऽयं पदार्थः)*. The word *नाना* keeps off such *प्रमा*, as *पटत्वविरुद्ध-घटत्ववान् घटः*. The illustration of *संशय*, *स्थाणुर्वा पुरुषो वा* is variously interpreted : *अयं पदार्थः स्थाणुत्वपुरुषत्वविशिष्टः । अयं पदार्थः स्थाणुर्वा न वा । अयं पदार्थः पुरुषो वा न वा ॥*

Some add a third kind of *अवयवार्थानुभव* called *तर्क* and define it as *व्याप्यारोपेन व्यापकारोपस्तर्कः ॥ तर्क० सं० ॥ व्याप्यपदं व्याप्यत्वेन ज्ञायमान-परम् । तेनाव्याप्यारोपेण तर्कं नाव्याप्तिः । आरोपपदं ज्ञानमात्रपरं । तेनाव्याप्यारोपेन धूमाभावेन बह्व्यभावतर्कं नाव्याप्तिः । व्यापकारोपेत्यनारोपपरं बाधविषयकावयवार्थ-निश्चयपरं । तेन ह्यहो वह्निमानित्यनुमितौ नातिव्याप्तिः ।इत्थं च व्याप्यत्वेन ज्ञानजन्यत्वे सति बाधविषयकावयवार्थनिश्चयजन्यत्वं पर्यवसितम् ॥ वाक्य० ॥* The falsifying of the *व्यापक* by assuming the *व्याप्य* is a *तर्क*, in the form *यदि वह्निर्न स्यात् तर्हि धूमोऽपि न स्यात्*, *बह्व्यभाव* being the *व्याप्य* and *धूमाभाव* being the *व्यापक*. The object of *तर्क* is to show that if one should deny the existence of fire and admit the existence of smoke, he is at once involved in the necessity of denying the existence of smoke as well, which being contrary to the hypothesis, is absurd. Thus we can easily see that a *तर्क* always ends in an absurd conclusion, and so far resembles the *reductio ad absurdum* of European Logic. A *Tarka* is used in establishing a *व्याप्ति*, as in the inference *पर्वतो वह्निमान् धूमान्*, the *व्याप्ति* between *धूम* and *वह्नि*. Because smoke is seen, fire is inferred, but if some one should so far forget the laws of causation as to admit smoke and deny fire, the *तर्क*—if no fire, no smoke—will at once render him conscious of the absurdity of his conclusion. Thus, though *तर्क* is useful in establishing a *प्रमा*, it itself is an *अप्रमा*, in which it always must result. Compare *व्यभिचार-स्याप्रहोय सहचारग्रहस्तथा । हेतुर्व्याप्तिग्रहे तर्कः क्वचिच्छङ्कानिवर्तकः ॥ २३७ ॥ व्यभिचाराग्रहः सहचारग्रहश्च व्याप्तिग्रहे कारणम् । यत्र भूयोदर्शनादपि शङ्का नापैति तत्र विपक्षे बाधतर्कोऽपेक्षितः । तथाहि । वह्निविरहिष्यपि धूमः स्यादिति यद्याशङ्का भवति तदा सा वह्निधूमयोः कार्यकारणभावस्य प्रतिसंधाना-न्निवर्तते ॥ मुक्ता० ॥*

All that knowledge which is apart from अप्रमा is यथार्थानुभव or प्रमा (प्रमन्निर्णं तु ज्ञानमत्रोच्यते प्रमा ॥ मुक्ता० ॥). That is, यथार्थ, which is capable of producing such action as leads to some real result, and an अनुभव which is of this kind is प्रमा ; as the cognition of gold in a piece of gold.

प्रमा and अप्रमा are defined by some as तद्वति तत्प्रकारकोऽनुभवः and तदभाववति तत्प्रकारकोऽनुभवः ॥ तर्क० सं० ॥ तत्प्रकारकं यज्ज्ञानं तद्विज्ञेयकं तत् प्रमा । तच्छून्ये तन्मतिर्या स्यादप्रमा सा निरूपिता ॥ मुक्ता० ॥ In all direct cognition the thing seen and the form in which it is seen are supposed to be related to each other as the qualified (विज्ञेय) and the qualifier (विशेषण or प्रकार) e.g., the cognition इदं रजतम् is equal to रजतत्ववत् (विशेषण) इदम् (विज्ञेय), equal again to इदं पदार्थविज्ञेयकं रजतत्वप्रकारकं ज्ञानम्. Hence यथार्थानुभव means तद्वत् (किञ्चिद्धर्मवत्) विज्ञेयकं तत् (किञ्चिद्धर्म) प्रकारकं ज्ञानम् (सम्यर्थो विज्ञेयत्वम् ॥ नील० ॥), i.e., continuing the previous illustration, रजतत्ववति (रजते) रजतत्वप्रकारकं ज्ञानम्. Similarly in अयथार्थानुभव, it will be observed, that the विज्ञेय is the अभाव of the धर्म which is the प्रकार of that knowledge, e.g., रजतत्वाभाववति (शुक्तौ) रजतत्वप्रकारकं ज्ञानम्. It must further be noticed that the relation of the विज्ञेयकत्व and प्रकारकत्व with the thing must be the same as that between the धर्म and the thing, viz., समवाय. इदं तु बोध्यं । येन संबन्धेन यद्वत्ता तेन संबन्धेन तद्विज्ञेयकत्वं तेन संबन्धेन तत्प्रकारकत्वं वाच्यं । तेन कपालादौ संयोगादिना घटाद्विज्ञाने नातिव्याप्तिः ॥ मुक्ता० ॥

The instrument (करण see note No. 35) of प्रमा, i.e., that which leads to यथार्थानुभव, is called प्रमाण, and is common to स्मृति as well as अनुभव. प्रमाण is defined in the *Sarvadarshana Samgraha* as साधनाभ्याव्यतिरिक्तत्वे सति प्रमाव्याप्तं प्रमाणम् ॥, which Mr. E. B. Cowell renders as "proof is that which is always accompanied by right knowledge, and is at the same time not disjoined from the proper instruments (as the eye, &c.), and from the site of knowledge."

35. That cause which contributes to an effect through some व्यापार is called करण. व्यापार means that which directly produces the effect to be produced by the cause, from which it itself has originally been produced. तत् (कारण)जन्यत्वे सति तत् (कारण)जन्य(कार्य) जनको व्यापारः e.g., संस्कार which directly contributes to स्मृति (the effect of अनुभव), and which is produced from अनुभव is the व्यापार through which the original cause (अनुभव the कारण) acts in producing स्मृति. Though करण is but a case of causation, it is distinguished from the general description of "cause," "as it possesses a peculiar feature,

and presents a greater degree of complexity than the common case. It often happens that the effect or one of the effects of a cause is, not to produce of itself a certain phenomena, but to fit something else for producing it. In other words, there is a case of causation in which the effect is to invest an object with a certain property." Mill's Logic, p. 388, Vol. I.

From this view of a कारण we naturally come to consider the nature of causation, and first begin with the query what is a cause? अनन्यथासिद्धनियतपूर्ववृत्ति कारणम्-अनन्यथासिद्धम् and कार्यनियतपूर्ववृत्ति कारणम् (नियतत्वं हि व्यापकत्वम् । यत्र कार्यं तत्र कारणमिति रूपम् ॥ नील० ॥ The words पूर्ववृत्ति exclude कार्य from the definition, for a कार्य is व्यापक of itself, but not पूर्ववृत्ति. A causé is पूर्ववृत्ति—necessarily preceding its effect, for "causation is the law of the *succession* of phenomena." Mill's Logic, p. 396, Vol. I. If, again, the words अनन्यथासिद्धम् were omitted, several accidental circumstances will be included in the idea of a cause, as will appear further on. All such accidental things must be excluded, for, in order to arrive at a correct induction—"which process is essentially an enquiry into cases of causation"—it is necessary that all circumstances which do not immediately and invariably contribute to the result, must be carefully excluded from the idea of a cause. Thus the word नियत—constantly concomitant—will be seen to exclude all remote circumstances, for constant concomitance of effect and cause means that the one is where the other is, and the one is not where the other is not (अन्वयव्यतिरेक = व्यापकत्वम्). When divested of all accidental and remote circumstances a cause may be defined as "the antecedent or concurrence of antecedents on which it (the effect) is invariably and *unconditionally* consequent"—Mill's Logic, p. 392, Vol. I. Thus, then, that is the cause of a given effect which precedes the effect, and is in constant concomitance with it, and is not अन्यथासिद्ध (disproved to be a cause by some other circumstance).

A thing can be shown to be no cause by one of three ways: (1) येन (इण्डेन or तन्तुना) सहैव यस्य (इण्डरूपस्य, इण्डत्वस्य, &c., or तन्तुरूपस्य तन्तुत्वस्य, तन्तुसंयोगस्य, &c.), यं (घटम् or पटम्) प्रति पूर्ववृत्तित्वमवगम्यते तेन (इण्डेन or तन्तुना) तस्य (इण्डरूपादेः or तन्तुरूपादेः) तं (घटम् or पटम्) प्रत्यन्यथासिद्धिः. All those which are known simultaneously with any particular immediate antecedent of an effect (सहितत्वमेकज्ञानविषयत्वं बोद्धव्यम् ॥ नील० ॥) are prevented from becoming the cause of that effect, by the antecedent on whose knowledge, the grasp of these

things depends, *e.g.*, तन्तुत्व, &c., which are known with तन्तु the antecedent of a घट, are prevented from becoming the cause of that घट by तन्तु.

(2) अन्य (शब्द) प्रति पूर्ववृत्तित्वे ज्ञात एव यस्य (आकाशस्य) यं (घटम्) प्रति पूर्ववृत्तित्वं गृह्यते तं (घटम्) प्रति तस्य (आकाशस्य) अन्यथासिद्धिः. That which is known to be antecedent to the given effect, on being known as the antecedent of something else is अन्यथासिद्धि with respect to that effect. As आकाश in the case of a घट. If आकाश were the cause of घट, we must understand its character as such, viz, the कारणतावच्छेदक of आकाश. This, in the present instance, will be आकाशत्व, which, however, cannot become a जाति (see note No. 6), and cannot, therefore, be clearly grasped. We must, therefore, understand आकाशत्व as शब्दसमवायिकारणत्व (शब्द being the *guna* of आकाश). Thus, as in trying to understand the nature of आकाश, the supposed cause of घट, we find it to be the antecedent of शब्द alone, we at once exclude it as अन्यथासिद्धि, from the category of causes contributing to the घट. So also the कुलालपित्तं, &c.

(3) अन्यत्र (घटान्तरे) कृतनियतपूर्ववृत्तिनः (दण्डचक्रादेः) एव कार्यं (प्रकृतघट) सम्भवे तत् (दण्डचक्रादि) सहभूतत्वं (देवागतरासभस्य) अन्यथासिद्धिः. The effect in hand being producible by causes known to be sufficient and necessarily concomitant and antecedent in similar other effects, anything that chances (with respect to the effect in hand) to exist with these causes, is अन्यथासिद्धि. With respect to a particular घट, we know that as in the case of other *ghatas* so in the case of this, दण्डचक्र, &c., must be the sufficient and necessary causes. Now an ass chancing to be among these causes (being used for the purposes of fetching the clay and the like) is अन्यथासिद्धि with respect to the घट in question, it being no more necessary to bring the clay on the back of an ass than in the hands of a man. It may here be questioned that though thus a particular ass may be prevented from becoming the cause of a particular घट, is it not necessary that the ass-kind (*i.e.*, some instrument of carrying the clay) should be a cause of the *ghata*-kind in general? The word नियत in the definition at once suggests a negative answer, inasmuch as रासभत्व is not an *invariable antecedent* of घटत्व; or, in other words, it is not present at the place where the कार्य is forming (कार्यदेशे), at the moment *immediately* antecedent (अव्यवहितपूर्वकालावच्छेदेन). If, however, instead of this, the words अन्यत्र in the definition were made to refer to a thing belonging to a class other than the one implied by

the word कार्य in the same, then रासभत्व can be shown to be अन्यथासिद्ध, but it will be impossible to understand how we can institute any comparison between the causes of effects, each belonging to a different class? Hence, says the text, नहि घटसामान्यादन्यत्र पदारौ, &c.

On careful examination it will appear that this kind of अन्यथासिद्धि includes the first two : एतेषु अन्यथासिद्धिषु मध्ये (अयं)मन्यथासिद्ध आवश्यकः । तेनैव परेषां चरितार्थत्वात् । तथाहि । इण्डादिभिरव-
श्यकृतनियतपूर्ववृत्तिभिरेव कार्यसंभवे इण्डत्वादिकमन्यथासिद्धम् ।
एवमन्येषामन्यतेनैव चरितार्थत्वं संभवति ॥ मुक्ता० ॥ also लघुनियतपूर्ववर्तित एव
कार्यसंभवे तद्विन्नमन्यथासिद्धम् । इत्येकविधमेवान्यथासिद्धत्वम् । लघुत्वं च शरीर-
कृतलघुस्थितिकृतं संबन्धकृतं च । तत्र प्रथममनेकद्रव्यत्वापेक्षया महत्त्वे । द्वितीयं
गन्धं प्रति रूपप्रागभावापेक्षया गन्धप्रागभावे गन्धस्य प्रतियोगिन उपास्थितत्वेन
शीघ्रं तदुपास्थितेः । तृतीयं इण्डत्वं इण्डरूपाद्यपेक्षया इण्डादौ स्वाश्रयइण्डसंयोगादि-
रूपपरंपरया गुरुत्वात् । एवं चैतावतैव निर्वाहेऽन्यथासिद्धिस्त्रिधा पञ्चधा चेति प्रप-
ञ्चो व्युत्पत्तिवैचित्र्याय ॥ नील० ॥

With the third kind of अन्यथासिद्धि in mind I am unable to perceive the usefulness of the word नियत in the original definition of कारण, and would recommend this point to the consideration of the reader. It should finally be remembered that with so many kinds of अन्यथासिद्धि in hand, we shall find that every कारण which acts through व्यापारं will become अन्यथासिद्ध. The philosophers of this school, however, obviate this difficulty by ruling : व्यापारेण व्यापारिणो नान्यथासिद्धिः ॥

36. यत्संभवेतं कार्यं &c. = यस्मिन् समवायसंबन्धेन वर्तमानं सन्, &c. For the kinds of समवाय, and its meaning (see note No. 63). The words प्रत्या-
सन्न in the definition of an असमवायिकारण mean समवायसंबन्धेन वर्तमान-
त्वम् (न्या० को०), the being in *Samavāya* relation. That, therefore, is an असमवायिकारण, which is related by *Samavāya* with its समवायिकारण
e.g., तन्तुसंयोग, which is a cause of पट, and which is related to the
असमवायिकारण of पट, viz., तन्तु by समवाय, is the असमवायिकारण of पट.
So also तन्तुरूप is the अ० स० cause of पटरूप, being related by समवाय
with the समवायिकारण (of पटरूप, viz., पट), through its (पटस्य) आश्रय
(the तन्तु) with which again it stands in समवायसंबन्ध. Here we
observe that the existence of the असंकारण in a common object
along with its effect, is either direct, or through the cause of that
effect. In the first instance, तन्तुसंयोग and पट, are both found to be
related to तन्तु by the same relation, viz., समवाय; but in the second,
तन्तुरूप, is found to be related to तन्तु, not with its effect पटरूप, but

with the cause of that effect, viz., पट. Thus we find असवाधिकारण sometimes defined as कार्येण कारणेन वा सहैकस्मिन्नर्थे समवेतत्वे सति कारणम् ॥ तर्क० सं० ॥.

37. The word तत् in तच्च प्रमाकरणम् refers to the word प्रमाण in the definition प्रमाकरणं प्रमाणम्. The *Vaisheshikas* accept only two प्रमाणs or instruments of right knowledge: प्रत्यक्ष and अनुमान; the other two शब्द and उपमान deriving their validity, but from the second of the first two. The *Naiyāyikas*, on the other hand, hold all four to be good instruments of knowledge; and the *Mīmāṃsakas* and the *Vedāntins* add two more in the form of अर्थापत्ति and अनुपलब्धि.

38. The order of perception, established is this: आत्मा मनसा युज्यते—मन इन्द्रियेण—इन्द्रियमर्थेन—ततः प्रत्यक्षम्. External objects come in contact with the various organs of sense, which come in contact with the mind, which in its turn is joined with the soul; thus results प्रत्यक्षज्ञान. Hence प्रत्यक्ष is defined as that which is produced by objects (अर्थ) coming in contact with (संनिकर्ष) the senses (इन्द्रिय). This प्रत्यक्ष is the instrument (करण) of प्रत्यक्षप्रमा—प्रत्यक्षज्ञान, इन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्ष being the व्यापार. In order to prevent the अव्याप्ति of this definition to the direct perception of God, in Whose case no इन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्ष is supposed to be necessary, some argue that this definition does not imply ईश्वरप्रत्यक्ष, but is meant to describe जन्य or अनित्य or mortal perception only. इन्द्रियं चक्षुरादिकम् । अर्थो घटादिः । तयोः संनिकर्षः संयोगः । तज्जन्यं ज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षम् । संनिकर्षध्वंसवारणाय ज्ञानमिति । अनुमितिवारणायैन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षोति । न चेश्वरप्रत्यक्षेऽव्याप्तिरिति वाच्यम् । अत्र जन्यप्रत्यक्षस्यैव लक्षितत्वात् । यथाह भगवान्सूत्रकारः । इन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षोत्पन्नं ज्ञानमव्यपदेश्यमव्यभिचारिव्यवसायात्मकप्रत्यक्षसाधारणमिति । सि० चं० ॥ also न चेन्द्रियजन्यत्वाभावादीश्वरप्रत्यक्षेऽव्याप्तिरत आह ईश्वरप्रत्यक्षं तु न लक्ष्यमिति । तथा च जन्यप्रत्यक्षमेव लक्ष्यमिति भावः । अव्यभिचारिभ्रमाभिन्नमित्यर्थः । अव्यपदेश्यमिति । निर्विकल्पकमित्यर्थः । व्यपदेशपदवाच्यत्वं तद्विषयकमित्यर्थाद्विशिष्टज्ञाने तत्तत्पदवाच्यत्वमुपनीतं भासत इति प्राचीनमतानुसारित्वान् । व्यवसायात्मकमिति विशिष्टज्ञानात्मकमित्यर्थः । विशिष्टज्ञानात्मकमिति यावत् । ईश्वरप्रत्यक्षस्यापि लक्ष्यत्वमभिप्रेत्याह । ज्ञानाकरणकमिति (in the *Muktāvali*) ज्ञानाजन्यमित्युक्तौ चाव्याप्तिर्विशिष्टज्ञानमात्रस्य विशेषणज्ञानजन्यत्वादतो ज्ञानाकरणकमिति । अनुमित्यादौ व्याख्यादिज्ञानस्य करणत्वमस्यैवेति न तत्रातिव्याप्तिः । अकरणकत्वादेव चेश्वरज्ञानसंग्रहः ॥ दिन० ॥ Though by the words इन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्ष the writer implies an exclusion of अनुमिति, &c., the author of the *Vedānta Paribhāṣā*, bearing in mind the circumstance that the *Naiyāyika* calls मनस् an इन्द्रिय, and that प्रत्यक्ष to him is possible by such

संनिकर्ष as ज्ञानलक्षण and others, calls in question, and perhaps justly, the division of knowledge into प्रत्यक्ष and अनुमान, &c.

39. *Pratyaksha* is of two kinds : सविकल्पक and निर्विकल्पक. That which arises from the relation of the qualifier and the qualified is called सविकल्पक, and that which respects no such relation is called निर्विकल्पक, e.g., इदं पदार्थविशेष्यकं घटस्वप्नकारकं घट इति ज्ञानं सविकल्पकम् । घट घटत्वं इत्याकारकमतीन्द्रियं ज्ञानं निर्विकल्पकम् ॥ All सविकल्पकज्ञान has to do with the thing and the form in which it is seen, whereas निर्विकल्पकज्ञान not being of this kind is necessarily अतीन्द्रियं, beyond the grasp of the senses, and hence indescribable. It is a kind of knowledge wherein there is an unbroken consciousness of the thing itself, e.g., घट or घटत्वं, &c. It is thus of the form घट or the form घटत्वं or the like, but not of the form इदं पदार्थविशेष्यकं घटस्वप्नकारकम्, &c. It cannot be maintained that such निर्विकल्पकज्ञान does not exist, for if it were so, one rising from sleep (which is supposed to obliterate all previous knowledge) will not recognise a घट without having previously (in his mind, in the form of संस्कार), the निर्विकल्पकज्ञान—घटत्वं, the form which the substance presented possesses, and is, therefore, at once recognised as a घट—all विशिष्टज्ञान—formal knowledge—being in this theory dependent on the विशेषणज्ञान—the knowledge of the form. For further discussion about the शक्ति (connotation and denotation) of words in this connection see note No. 55. Compare with this view of निर्विकल्पकज्ञान the *Vedāntic* view निर्विकल्पस्तु ज्ञातृज्ञानादिभेदलयापेक्षया अद्वितीयवस्तुनि तदाकाराकारितायाश्चित्तवृत्तेरतितरामेकीभाविनावस्थानम् ॥ वेदा० सा० ॥

40. In every act of direct perception the व्यापार is, as we have seen, the इन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्ष. But as everything, which is the object of direct perception, is not always in immediate contact with the sense of perception, the व्यापार in acts of लौकिक (i.e., produced by external senses) प्रत्यक्ष is assumed to be of six kinds. Perception (1) by actual contact, as the sight of a jar, &c.; (2) by being in समवाय with that which is in direct contact (संयुक्त), as the grasp of the *guna*, *karma*, or *jāti* of a substance; (3) by being in समवाय with that which is already in समवाय with the thing in direct contact, as of the *jāti* गुणत्व and कर्मत्व; (4) by simple समवाय, as of शब्द; (5) by being in समवाय with that which is grasped by समवाय, as शब्दत्वं; and lastly by (6) adjectival relation, as of समवाय and अभाव. Inasmuch as समवाय and अभाव are not capable of being directly observed, we perceive them only in the form of an adjective qualifying the thing of which one or both of them are predicated; thus इह शब्दसमवायोऽस्ति is equal to

शब्दसमवायविशिष्टमिदम् or इह यदो नास्ति is equal to घटाभावविशिष्टमिदम्. It is further easy to observe that the adjective may at times qualify the instrument of knowledge (इन्द्रिय), as in the case of the cognition of शब्दसमवाय or शब्दाभाव (for शब्द is cognizable by the ear alone, and it stands to the ear in समवाय relation); or the object in direct contact with the instrument of knowledge (इन्द्रियसंबद्ध), as in the case of घटसमवाय or घटाभाव. अभावप्रत्यक्षे समवायप्रत्यक्षे चेन्द्रियसंबद्धविशेषणता हेतुः । वैशिष्टिकमते तु समवायो न प्रत्यक्षः । अत्र यद्यपि विशेषणता नानाविधा तथापि भूतलादौ घटाद्यभावः संयुक्तविशेषणतया गृह्यते । संख्यादौ रूपाद्यभावः संयुक्तसमवेतविशेषणतया । शब्दाभावः केवलश्रोत्रावच्छिन्नविशेषणतया । कादौ खत्वाद्यभावः श्रोत्रावच्छिन्नसमवेतविशेषणतया । यदादौ पटाभावश्च संयुक्तविशेषणतया तथापि विशेषणता त्वेकैव सा ॥ कुक्ता० ॥

41. In the प्रत्यक्ष called अलौकिक (not cognised by the external senses) or mental, the संनिकर्ष which is the instrument is of three kinds: (1) सामान्यलक्षण, (2) ज्ञानलक्षण, (3) योगजधर्म. सामान्य लक्षण इत्येत्यर्थः । तत्र लक्षणपदेन यदि स्वरूपमुच्यते तदा सामान्यस्वरूपा प्रत्यासत्तिरित्यर्थो लभ्यते । तच्चेन्द्रियसंबद्धविशेष्यकज्ञानप्रकारीभूता बोध्या । तथाहि । यच्चेन्द्रियसंयुक्ता धूमादिस्तद्विशेष्यकं धूम इति ज्ञानं यत्र जातं तत्र ज्ञाने धूमत्वं प्रकारस्तत्र धूमत्वेन संनिकर्षेण धूमा इत्येवं रूपं सकलधूमविषयकं ज्ञानं जायते । आसत्तिराश्रयाणां तु सामान्यज्ञानमिष्यते । ... तथा च सामान्यलक्षण इत्यत्र लक्षणशब्दस्य विषयोऽर्थस्तेन सामान्यविषयकं ज्ञानं प्रत्यासत्तिरित्यर्थो लभ्यते ॥

कुक्ता० ॥ The (mental) perception of all that is the substratum of a particular सामान्य, follows immediately upon the comprehension of that सामान्य. In having therefore a knowledge of the whole class to which an object directly cognised belongs, the व्यापार is सामान्य-लक्षण, viz., that whose लक्षण is a सामान्य. We see धूम at a particular place, and though the विशेष्य here is the धूम, the प्रकार is धूमत्व, the required सामान्य, through the comprehension whereof everything which is the आश्रय of धूमत्व, viz., धूम in general, is at once cognised. The व्यापार in this प्रत्यक्ष, therefore, is the सामान्यलक्षण—धूमत्व. About the physical instruments which are rendered capable of cognising objects in any one of these three ways, opinions are divided. The old school (संप्रदायविदः) holds that the perception produced by these is capable of being produced by any one of the six senses; whereas later writers hold, and perhaps correctly, that it is the mind alone that becomes the instrument. (2) By the ज्ञानलक्षणसंनिकर्ष is produced through the mind a knowledge of all objects which are the subject thereof; e.g., the imaginary forms of a poet's fancy. So also,

in the perception, this ointment is fragrant, the knowledge of the abstract—सौरभ—is produced by this संनिकर्ष; for as सौरभ is not perceptible by the eye (चक्षुरयोग्य, it being no substance or जाति or अभाव &c.) it cannot be cognizable by the संयुक्तसमवाय or संयुक्तसमवेतसमवाय संनिकर्ष. The difference between ज्ञानलक्षण and सामान्यलक्षण संनिकर्ष lies in the fact that the one leads to a perception of the thing itself and the other to a perception of the substratum of that thing. सामान्य-लक्षणा प्रत्यासत्तिर्हि तदाश्रयस्य ज्ञानं जनयति। ज्ञानलक्षणाप्रत्यासत्तिस्तु यद्विषयकं ज्ञानं तस्यैव प्रत्यासत्तिः ॥ मुक्ता० ॥ (3) By the योगजधर्मसंनिकर्ष (योगजो योगान्ध्यासजनितो धर्मविशेषः श्रुतिपुराणादिप्रतिपाद्य इत्यर्थः ॥ मुक्ता० ॥) is produced in the *Yogin*, the direct perception of all knowable things.

42. Having described the two kinds of व्यापार or संनिकर्ष as the means through which the senses perceive objects, the author takes up the original प्रत्यक्षज्ञान (तच्च प्रत्यक्षं, &c.); and divides it into six classes according as the thing perceived belongs to the class of things cognizable by any one of the senses.


43. If ब्राण and the other senses were really the असाधारणकारण of the various perceptions of गन्ध, &c., the गन्ध of a परमाणु as well as of a jewel must be cognizable by ब्राण. This, however, is not possible, for the rule of perception is that गन्ध, &c., become amenable to the senses only when they are found in the same place as dimension (महत्त्वसमानाधिकरणाः), and are developed (उद्भूत). The smell in the atom is not co-existent with dimension, for atomic combinations begin to assume any visible dimension only from the व्यपुक्त and upwards; that in the jewel is not developed.

So also in the case of शब्द, though आकाश, the generating cause, is everywhere, the sound is not heard by us from wheresoever it may be produced. Sound produced by the beating of a drum at some distance is heard only when it is transmitted to the portion of आकाश intercepted in the ear, by what is called the वीचितरङ्गन्याय (= the argument or analogy of a wave propelling a wave. As one wave in the ocean drives forth another, till the first and all in succession reach the shore, so one sound propels another in the great ocean of आकाश, till the first and all successive sounds reach the ear and become cognizable), or the कदम्बगोलकन्याय (= the argument or analogy of *Kadamba* buds. No sooner does rain water touch the closed buds of a *Kadamba* tree, they open on all sides at once. Some say the buds of the *Kadamba*, whenever they open, put forth their petals on all four sides at once. In both the ideas

the point is the simultaneity of the process. Just as these buds open at once or put forth petals on all sides immediately, so on the production of sound its forms, so to speak, branch off on all sides to the ear which can cognise them).

Leaving the *gunas* and the rule of their perception, the author comes to the *dravyas*, and the rule of their perception. He concludes that of the six senses, घ्राण, रसना and श्रोत्र are not capable of apprehending any *dravya*; whereas चक्षुष्, त्वक् and मनस् are. That *dravya* which has *dimension*, as well as *developed form*, is capable of being cognised by the eye. So also, *mutatis mutandis*, of the skin. Hence the जाति—द्रव्यत्व, &c., कर्म and the other *gunas* enumerated become cognizable by the eye or the skin, according as they stand by समवाय in some proper द्रव्य, i.e., द्रव्य amenable to the senses, as also the समवाय and अभाव of each. जीवात्मा together with its *gunas*, &c., is cognised by the mind. The rule, therefore, is: that organ of sense which cognises anything, cognises its सामान्य, समवाय and अभाव as well.

44. *Anumāna* is the *karana* of अनुमिति or inference, and it takes the form of the generalisation धूमो वह्निव्याप्य. व्याप्य is a term which covers a smaller area than its correlative व्यापक as in the present instance धूम, whose व्यापक is वह्नि. The expression धूमो वह्निव्याप्य, therefore, means that धूम is constantly and invariably accompanied by fire, i.e., they are related as cause and effect; or there exists a व्याप्ति between the two. व्याप्य generally corresponds to the middle term of a syllogism and व्यापक to the major, these being respectively called हेतु or साधन and साध्य. Now, when अनुमान is said to be the *karana*, the लिङ्गपरामर्श or तृतीयलिङ्गपरामर्श, as it is here described, becomes the व्यापार. परामर्श is often described as व्याप्तिविशिष्टपक्षधर्मज्ञानं परामर्शः, and it takes the form वह्निव्याप्यधूमवानयम्. पक्ष is the thing about which something is to be proved; and corresponds to the minor term of a syllogism. पक्षधर्म is the quality of the पक्ष, as धूम of the mountain on which it is seen. The पक्षधर्मता, therefore, is in the धूम. धूमवानयम् is the पक्षधर्मज्ञान, but it hardly assists us to the last inference, till we know that this धूम which the mountain possesses, is constantly accompanied by fire. Thus the ज्ञान of the पक्षधर्मता must be qualified, must be invariably accompanied, by a knowledge of the relation between धूम and वह्नि, or by the knowledge of the व्याप्ति of the two. It will, however, not do to know that धूम which has a व्याप्ति with वह्नि is on the पक्ष, for, to produce the required inference, the remembrance—धूम has व्याप्ति with वह्नि, must be almost simultaneous



with the apprehension of the existence of धूम on the mountain. Hence व्याप्तिविशिष्टं (and not व्याप्तिविशिष्टस्य or विशिष्टे) पक्षधर्मताज्ञानं परामर्शः. लिङ्ग or sign means the same thing as हेतु, and this kind of परामर्श is often called लिङ्गपरामर्श or तृतीयलिङ्गपरामर्श. It is further explained how this परामर्श is the third. The first step in the process of constructing the syllogism is the ascertainment of the major premis, in the form A is B : wherever there is smoke, there is fire. This is ascertained by observing the frequent concomitance of धूम and वह्नि as in a cooking-room &c. When smoke is seen at some place, as on a hill, this generalisation at once comes up to the mind, in connection with that smoke. This is the second step. The third consists in asserting, this hill has smoke which has व्याप्ति with fire. It should be remembered that the apprehension of smoke and the remembrance of the व्याप्ति are both acts, as it were, of one consciousness, as explained above. The syllogism being thus complete, the inference follows. Thus Anumiti is the knowledge of the लिङ्गी through the लिङ्ग, which means that which has a व्याप्ति and पक्षधर्मता. Taking the लिङ्ग to be धूम, in order to be able to infer वह्नि (लिङ्गी) we must know that there is a constant concomitance between धूम and वह्नि (व्याप्ति), and that the धूम is on the mountain (पक्षधर्मता). Thus अनुमिति is लिङ्गज्ञानजन्यं लिङ्गिज्ञानम्.

The important step in every syllogism is the establishment of the major premis or व्याप्ति by a series of observations (प्रत्यक्ष); the form in which we may afterwards cast our reasoning to ascertain whether any particular instance is included in the generalisation, being but a secondary process. It is very appropriately remarked: "when therefore we conclude from the death of John and Thomas and every other person we ever heard of, in whose case the experiment had been fairly tried, that the Duke of Wellington is mortal like the rest, we may indeed pass through the generalisation all men are mortal as an intermediate step, but it is not in the latter half of the process, the descent from all men to the Duke of Wellington, that the *inference* resides. The inference is finished when we have asserted that all men are mortal. What remains to be performed afterwards is merely deciphering our own notes"—Mill's Logic, Vol. I., p. 214. Also "the reasoning lies in the act of generalisation, not in interpreting the record of that act, but the syllogistic form is an indispensable collateral security for the correctness of the generalisation itself"—p. 225. Hence it is plain that the knowledge of the लिङ्ग in

the form of the परामर्श described before is the real inference. The *Naiyayika* syllogism is generally stated in a form divested of the *petitio principii* which the western form of syllogism is supposed to involve. When it is stated यत्र यत्र धूमस्तत्र तत्रानिर्व्या महात्मसः we plainly have the major premis divested of the fallacy. "In the argument which proves that Socrates is mortal one indispensable part of the premis will be as follows, 'my father, and my father's father, A, B, C, and an indefinite number of other persons were mortal,' which is only an expression in different words of the observed fact that they have died. This is the major premis divested of the *petitio principii*, and, cut down to as much as is really known by direct evidence"—Vol. I., p. 232. And, lastly, it may be remarked that the form of syllogism under consideration is neither entirely deductive nor inductive, but combines both the processes together, for it is inductive inasmuch as it gives the very steps by which the major premis has been arrived at, and deductive inasmuch as it applies this generalisation to a case in hand.

45. The question of arriving at a generalisation evidently involves the whole theory of causation. It will be interesting, therefore, to observe what rules the ancients have laid down for carrying on the process of induction, and with what success. A व्याप्ति is defined as अव्यभिचरितसामानाधिकरण्यम्—the सामानाधिकरण्य (constant concomitance—of the हेतु and साध्य), without variation (व्यभिचार) in any single instance. The same is defined by *Gangesho-pādhyāya*, after rejecting the five पूर्वपक्षलक्षणः (1) साध्याभाववदवृत्तित्वम्. (2) साध्यवद्भिन्नसाध्याभाववदवृत्तित्वम्. (3) साध्यवत्प्रतियोगिकान्योन्याभावासामानाधिकरण्यम्. (4) सकलसाध्याभाववन्निष्ठाभावप्रतियोगित्वम्. (5) साध्यवदन्यावृत्तित्वम्, as हेतुसमानाधिकरण्याव्यन्ताभावाप्रतियोगिसाध्यसामानाधिकरण्यम् ॥ साध्याभाववदवृत्तित्वाल्लोच्यते न संभवति । इदं वाच्यं ज्ञेयत्वादित्यादावव्याप्तेः । साध्याभाववदप्रसिद्धिरित्यालोच्यते । हेतुसमानाधिकरणेति । वह्निमान् धूमादित्यादौ धूमसमानाधिकरणे योऽव्यन्ताभावो घटाव्यन्ताभावस्तदप्रतियोगी वह्निस्तत्सामानाधिकरण्यं धूमेऽस्तीतिकृत्वा लक्षणसमन्वयः ॥ नील० ॥ This sort of constant invariable concomitance is found in all good हेतुs, as in smoke proving the existence of fire. This concomitance is proved by अन्वय and व्यतिरेक in the form A is, where B is; A is not where B is not, or B is not where A is not; answering to Mill's Inductive Methods of Agreement and Difference. The concomitance (सहचार) यत्र धूमस्तत्राग्निः must, however, be established not only by instances corroborating the assertion, but also by showing that धूम is not at any place where fire is not

(व्यभिचाराभाव). All good हेतुs, as has been said before, are of this kind; but a bad one is not such, *e.g.*, if smoke be inferred from वह्नि the हेतु—वह्नि will be a bad one; for the concomitance of fire and smoke can be shown to be broken (व्यभिचार) in the case of a heated ball of iron. Hence in arriving at a व्याप्ति, we require the सहचारज्ञान with (सहकृत) the व्यभिचाराभावज्ञान. व्यभिचार or variation means the existence of the हेतु at a place where the साध्य is not. As on this being known it becomes impossible to assert a general rule of causation, it follows that the absence of this व्यभिचार is a cause in the assertion of a व्याप्ति. But over and above this there must be an ascertained concomitance of the साध्य and हेतु as shown before. Thus this concomitance, assisted by, or accompanied with, a knowledge of the absence of any variation, is the instrument of establishing a general rule of causation (व्याप्ति).

46. If we are sure that there is fire on the mountain we do not undertake the trouble of proving it to ourselves; but we may still do so, if, in order to convince some one, we desire to demonstrate the existence of fire. Hence in the case of proving something of another thing, two things become necessary; the doubt as to the relation between the two; and the desire to ascertain the relation (whether previously ascertained or not). Now पक्ष is the thing of which something is to be predicated, *i.e.*, whose relation with the साध्य is to be proved. This can happen only if the साध्य is not known to be with the पक्ष; so also can it take place whenever we want to demonstrate the relation. In order that पक्षता may be found in a thing there should be an absence of साध्यनिश्चय, which (निश्चयाभाव) again must be accompanied by the absence of the desire to demonstrate. If there is साध्यनिश्चय no inference can proceed, and even if there is साध्यनिश्चय the inference can proceed if there is अनुमित्सा; so the साध्यनिश्चय must be accompanied by the absence of अनुमित्सा to prevent the inference from taking place. When, therefore, the inference does take place, there is an absence of साध्य-निश्चय accompanied with अनुमित्साविरह *i.e.*, पक्षता is अनुमित्साविरहविशिष्टसाध्यनिश्चयाभावः or in the words of the *Dipikā* सिषाधयिषाविरहसहकृतसिद्धभावः। साध्यसिद्धिरनुमितप्रतिबन्धिका। सिद्धिसत्त्वेऽप्यनुमिनोमीतीच्छाया-मनुमितिदर्शनात्सिषाधयिषोत्तेजिका। तत्तत्तेजिकाभावाविशिष्टमप्यभावस्य साहकारणत्ववत्। सिषाधयिषाविरहसहकृतसिद्धभावस्याप्यनुमितकारणत्वम्. compare also: सिषाधयिषाविरहविशिष्टसिद्धभावः पक्षता तद्वान् पक्षः। सिषाधयिषामात्रं न पक्षता विनापि सिषाधयिषां घनगर्जितेन मेघानुमानात्। अत एव साध्यसंदेहोऽपि न पक्षता। विनापि संदेहं तदनुमानात्। सिद्धौ सत्यामपि सिषाध-

यिषासत्त्वेऽनुमितिर्भवत्येवेत्यतः सिषाधयिषाविरहविशिष्टत्वं सिद्धौ विशेषणम् ।
तथा च यत्र सिद्धिर्नास्ति तत्र सिषाधयिषायां सत्यामसत्यामपि पक्षता यत्र
सिद्धिरस्ति सिषाधयिषा च नास्ति तत्र न पक्षता सिषाधयिषाविरहविशिष्टसिद्धेः
सत्त्वात् ॥ मुक्ता० ॥

47. The *hetu* or middle term employed in proving an inference is one of three kinds: केवलान्वयी, केवलव्यतिरेकी or अन्वयव्यतिरेकी. That *hetu* which has an *Anvaya-vyapti* only, is केवलान्वयी. अन्वय is an assertion of the concomitance of the हेतु and the साध्य, and व्यतिरेक means an assertion of the same between the साध्याभाव and हेत्वभाव. अन्वय corresponds to the A proposition of western Logic in the form All A is B, which in conversion takes the form All not—B is not—A, corresponding to the व्यतिरेक enunciated here. In a केवलान्वयी *hetu*, it is possible to express the premis with the result of previous induction only in the form All A is B, and not in the form All not—B is not—A, for, in the example, examined in the text, not—B is not capable of comprehension, and, therefore, cannot become the subject of predication. It will further be clear that from this view of these three kinds of asserting the व्याप्ति, we can arrive at something like the *modes or moods* and *figures* of western logic. These three, in fact, are the ways of ascertaining the relation of cause and effect between any two given things, the test being, that the one is where the other is, and the second is not where there is not also the first, in the form यत्र यत्र धूमस्तत्र तत्राग्निः (अन्वय); यत्र यत्राग्निर्नास्ति तत्र तत्र धूमोऽपि नास्ति (व्यतिरेक). As with a केवलान्वयिहेतु it is not possible to prove the inference by a व्यतिरेकव्याप्ति, so with a केवलव्यतिरेकिहेतु, it is not possible to deduce the conclusion through an अन्वयव्याप्ति. Though in a केवलव्यतिरेकि inference, we may, unlike the केवलान्वयि, be able to enunciate the अन्वयव्याप्ति, we cannot corroborate it by any instances supporting the generalisation; for all the things upon which we can draw for an instance are, in the example given in the text, placed under the category of पक्ष. For an अन्वयव्यतिरेकिहेतु it is easy to find both kinds of व्याप्ति as in the case of inferring वद्धि from धूम. From an examination of these two kinds of propositions, the nature of अन्वय and व्यतिरेक is explained in the following two couplets. That which precedes, viz., that which begins the proposition with यत्र यत्र is called व्याप्य; and that which follows, viz., concludes the proposition just with तत्र तत्र is called व्यापक. Hence in an अन्वयव्याप्ति the साधन, or the हेतु becomes the व्याप्य, and the साध्य the व्यापक; whereas in a व्यतिरेकव्याप्ति साध्याभाव becomes the व्याप्य (distributed: minor term), and साधनाभाव the व्यापक.

48. An *अन्वयव्यतिरेकिहेतु*, in order to be good, must satisfy five conditions: (1) The being on the *Paksha*; and (2) also on the *Sapaksha*, or that the relation of the *साध्य* with which, is already demonstrated. (3) The not being found (*व्यावृत्तिः*) at a place where the *साध्य* is not (*विपक्ष*). (4.) The being the subject (*विषय*) of an *अबाधितज्ञान* i.e., the knowledge that the concomitance between the *साध्य* and *हेतु*, is not shown to be inconstant by any other *Pramāṇa* as in the *hetvābhāsa* called *बाधित*, (*vide* Note No. 53). (5) The being not opposed by another inference in which the *साध्य* is shown by another *hetu*, to be absent from the *पक्ष*, (*vide* Note No. 52). The different names given to these five are, thus, explanatory of themselves. It will be seen similarly that in a *केवलान्वयि* inference the third condition cannot be fulfilled, because the *विपक्ष* is not known; and that in a *केवलव्यतिरेकि* inference the second condition cannot be satisfied, there being no *सपक्ष*.

49. The having the property of being the subject of that knowledge which interferes with the inference, or any of its subordinate instruments is the characteristic (*उपाधिः=उपाधिरूपं सामान्यम्. C.*) of a *hetvābhāsa*; and that which has this characteristic is a *hetvābhāsa*. In order that an inference should become vitiated by a fallacy it must be shown that some *यथार्थज्ञान* is directly opposed to the conclusion in hand, e.g. in the instance *इदो वह्निमान्*, the *हेत्वाभास* will be the right contradictory knowledge *इदो बन्धभाववान्*. But it must be noticed, at the beginning, that the word *हेत्वाभास* is capable of a double interpretation. (1) *हेतुवहाभासन्त इति हेत्वाभासा दुष्टा हेतवः । (2) हेतोरभासा हेत्वाभासा हेतुनिष्ठा दोषस्तेषां भावस्तत्त्वमित्यर्थः । इदो वह्निमानित्याद्यनुमितिं प्रति बन्धभाववान् इह इत्यादिबाधनिश्चयस्य प्रतिबन्धकतया प्रमात्मकतादृशनिश्चयविषयत्वं बन्धभाववद्भावाक्षतमिति लक्षणसम्बन्धः ॥ नील० ॥* *Hetvābhāsa*, therefore, is (1) that false *hetu* which looks like a true one; or (2), the fault in the *hetu* used in the inference in question, as, in the instance, analysed above. Accepting the second explanation of a *hetvābhāsa*, it will be necessary to examine in each instance how and where in an inference the fault occurs. As in many of the *hetvābhāsas*, especially those which proceed from the *व्यभिचार* of the *hetu* (as *सम्यग्भिचार*, *विरुद्ध*, *आश्रयासिद्ध*), the part directly affected by the *प्रमात्मकबाधनिश्चय* is not the conclusion, but the *परामर्श*, we have the words *अनुमितितत्करणान्यतर*, &c., in the definition. Again, the word *ज्ञान* in the definition must be understood to mean *यथार्थज्ञान*, otherwise any *अयथार्थज्ञान* may be brought

to oppose an inference, *e.g.*, if to show the invalidity of the inference पर्वतो वह्निमान्, which is good, the ज्ञान required were not यथार्थ, any भ्रमात्मकज्ञान such as पर्वतो न वह्निमान्, will serve to undo an otherwise valid conclusion.

50. सव्यभिचारोऽनैकान्तिक उच्यते इति शेषः । तत्त्वं च साधारणान्वयतम-
त्वम् ॥ सि० चं० ॥ The *hetvābhāsa* called सव्यभिचार (accompanied by
a व्यभिचार of the हेतु), is one of the three described further on. Sādhā-
rana, (*i.e.*, common, that in which the *hetu* is common to the सपक्ष as
well as विपक्ष), is that wherein the *hetu* is found both in the सपक्ष and
विपक्ष. In the illustration पर्वतो धूमवान् वह्नेः, the हेतु—वह्नि—is found in
places where the साध्य—धूम—is not, as a heated ball of iron. Thus
it is found in सपक्ष (things with धूम, a cooking-room, &c.), as
well as in विपक्ष (heated ball of iron), which latter circumstance
constitutes the व्यभिचार, whose absence is always necessary in esta-
blishing a व्याप्ति (व्यभिचारज्ञानविरह &c.). Thus the ज्ञान of fire being
in a place where there is no smoke, prevents the apprehension of
the व्याप्ति through showing a व्यभिचार in the *hetu*. Again, because,
in the assertion Socrates is immortal, for he is a being, we find
being in constant concomitance with mortals as well as immortals
we at once perceive that the inference is a fallacy arising from
the assumption of a false premis, the हेतुभास consisting of the
यथार्थज्ञान in the form of the व्यभिचार of the middle term—being.

In *Asādhāraṇa* (uncommon, *i.e.*, not common, the *hetu* being in
the *paksha* alone), the *hetu* is not found either in the सपक्ष or the
विपक्ष, but in the पक्ष only. If we say शब्द is नित्य, because it has
शब्दत्व, we at once perceive that शब्दत्व is a हेतु which has no सपक्ष
or no विपक्ष, it being confined to the पक्ष alone. This being ascertain-
ed, it is impossible for the inference to proceed even an inch beyond
the mere assertion of the relation between शब्द and शब्दत्व. We
cannot, here, assert the अन्वयव्याप्ति of शब्दत्व and नित्यत्व, for शब्दत्व
is not to be seen in any place with नित्यत्व (सपक्ष). What is, then,
possible is only a व्यतिरेकव्याप्ति. Inasmuch, however, as there is no
अन्वय, we see, that शब्दत्व is व्यावृत्त (turned off, absent) from all its
सपक्ष. Then, by the rule, that *hetu* which is absent from a thing with
certain attributes, establishes the absence of these attributes at the
place where it is found, we at once perceive that शब्दत्व which is व्यावृत्त
from its सपक्ष, *i.e.*, नित्य things, must prove the absence of नित्यत्व
viz., अनित्यत्व at the place where it is found, *i.e.*, in शब्द. Turning,
again, to the व्यतिरेकव्याप्ति—यच्च नित्यत्वं नास्ति तत्र शब्दत्वं नास्ति—we see

that शब्दत्व is व्यावृत्त from नित्यत्वाभाव (विपक्ष). By applying the said rule, we find शब्दत्व to prove नित्यत्व (नित्यत्वाभावाभाव) in शब्द. Thus नित्यत्व as well as अनित्यत्व can be shown to be in शब्द from the *hetu* शब्दत्व. But as the existence of a thing and its अभाव is not possible in the same place, at the same time, the assertion of the व्याप्ति of शब्दत्व and नित्यत्व, becomes impossible from our consciousness of this knowledge. Hence शब्दत्व being confined to शब्द alone, can prove nothing with respect to शब्द, except, at best, a doubt as to its relation with नित्यत्व or अनित्यत्व. Here evidently the argument is vitiated by the assumption of a false premis embodying the relation of शब्द and नित्यत्व, the *hetvābhāsa* being the ज्ञान of the impossibility of नित्यत्व, and अनित्यत्व co-existing (निश्चितसाध्यवतो निश्चितसाध्याभाववतश्च व्यावृत्तत्वम्—हेतोः).

Anupasamhari (non-inclusive : not including or having even a single सपक्ष or विपक्ष to assist either conclusion) is that which embraces every known thing in the पक्ष, and leaves no room for the corroboration of a general rule of causation by proper illustrations. It is here impossible to find any place independent of the पक्ष, where the relation between the *hetu* and *sādhya* can be observed, and the observation turned to any account. If we say the creation is an illusion, because it is momentary, we at once perceive that it is impossible to find the relation between momentariness and illusion, there being no instance either positive or negative for making the observation, because we know of nothing besides creation : the हेतुत्वान्तास consisting in the knowledge that the हेतु is connected neither with any positive, nor negative instances. (यत्किञ्चिन्निश्चयाविषयसाध्यकत्वे सति यत्किञ्चिन्निश्चयाविषयसाध्याभावकत्वम्).

Both in असाधारण and अनुपसंहारी the relation of the साध्य and पक्ष is at once made extremely doubtful, and, therefore, they look more like one and the same form of fallacy than two different ones. The point of distinction between the two must, however, be carefully noted. In असाधारण, though the साध्य is found in many places besides the पक्ष, the हेतु is not found with it; whereas in अनुपसंहारी neither the साध्य nor the हेतु are to be found in any place except the पक्ष.

As further interesting illustrations of साधारण and असाधारण, we may examine the nature of अतिव्याप्ति and अव्याप्ति. In the definition गौः शृङ्गित्वम् we evidently have a हेतु common to the सपक्ष (गौः) as well as the विपक्ष (अजादयः). Hence all definitions

which include something more than the thing defined are cases of the *hetvābhāsa* called साधारण. Again, in गोः कपिलत्वम् we have a case of असाधारण. We see an only black-brown cow, or a collection of such cows, and say कपिलत्व is accompanied by गोत्व, which is evidently false, for कपिलत्व being confined only to the individual or individuals seen proves nothing with respect to that individual or individuals. We cannot say यत्र कपिलत्वं तत्र गोत्वम् : there being no other instance (सपक्ष) than the one in question (which we must suppose to include all cases of कपिला). Thus कपिलत्व being व्यावृत्त from all its सपक्ष (things with गोत्व as red and white and other cows,) proves गोत्वाभाव in the पक्ष by the rule यो यद्वतो व्यावृत्तः &c. Again, applying the व्यतिरेकव्याप्ति—यत्र गोत्वं नास्ति तत्र कपिलत्वं नास्ति यथा वक्रादौ, we learn that कपिलत्व is व्यावृत्त from गोत्वाभाव, and, therefore, proves by the same rule, गोत्वाभावाभाव or गोत्व in the पक्ष. Thus गोत्व and गोत्वाभाव, two contradictory things, being proved in the पक्ष, at the same time, it is impossible for the हेतु-कपिलत्व to accomplish anything. Hence all cases of अव्याप्ति or definitions, which are too narrow, fall under असाधारण.

All these three fallacies are different forms of what in Western Logic may be called the fallacies of false induction, leading to the assumption of a false premis. That smoke is a necessary effect of fire, that eternity is dependent on the possession of the quality of sound, and that being capable of observation is connected with eternity are all conclusions more or less viscious in themselves, being arrived at by imperfect induction, and *à priori* reasoning.

51. *Virrudha* (or opposed) is that *hetu*, which is व्याप्त by (*i.e.*, which has व्याप्ति with) not as usual the साध्य, but the अभाव of the साध्य. *Pratipaksha* (rival) is that *hetu* which proves in the same पक्ष, the अभाव of the साध्य of another हेतु. *Satpratipaksha* (with rival) is that which has a प्रतिपक्ष, *i.e.*, which has a *hetu* establishing a साध्य the अभाव whereof is shown in the same thing, by another *hetu*. Though in both these, the *hetu* proves the अभाव of the साध्य, the difference between the two lies in the fact that in the first this अभाव is proved by the same हेतु, whereas in the second it is proved by another. The knowledge that in विरुद्ध the *hetu* is always व्याप्त by the साध्याभाव constitutes the हेत्वाभास which prevents the inference. The *hetvābhāsa* in सत्प्रतिपक्ष is plain enough. Some, moreover, maintain that in विरुद्ध there is always a व्यतिरेकव्याप्ति which constitutes the बाधज्ञान, and in सत्प्रतिपक्ष it is only an अन्वयव्याप्ति that

does the same. For, in अयं गौरिकशकत्वात् (= गौरिकशकत्वम् being an instance of the fault of a definition, called असंभव), एकशकत्व is concomitant not with गोत्व but गोत्वाभाव, and, therefore, the प्रतिबन्धक-यथार्थज्ञान is the व्यतिरेकव्याप्ति—यत्र गोत्वाभावाभावस्तत्रैकशकत्वाभावः i.e., यत्र गोत्वं तत्रैकशकत्वं नास्ति. The अन्वयव्याप्ति constituting the हेत्वाभास in सत्प्रतिपक्ष, is plain enough.

Again विरुद्ध differs from साधारण inasmuch as in the former there is an actual constant व्याप्ति of the हेतु with साध्याभाव, whereas in the latter there is only a सामानाधिकरण्य of the two. In other words, the हेतु in साधारण is found at *places*, where there is an अभाव of the साध्य, but in विरुद्ध it is found *exclusively* in places where there is अभाव of the साध्य, and has therefore a व्याप्ति with the साध्याभाव.

52. That which has the characteristic of being the subject of such knowledge as interferes directly with the परामर्श, is called असिद्ध (disproved, false). It is of three kinds: (1) आश्रयासिद्ध, (2) स्वरूपासिद्ध, (3) व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध. That which has for its पक्ष, a thing possessed of a distinctive characteristic, which is fictitious, is called आश्रयासिद्ध, or that whose substratum is false. In the illustration the पक्ष is गगनारविन्द, i.e., अरविन्द having the distinctive characteristic of being in गगन. गगनीयत्व must therefore be co-existent and co-extensive with अरविन्दत्व; or in the language of the book must be the अवच्छेदक of अरविन्दत्व. But as the अवच्छेदक here is a mere fiction, there is an अभाव of the पक्षतावच्छेदक in the पक्ष, which is therefore पक्षतावच्छेदकाभाववान्. Thus the conviction अरविन्दे गगनीयत्वं नास्ति being once established, the परामर्श—सुरभित्वव्याप्यारविन्दत्व-वद्गगनारविन्दम्—cannot stand, the हेत्वाभास consisting of the said conviction. आश्रयासिद्धि or the characteristic of an आश्रयासिद्धि is otherwise thus defined. आश्रयासिद्धिश्च पक्षे पक्षतावच्छेदकविरहः ॥ नील० ॥ आश्रयासिद्धत्वं च पक्षतावच्छेदकाभावकत्वम् । भवति हि अरविन्दे गगनीयत्वरूपपक्षतावच्छेदकाभावकत्वम् । अरविन्दरूपपक्षे गगनीयत्वस्य विरहान् ॥ सि० च० ॥ पक्षतावच्छेदकविशिष्टपक्षासिद्धिः ॥ न्या० को० ॥

स्वरूपासिद्धि (falsity of the very form) otherwise called हेत्वसिद्धि, is that हेतु which is the respondent of the अभाव in the पक्ष; or as Nilakantha defines it in more simple language, the absence of the हेतु in the पक्ष. (स्वरूपासिद्धिश्च पक्षे हेत्वभावः). अत्र पक्षे हेतोरभाव एव बोधः । एतादृशज्ञानं हेतुमान् पक्ष इति परामर्श प्रतिबध्नाति ॥ नी० ॥

व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध (the nature of the व्याप्त-हेतु-being false) is that *hetu* which is possessed of the अभाव of that which is the व्याप्यत्वावच्छेदक. The व्याप्य in the illustration is धूम and its अवच्छेदक is काञ्चनमयत्व. As it is impossible for smoke to be of gold, the परामर्श indicated in the

text is rendered invalid by the knowledge of this impossibility ; for such a परामर्श is dependent (अवगाहिवात्) on the relation of काञ्चनमयव with धूम, in order to constitute the latter into a comprehensible हेतु.

53. That which has for its पक्ष a thing with the अभाव of the predicated साध्य is called बाधित (contradicted). This, however, is distinguished from सत्प्रतिपक्ष by the fact that in this the अभाव of the साध्य is shown by another प्रमाण, and not by another हेतु. The direct knowledge (लौकिकनिर्णय=प्रत्यक्षप्रमाण) of the absence of a thing being always a bar in the way of asserting the possession of that thing by something else, no inference can be drawn after knowing (by स्पर्शनप्रत्यक्ष) that there is no अनुपपत्ति in fire. The two other हेत्वाभास in which the inference is directly vitiated are असाधारण and विरुद्ध; and these are different from बाधित by the circumstance that in the one the हेतु is neither in the सपक्ष nor in the विपक्ष, which here is not the case ; and that in the other the हेतु has a direct व्याप्ति with the अभाव of the साध्य, whereas here there is nothing of the kind.

Compare on the *hetvābhāsas*: साधारणः साध्यवदन्यवृत्तिस्तेन च व्याप्ति-प्रतिबन्धः क्रियते । असाधारणः साध्यासमानाधिकरणो हेतुस्तेन च साध्यसामानाधिकरण्यग्रहः प्रतिबध्यते । अनुपसंहारी चात्यन्ताभावाप्रतियोगिसाध्य-कादिरनेन व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिज्ञानप्रतिबन्धः क्रियते । विरुद्धस्तु साध्यव्यापकीभूताभावप्रतियोगी । अयं च साध्याभावग्रहसामग्रीत्वेन प्रतिबन्धकः । सत्प्रतिपक्षे तु प्रति-हेतुः साध्याभावसाधकः । आश्रयासिद्धिः पक्षे पक्षतावच्छेदकत्वस्याभावः । यत्र काञ्चनमयः पर्वतो वह्निमानिति साध्यते तत्र पर्वतो न काञ्चनमय इति ज्ञाने विद्यमाने काञ्चनमये पर्वते परामर्शप्रतिबन्धः फलम् । स्वरूपासिद्धिस्तु पक्षे व्याप्य-त्वाभिमतस्याभावः । तत्र ह्रदो द्रव्यं धूमादित्यादौ पक्षे व्याप्यत्वाभिमतस्य हेतोरभाव-ज्ञाते पक्षे व्याप्यहेतुमत्ताज्ञानरूपस्य परामर्शस्य प्रतिबन्धः फलम् । वह्निमा-त्रीलधूमादित्यादौ गुरुतया नीलधूमत्वस्य हेतुतावच्छेदकत्वमपि व्याप्यत्वासिद्धि-रिति वदन्ति । बाधस्तु पक्षे साध्याभावादिः । एतस्यानुमितिप्रतिबन्धः फलम् ॥ मुक्ता ॥

All the *hetvābhāsas*, which appear more or less to be fallacies of induction, may thus be summarised:—

हेत्वाभास vitiating the	{	व्याप्ति.	{ साधारण—(हेतु common to सपक्ष and विपक्ष.) अनुपसंहारी—(हेतु in पक्ष alone). आश्रयासिद्ध—(पक्ष false).
		परामर्श.	{ स्वरूपासिद्ध—(हेतु not in पक्ष). व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध—(हेतु false).
		अनुमिति.	{ असाधारण—(हेतु not in सपक्ष or विपक्ष). विरुद्ध—(हेतु in साध्यभाव alone). सत्प्रतिपक्ष—(साध्याभाव proved by another हेतु). बाधित—(साध्याभाव proved by another प्रमाण).

54. It is questioned why a *सोपाधिकहेतु* is not considered in the *hetvābhāsa*s, for *उपाधि*, or *accident*, is also a fault in the *हेतु*. This, however, is not done in this book (though some like the *Tarkasamgraha* treat of a *सोपाधिकहेतु* under *व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध*) for an *उपाधि* does not, like the rest of the *हेत्वाभास*s, directly invalidate the inference or any subsidiary member thereof. How then is the argument (proving the direct cognizability) of *वायु* (from the *हेतु-प्रत्यक्षस्पर्शाश्रयत्व*) pronounced to be vitiated by (the middle term having an *उपाधि* or) *accident* (in the form of *उद्धूतरूपवत्त्व*)? It is replied, simply because *उपाधि* is only a *प्रयोजक*—an instrument—in bringing about the *व्यभिचारज्ञान* (*उपाधिव्यभिचारेण हेतौ साध्यव्यभिचारानुमानमुपाधेः प्रयोजकम् ॥ मुक्ता. ॥*) of the *साध्य* and *हेतु*. Thus a *हेतु* with an accident may come under *हेत्वाभास*, not as directly showing any fault in the *हेतु*, but as indirectly suggesting its non-concomitance with the proposed *साध्य*.

In order to prove anything to be an *उपाधि* or accident it has to be shown that that thing is found in places where the *साध्य* is, *i.e.*, is *व्यापक* of the *साध्य*, but that it is not in places where the *हेतु* is *i.e.*, is *अव्यापक* of the *साधन* or *हेतु*. (*साध्यव्यापकत्वे सति साधनाव्यापक उपाधिः*). *आर्द्रैन्धनसंयोग* is an *उपाधि* of the *हेतु*—*वह्निमत्त्व* in the inference *पर्वतो धूमवान् वह्नेः* for “wet fuel” is found in places where smoke is, but is not found in places where fire is (as in a heated ball of iron). This circumstance being known, the concomitance (*व्याप्ति*) of the *हेतु* and *साध्य* becomes difficult to ascertain. In fact, here, we first ascertain the concomitance of the *साध्य* and the *उपाधि*; and then, from ascertaining the non-concomitance of the *हेतु* of that *साध्य* and the *उपाधि*, at once grasp the impossibility of any concomitance between the said *हेतु* and the said *साध्य*. This kind of *उपाधि* is often called—*शुद्धसाध्यव्यापक* or *केवलसाध्यव्यापक*. तथाहि । यत्र शुद्धसाध्यव्यापक उपाधिस्तत्र शुद्धनैवोपाधिव्यभिचारेण साध्यव्यभिचारानुमानम् । यथा धूमवान् वह्नेरित्यासौ वह्निर्धूमव्यभिचारी साध्यव्यापकार्द्रैन्धनसंयोगव्यभिचारित्वासिति व्यापकव्यभिचारिणो व्याप्यव्यभिचारावश्यकत्वात् ॥ मुक्ता. ॥. The last case of *उपाधि* noticed in the text resembles the *उपाधि* called *पक्षधर्मावच्छिन्नसाध्यव्यापक*. The *साध्यव्यापकता* is यत्र यत्र इयामत्वं तत्र तत्र शाकपाकजत्वम्. This, however, will not hold good with regard to crows and others, and the *साध्य* must, therefore, be accepted in some modified sense. *इयामत्त्व*—the *साध्य*—must then be accepted as co-existent and co-extensive only with the *अवच्छेदक* of the *पक्षधर्म*. The *पक्ष* being *गर्भस्थानिन्नातनय*, the *पक्षधर्मावच्छेदक* will be *मित्रातनयत्वम्*. The *साध्यव्यापकता* will now be यत्र मित्रातनयत्वावच्छिन्न इयामत्वं तत्र

शाकपाकजत्वम् । यथा मित्रातनयषट्के । The साधनाध्यापकता will be यत्र मित्रातनयत्वं तत्र शाकपाकजत्वं नास्ति यथा मित्रातनयषट्कातिरिक्ते मित्रातनय-पञ्चके । Thus शाकपाकजत्व being shewn to be an उपाधि, the inference falls to the ground. Similarly वायुः प्रत्यक्षः प्रत्यक्षस्पर्शाश्रयत्वात् । इत्यत्रो-द्धूतरूपवत्त्वमुपाधिः is also an instance to the point. The साध्यव्या-पकता—यत्र प्रत्यक्षविषयत्वं तत्रोद्धूतरूपवत्त्वम् will not be true of रूप, रस &c., which are प्रत्यक्षविषय, but have no उद्धूतरूप in them (गुणे गुणानङ्गीकारात्). The उपाधि must, therefore, be assumed to be the व्यापक of the साध्य which is in the same place as (अवच्छिन्न by) the पक्षधर्म, which we take as बहिर्द्रव्यत्व, the परसत्ता in वायु. Therefore यत्र बहिर्द्रव्यत्वावच्छिन्नप्रत्यक्षविषयत्वं तत्रोद्धूतरूपवत्त्वम् will be the proper साध्यव्यापकता, for now the साध्य thus modified will exclude रूप, रस, &c., which have no बहिर्द्रव्यत्व in them, and will apply to all such external *dravyas* as are cognizable by our senses. The rest is clear. Compare on this kind of उपाधि, यत्र तु किञ्चिद्धर्मावच्छिन्नसाध्यस्य व्यापक उपाधिस्तत्र तद्धर्मवति उपाधिव्यभिचारेण साध्यव्यभिचारानुमानम् । तथा स इयामो मित्रात-नयत्वादित्यादौ मित्रातनयत्वं इयानुत्वव्यभिचारिमित्रातनये शाकपाकजत्वव्य-भिचारित्वादिति ॥ मुक्ता० ॥

55. That which is the subject of the knowledge of the instru-ment producing right testimony, is शब्दः. शब्दज्ञानं तु करणं द्वारं तत्र पदार्थधीः । शब्दबोधः कलं तत्र शक्तिधीः सहकारिणी ॥ मुक्ता० ॥. Hence in the knowledge नदीतीरे पञ्चफलानि सन्ति, the पदज्ञान or शब्दज्ञान, i.e., the knowledge of the meaning of the terms involved in the statement, is the करण, and the remembrance of the objects denoted by the words is the व्यापार (द्वारम्). A *pada* is defined as that which has a meaning, as against *Pāṇini* who says सुप्तिङन्तं पदम् (अष्टा० १-४-१४). A collection of such पद is a वाक्य, and the interconnection of the objects suggested by the words is the वाक्यार्थः. On this subject the *Mīmāṃsakas* and the rhetoricians hold different views, which may be seen elsewhere.

पद is of two kinds: मुख्य or शक्त, and गौण or लाक्षणिक. That which suggests a meaning by the strength of a शक्ति, is with respect to that meaning called मुख्य, शक्त or principal. शक्ति is an eternal convention made about words and their meaning, as in the case of घट, पद, &c., Two questions naturally occur at this stage of inquiry. (1) How is the शक्ति of a word determined? (2) whether the meaning of words is connotative, denotative, or both? The first question is easily answered in the words of a verse quoted by *Nilakantha* and others: शक्तिग्रहं व्याकरणोपमानकोशास्रवाक्याद्व्यवहारतश्च । वाक्यस्य शेषाद्विज्ञेयं-

न्ति सान्निध्यतः सिद्धपदस्य वृद्धाः ॥ (व्याकरण-उपमान-कोश-आप्तवाक्य-व्यवहार-वाक्यशेष as यवमयश्चरुर्भवतीत्यत्र यवशब्द आर्यव्यवहारादीधशूकविशिष्टस्य वाचकः । स्लेच्छव्यवहारात्कङ्गोर्वाचको वेति संदेहे, वसन्ते सर्वसस्यानां जायते पत्रज्ञातम् । मोदमानाश्च तिष्ठन्ति यवाः कणिशशालिन, इति वाक्यशेषादीधशूकविशिष्टे शक्तिनिर्णयः—विवृति—सिद्धपदस्य सन्निधि—all determine the शक्ति of a term). On the second question the *Naiyāyikas* join issue with the *Mīmāṃsakas*. The latter hold that words like गो, &c., have only a connotative sense (जाति), and not denotative (व्यक्ति), for the conception of an individual is not possible without its connotation being ascertained first. It is only by आक्षेप—अर्थापत्ति—say the *Mīmāṃsakas*, that words though connotative in their intent, signify an individual as well. The *Naiyāyikas* retort that as when using such expressions as गामानय, &c., we find only an individual गो, and not the attribute गोत्व, brought to us, it follows that the import of terms is both connotative and denotative (जातिविशिष्टव्यक्तौ शक्तिः). Compare मीमांसकास्तु विशेषणत्वेन गोत्वादेरेव प्रथममुपस्थितत्वाद्वादिपदानां गोत्वादावेव शक्तिव्यक्तिलाभस्तु गोत्वं ह्याश्रयं विनानुपपन्नमित्याक्षेपादित्याहुस्तदसत् । विनाप्याक्षेपं गौश्चरतीत्यनेन व्यक्तीप्रतीतिः ॥ सि० च० ॥. The rhetoricians, on the other hand, who reconcile everything by a tripple शक्ति of words, अभिधा, लक्षणा, and व्यञ्जना or import, proper, implied, and inferred, leave the *Mīmāṃsakas* and the *Naiyāyikas* to settle their dispute among themselves : आकाङ्क्षा सन्निधियोग्यतावशाद्द्वयमाणस्वरूपाणां पदार्थानां समन्वये तात्पर्यार्थो विशेषवपुरपदार्थोऽपि वाक्यार्थः समुल्लसतीत्यभिहितान्वयवादिनां मतम् । वाच्य एव वाक्यार्थ इत्यन्विताभिधानवादिनः ॥ का० प्र० ॥

'That which suggests a meaning by the strength of लक्षणा or implication, is with respect to that particular meaning called लाक्षणिक or गौण. In the instance गङ्गायां घोषः, the word गङ्गा refers, not to the stream, but to the bank,—which meaning, therefore, is the लाक्षणिक meaning of that word. लक्षणा is but a kind of relation with the शक्यार्थ or principal sense, and no separate शक्ति as the rhetoricians maintain. The difficulty experienced in settling the meaning of certain terms, correlated, is the chief cause of directing us to look up for this kind of related or implied meaning (तात्पर्यानुपपत्तिर्हि लक्षणायां बीजम्). Hence the sense thus *inferred* under these circumstances cannot be maintained to be an eternal convention or शक्ति. The शक्ति of the word गङ्गा, in the illustration, is in the stream of the river; but as a village can hardly be imagined to stand thereon, we try to attach some other meaning to the word गङ्गा, not very remote

from its original sense, and quite naturally think of the bank, which is related to the stream (शक्यसम्बन्ध), and which reconciles the apparent incongruity (सात्पर्यानुपपत्तिः). The गौणी वृत्ति—सिंहो माणवकः— as well as the व्यञ्जना of the rhetoricians, are included by the *Natyāyikas* in inference.

56. शाब्दबोध or knowledge from words, is produced by words connected with one another in the four ways enumerated in the text. आकाङ्क्षा or interdependence is the being said together of one word with another, without which other the first is incapable of producing any knowledge, which must follow from the interdependence of words (अन्वयानुभव). The शाब्दबोध produced by the phrase घटमानय may be interpreted into घटकर्मकमानयनं कुरु. Here if the word indicating some क्रिया, i.e., the क्रियापद, were not present, the knowledge that the घट is to be *carried* somewhere, will never have followed; as also in the absence of the word घटम्—the कर्म—no knowledge of the thing to be *carried* would ever have been possible. Hence as each of the word in the sentence has dependence on the other, for producing knowledge, the words have mutual आकाङ्क्षा with each other. This view of आकाङ्क्षा appears to have been favoured by *Nilakantha*, but there are others who take a slightly different view of the matter. As every single word is capable of suggesting a relation with some other word, if in either case that relation is indicated by some sort of terminations, &c., all words may be said to have आकाङ्क्षा for such terminations, also. गमानयेत्यत्र गोपदनिष्ठं अपराभावप्रयुक्तं शाब्दबोधानुपधायकत्वम् । गोपदे अपदनिरूपिताकाङ्क्षा । शाब्दबोधस्तु गोवृत्तिकर्मत्वमिति ॥ वाक्य० ॥ ननु वृत्तिग्रह एव शाब्दहेतुः । तदा गौरश्च इति वाक्यादपि शाब्दोत्पत्तिःअत आह ।घटादिलक्षणपदस्य पदान्तरं विभक्तिपदं तस्य व्यतिरेकोऽभावस्तत्प्रयुक्तंअन्वयानुभावकत्वं शाब्दबोधानुपधायकत्वाकाङ्क्षा ॥ सि० च० ॥ The other three requisites are plain enough. Hence शाब्दबोध is produced only after the words in any sentence satisfy all the four required conditions. शाब्दलक्षणं तु शक्तिलक्षणान्यतरसंबन्धेन पदजन्यपदार्थस्मृतिस्वावच्छिन्नकारणतानिरूपितकार्यत्वम् । अत्रेयं शाब्दबोधप्रक्रिया । प्रथमं गवादिपदानां गवाद्गौ संबन्धज्ञानं । गवादिर्गवादिपदशक्त्यो लक्ष्यो वेति । ततः कालान्तरे गमानयत्वमिति केनचिदुक्ते गवादिपदेभ्यो गवादीनर्थान् स्मरति । आकाङ्क्षादीन् जानतस्तदनन्तरं गौकर्मकमानयनामुकूलकृतिमांस्त्वमिति शाब्दबुद्धिर्जायते ॥ वाक्य० ॥

57. A sentence that enjoins an act (which is meant to accomplish some good), is विधि (sentence implying such injunction as is generally implied by the termination of the potential, the impera-

tive, the *vedic* subjunctive (लेट्) or the potential participle &c.); one that prohibits an act (by showing its tendency to sinfulness) is निषेधः. Words other than these two are अर्थवादः (the description of the sense, an embellishment of the meaning in a manner to prepare the mind towards the act). तत्राद्यो (विधिः) विध्यभिधायकप्रत्ययचटितं वाक्यम् । स च प्रत्ययो लिङ् लोट् लोङ् तस्य कृतप्रत्ययरूपः । भवति हि ज्योतिष्टोमेन स्वर्गकामो यजेतेति वाक्यम् । तथात्र लिङेव तादृशप्रत्ययः । विध्यभिधायकेत्यत्राभिधेयविधिर्ज्ञेयः । स च प्रयत्नजनकचिकीर्षाजनकज्ञानविषयः । कृतिसाध्येष्टसाधनत्वमेव सः । इदमेव लिङर्थः । विध्यर्थ इत्यपि चोच्यते ।न कलञ्जं भक्षयेदित्यादौ नन्वा विध्यर्थाभावो बोध्यते । अत्र प्राभाकराः प्रवृत्तिं प्रति कृतिसाध्यताज्ञानं हेतुः । तेन कृत्यसाध्ये न प्रवृत्तिः । ननु विषमक्षणादौ प्रवृत्तिप्रसङ्गः इति चेत् । तदनुयायिन इष्टसाधनतालिङ्गककृतिसाध्यतानुमितिरिष्टसाधनताज्ञानकालीनकृतिसाध्यताज्ञानं वा काम्यस्थले प्रवर्तकमतो नोक्तदोषः । नित्यस्थले चाहमिदानींतनकृतिसाध्यसन्ध्यावन्दनको ब्राह्मणत्वे सति विहितसन्ध्याकालीनशौचादिमत्त्वादिति शौचादिमत्त्वप्रतिसन्धानजन्यकृतिसाध्यताज्ञानमिति समादधते । अथाननुगम इति चेत् । स्वविशेषणवन्ताप्रतिसन्धानजन्यत्वमेव कृतिसाध्यताज्ञानेऽनुगतम् । स्वं पुरुषस्तत्र काम्ये इच्छैव विशेषणं नित्ये शौचादिकमेवेति प्रलपति तत्र । अलवीयस्त्वादिति ॥ सि० चं० ॥. Next, an *Arthavāda* is said to be of three kinds in the *Nyāyamāldvīstara* : विरोधे गुणवादः स्यादनुवादोऽवधारिते । भूतार्थवादस्तज्ज्ञानादर्थवादस्त्रिधा मतः ॥, of which आदित्यो द्युपः, अमिहिमस्य भेषजं and वृत्राय वज्रमुदयच्छदिन्द्रः are the respective instances.

Lastly, we may close this examination of शब्द with a passage setting forth the difference between the *Naiyāyika* view, and the view of the grammarians, who recognise the शक्ति of words in a kind of स्फोट or disclosure which is (वर्णानां वाचकत्वानुपपत्तौ यद्वलादर्थप्रतिपत्तिः स इति वर्णातिरिक्तो वर्णाभिव्यङ्ग्योऽर्थप्रत्यायको नित्यः शब्दः ॥ सर्व० सं० ॥ also वैयाकरणा वर्णव्यतिरिक्तस्य वाचकत्वमिच्छन्ति वर्णानां वाचकत्वे द्वितीयादिवर्णाचारणानर्थक्यप्रसङ्गात्.....तद्व्यतिरिक्तः स्फोटोनादाभिव्यङ्ग्यो वाचकः ॥ कैय० ॥), as it were, an eternal power indicating the object (by a kind of व्यञ्जना), independently of the letters of the word. Also, ज्योतिष्टोमेन स्वर्गकामो यजेतेत्यत्र कृतिसाध्यबलवद्विष्टाऽजनकेष्टसाधनज्योतिष्टोमनामकयागकः स्वर्गकाम इत्यर्थः । एवमेव सर्वत्र प्रथमान्तमुख्यविशेष्यकः शाब्दबोधो ज्ञेयः । वैयाकरणास्तु धात्वर्थमुख्यविशेष्यक एव शाब्दबोधो यथा चैत्रः पचति तण्डुलमित्यत्र तण्डुलनिष्ठविक्षिप्त्यनुकूलश्चैत्रकर्तृकपाक इति बोध इत्याहुः ॥ सि० चं० ॥

58. The *Mīmāṃsakas* add two more *Pramānas* or instruments of knowledge in the form of अर्थापत्ति and अनुपलब्धि. अर्थापत्ति or implication, is a mere case of *Anumāna*, and is capable of being borne out by a व्यतिरेकन्यासि. अनुपलब्धि also is no separate प्रमाण. When there is no वट before us, we have the प्रत्यक्षज्ञान of an अभाव whose प्रतियोगी

is the घट. This knowledge of घटाभाव is possible only because the प्रतियोगी is not found with the अभाव (*lit.*, there is no knowledge—अपलब्धि—of the घट). Hence the not being of the प्रतियोगी at the place of its अभाव (प्रतियोग्यनुपलब्धि), assists the direct perception of the अभाव (अभावग्रहे—ज्ञाने—प्रत्यक्षस्यैव सहकारिणी). Thus as the अभाव is cognised by प्रत्यक्षप्रमाण assisted by the प्रतियोग्यनुपलब्धि, this latter is no separate प्रमाण whatever. It may, however, be argued that the अभाव is not cognised by प्रत्यक्ष, but by अनुपलब्धि, for as both of these are factors in one and the same act of perception, there is no reason to lay more stress on the one than on the other. But if this were the case, the common experience of first seeing that there is no घट, and then recognising by direct cognition the अभाव of the घट—experience which in this manner subordinates the योग्यानुपलब्धि to the प्रत्यक्ष—ought to have been reversed. *Anupalabdhī* is, therefore, no separate प्रमाण.

It may be noticed, in passing, that the *Vaisheshikas* do not regard even शब्द or उपमान as any different *pramāṇas*. According to them they are included in inference. शब्दोपमानयोर्नैव पृथक्प्रामाण्यमिच्छते । अनुमानगतार्थत्वादिति वैशेषिकं मतम् ॥ मुक्ता ॥.

58. The question is whether the प्रामाण्य or प्रमात्व of ज्ञान is known by itself (*i.e.*, along with the ज्ञान), or by any other subsequent process. In other words, whether on our cognition of a thing do we also know that that cognition is a प्रमा—यथार्थज्ञान? or is it that we determine the यथार्थ of a perception subsequently? The *Mīmāṃsakas* (the followers of प्रभाकर), as well as the *Vedāntins*, accept the first doctrine, while the *Naiyāyikas* uphold the second. In every perception of a thing, the *Mīmāṃsaka* will join the seeing as well as the consciousness that it is right seeing in one and the same act of cognition; whereas the *Naiyāyika* will make the second dependent on an inference, and therefore apart from the first. A man sees by प्रत्यक्ष some water at a distance, and recognising along with the act of perception, the rightness of this knowledge, proceeds towards it. प्रामाण्य is thus made the subject of the same act of cognition. This प्रामाण्य is a kind of स्वतस्त्व or self-cognizability, in the form of being the subject of that which (*viz.*, the instrument—ग्राहक—of knowledge in general, *i.e.*, अनुव्यवसाय, &c., as जलमहं जानामि in the present instance; for the knowledge that there is water is grasped only in the form of the secondary consciousness जलमहं, &c.) enables one to cognise all kinds of ज्ञान in general. The जलज्ञान in a person manifests itself in the form of the अनुव्यवसाय—जलमहं जानामि,—which, therefore,

is the *ग्रहक* of that *ज्ञान*. The *प्रमात्व* of this *ज्ञान* becomes a subject of the same *अनुव्यवसाय* which takes cognisance of the original *जल-ज्ञान*, i.e., the *ज्ञान* and its *प्रामाण्य* are both subjects of one and the same act of cognition. Thus the *प्रामाण्य* of a *ज्ञान* is *स्वतो ग्राह्य*, known of itself. अत्र *ज्ञानप्रामाण्यं तदप्रामाण्याग्राहकं यावद्ज्ञानग्राहकसामग्रीवद्ग्राह्यत्वमिदमेव स्वतो ग्राह्यमिति किंवदन्ती* । अस्यार्थः । *ज्ञानप्रामाण्यं ज्ञाननिष्ठा प्रामाण्यग्राहिका यावती ज्ञानग्राहिकानुव्यवसायादिरूपा सामग्री तद्ग्राह्यमिति* । इदमेव ज्ञातो स्वतस्त्वमित्युच्यते । घटमहं जानामीत्यनुव्यवसायो घटं घटत्वं समवायं च विषयीकुरुर्वैजात्यनि प्रकारभूतघटमात्मानं तत्सम्बन्धीभूतव्यवसायं विषयीकरोति । एवं सति पुरोवर्तिप्रकारसम्बन्धस्यैव प्रमापदार्थत्वेन स्वत एव प्रामाण्यं गृह्णातीति मुरारिमिश्राः । अनुव्यवसायात्मकमेव सर्वं ज्ञानं तच्च स्वप्रकाशमिति मातृभेद्यविषयत्वाच्चिपुटीर्युच्यते । स्वप्रकाशसामर्थ्यादेव स्वात्मानमिव स्ववृत्तिप्रामाण्यं स्वत एव गृह्णातीति प्राभाकराः । अयं घट इति ज्ञानानन्तरं घटे ज्ञातता नाम फलं भवति । ततो ज्ञातो घट इति तत्प्रत्यक्षं पश्चात्तया ज्ञानमात्रस्यातीन्द्रियत्वात् ज्ञानं तन्निष्ठप्रामाण्यं चाहं घटत्वप्रकारकज्ञानवान् घटत्वप्रकारकज्ञाततावत्त्वादित्यनुमीयते तस्मात्स्वत एव प्रामाण्यं गृह्यते स्वतो ग्राह्यत्वं च ज्ञानग्राहकातिरिक्तानपेक्षकत्वमिति भट्टाः । तन्न-ति सौतमीयाः ॥ सि० च० ॥ On further analysis it will appear that the *प्रमात्व* of a *ज्ञान* is also a case of *ज्ञान*, of the same kind, though not the same, as the original *ज्ञान*, the subject of this *प्रमात्व*. If the *प्रमात्व* of *ज्ञान* in general, then, were not at some stage *स्वतो ग्राह्य*, there will be *confusion ad infinitum* (अनवस्था), not unaffecting even the last *ज्ञान*, or godhead.

To this theory of the *Mīmāṃsā* and the *Vedānta*, the *Naiyāyika* takes exception on the following grounds. If the *प्रमात्व* of a *ज्ञान* were self-manifest, the doubt whether the cognition of water I have had was *प्रमा* or not, will never arise, inasmuch as, on the *Mīmāṃsaka* hypothesis, the *प्रमात्व* as well as the *जलप्रत्यक्ष* are subjects of one and the same act of cognition. If, to avoid this difficulty, it be argued that there is no real *ज्ञानग्रह*, when there is a doubt, such reasoning will not do. For, if there be no *ज्ञानग्रह*, then the existence of *संशय*, which is admitted, will not be possible—a *संशय* being the absence of that *प्रामाण्य* which has *ज्ञान* for its *धर्मा*, i.e., which is a *धर्म* of *ज्ञान*. In every act of doubt the knowledge of the *substratum* of that doubt is always necessary; and if we admit no *ज्ञानग्रह* in *संशय*, the existence of *संशय* will be but an impossibility, which is absurd on the opponent's own hypothesis—*संशय* being accepted by him as a kind of *ज्ञान*.* The *स्वतः-प्रामाण्य* of *ज्ञान* reduces itself,

* This is the chief point of difference between the *Vedānta* on the one hand, and *Nyāya* and other philosophies on the other. The one accepts one uniform *ज्ञान* in the form of *प्रमा*, explaining *संशय*, &c., in various ways under names like *मत्पा*, *विवर्त*, *अविद्या*, &c.; the other set accepting all possible variety in knowledge.

therefore, to nothing. The परतः—प्रमाण्य of ज्ञान is further illustrated by an instance. A man, who has not had any experience of the phenomena of water, chances to see some at a distance, and proceeds, though yet doubtful of the observation being a प्रमा or धन, in the direction thereof. Having, however, succeeded in obtaining water, he reasons within himself: the cognition of water I had had before was प्रमा, for it led to an action resulting in some tangible result, agreeing with the previous observation. Whatever after being seen does not lead to such समर्थप्रवृत्ति (result according with the observation) is always अप्रमा, e.g., seeing water in the mirage. Therefore this जलज्ञान was प्रमा and nothing else. Thus the प्रमात्व of the ज्ञान is determined, not with the ज्ञान, but after it. This, however, for a man who takes note of phenomena for the first time. In the event of an experienced man seeing water at a distance, the प्रमात्व of the ज्ञान is determined even before taking any action in the direction of the water. This is done by an अन्वयव्याप्ति in the form, this (second) जलज्ञान is प्रमा being of a kind with the first जलज्ञान (अनभ्यासदृशान्न), which led to agreeable result.

59. The असमवायिकारण of initial falling is गुरुत्व. गुरुत्व stands to the substance capable of falling, in समवायसंबन्ध along with आद्यपतन—the कार्य—which also stands to the substance in the same relation. Hence गुरुत्व is properly described as the असमवायिकारण of आद्यपतन. द्वितीयादिपतनस्य वेगासमवायित्वाद्वाचेति ॥ दिन० मु० ॥

60. See note No. 43.

61. All philosophy is agreed upon the mutability of things; and also of the properties of those things in general. The *Buddhists* look upon things as new and new at every succeeding second, and hold that they are made up, as it were, of a number of *kshanas* or moments, following one another. From this view of things in their relation to time nothing can escape, except such things as are necessarily नित्य on account of being विभु in their character. The change we see in विभु things amenable to our senses, is but a change more apparent than real, it being located in the विशेषगुण of the thing and not in the thing itself. On the nature of the change to which these *gunas*, as well as objects in general, are subject there are two opinions. The *Naiyāyika* maintains that any given गुण stands for three *kshanas* or moments: (1) उत्पत्तिक्षण, the stage of production; (2) स्थितिक्षण, the stage of existence, during which a new गुण, which is to succeed the first, obtains its उत्पत्तिक्षण; (3) नाशक्षण, the stage of

destruction, when the first *guna* is destroyed, and the second which is produced in the *स्थितिक्षण* of the first, takes its place. Thus the first *गुण* comes to be destroyed only in the third stage of existence, *i.e.*, in the *second* after its *birth*: (*स्वद्वितीयक्षणोत्पन्ननाश्यत्वम्*). The *क्षणिकविज्ञानवादी* maintains that there is no *स्थितिक्षण*—everything being destroyed in the moment next its birth. What the text lays down is only with the view of setting aside this theory.

62. See note No. 6. *उपाधिरूपसामान्य* is that which is related by *परंपरा*—a kind of indirect relation, through a series. *प्रमेयत्व* which means *प्रमात्व* is related to the *घट* (the object of the *प्रमा*) by a *परम्परा*, *प्रमात्व* being in *प्रमा* which again is in *घट*. This *परम्परा* is described as *स्वाश्रयविषयसंबन्ध* in a note to MS. F.

63. Those are called *अद्युतसिद्ध*, of which one exists as entirely in and of another, without losing its identity, *e.g.*, the cloth of and in the threads forming it. These could be reduced to the five classes enumerated in the text—*vide* note No. 5.


64. A thing may be absent in one of two ways: it may not be the thing we see, and may, therefore, not be found in it, inasmuch as it is different from it; or it may be that a thing is not seen at any particular time on, or in another thing. That a pot of clay is not a piece of cloth, and *vice versa*, is an instance of the first kind of *अभाव*; and that a piece of cloth is not to be found in this room, that of the second, the first being called *अन्योन्याभाव* or absence by *identity*, and the second *संसर्गाभाव* or absence by *contact*. A thing absent by contact may be absent in one of three ways according to the time of observation. The thing was not in a thing, is not in a thing, or does not exist for all time. The effect, before its actual production, *was* not seen in the cause (*समवायिकारण*) *i.e.*, did not exist in *contact* with the cause, *e.g.*, a *घट* in the shells that make it. This is *प्रागभाव*. When a thing is destroyed it is merely reduced to its component parts—the original causes—in which therefore it *is* no longer seen (has no *contact* with the cause), *e.g.* a pot of clay broken and reduced to its original shells. This is *प्रध्वंसाभाव*. It will be seen that *प्रागभाव* has no beginning but has an end, *प्रध्वंसाभाव* has a beginning but no end, and *अत्यन्ताभाव* is eternal. A thing which does not exist at any one of the three periods of time must be an absolute non-entity like the horns of a hare. This is *अत्यन्ताभाव*. After this general view of *अभाव* and its sub-divisions, we may examine the phraseology of the definitions. *अन्योन्याभाव* is that *अभाव* which has for its *प्रति-*

योगी a thing defined by तादात्म्यसंबन्ध. In the अभाव of a घट or anything, the प्रतियोगी of the अभाव, has two things: the प्रतियोगिता, as well as the relation by which the thing is known as absent. This latter is of two kinds: तादात्म्य—identity—(as घटत्व—the identity of the घट with itself), and संसर्ग—contact—(as the contact of the घट with the place—अधिकरण—where its अभाव is noticed). The प्रतियोगिता of an अभाव, found in the प्रतियोगी may be defined by either of these two relations. In other words, a thing (प्रतियोगी) may not be another thing (तादात्म्य), or may not be seen on or in a thing (संसर्ग). From the illustrations already given it will appear that in an अन्योन्याभाव the प्रतियोगिता is defined by तादात्म्य; in a संसर्गाभाव by संसर्ग. घटः पटो न which is an instance of अन्योन्याभाव, therefore, means घटत्वरूपा या तादात्म्यसंबन्धावच्छिन्ना (घटनिष्ठा) प्रतियोगिता तद्वान् घटाभावः पटे. We have already determined संसर्गाभाव to be of three kinds from its relation to time, and we have there seen that in the third kind of संसर्गाभाव, or अत्यन्ताभाव, the संसर्ग of the प्रतियोगी is not to be found at any one of the three periods of time. Thus the old school of *Nyāya* held that this अभाव is नित्य, whereas the other two are not so. In other words, though the प्रतियोगिता of all three is अवच्छिन्न by संसर्ग, that of अत्यन्ताभाव is अवच्छिन्न not by any limited period of time but eternity (त्रिकाल). Thus to separate this अभाव from the two other *abhāvas*, which are अनित्य, it is defined as त्रैकालिकसंसर्ग &c., त्रैकालिकभूतभविष्यद्वर्तमानरूपत्रिकालवृत्तिरित्यर्थः । नित्य इति भावः ॥ वाक्य० ॥ ध्वंसप्रागभावयोः प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकसंबन्धो वर्तत इति मताभिप्रायेण त्रैकालिकेति विशेषणमन्यथान्योन्याभाववारकेणैव तद्वारणात्तद्वृत्ततापत्तेः ॥ नील० ॥ The other and more modern view of this अभाव, however, does not favour this construction, अत्यन्ताभाव being regarded as a mere case of non-existence for a time. They further maintain that if after predicating such an अत्यन्ताभाव of a thing, the thing were introduced in the अधिकरण of its अभाव, the अभाव is not destroyed but rendered merely imperceptible (अप्रतीत). भूतले घटसंयोगप्रागभावप्रध्वंसयोरत्यन्ताभावप्रतीतिनियामकत्वं कल्प्यते ॥ तर्कही० ॥ There are others who instead of taking such a view of अत्यन्ताभाव, call this a fourth kind of अभाव-उत्पादविनाशशाली—*vide Mukṭāvalī*, verse 12 and Notes, *et. seq.*

65. *Vide* note No. 9; as well as Nos. 50 and 51.

66. The *sūtra* with which the *Nyāya* opens is: प्रमाणप्रमेयसंशयप्रयोजनदृष्टान्तसिद्धान्तावयवतर्कनिर्णयवाद् जल्पावितण्डाहेत्वाभासच्छलजातिनिग्रहस्थानानां तत्त्वज्ञानान्निःश्रेयसाधिगमः ॥ The author consistently with

this raises a doubt in the form of questioning the utility of describing and understanding all these *padārthas*, &c., knowledge of which is of no use, it being that of something other than the soul, which, in fact, ought to be the real subject of the inquiry into the nature of happiness—the chief end of all human effort. This is only a misunderstanding, for, according to the aphorism quoted, the essence (of the soul) is comprehended only through a proper understanding of the *padārthas*, &c. Knowledge thus acquired will lead to final absolution (from the bonds of death and birth), which is the *summum bonum*, the highest happiness—मोक्ष. Absolution is absolute destruction of pain. It is that destruction of pain which is not co-eval with the antecedent non-existence of pain to be found in the place where it (the first destruction of pain) takes place. If this destruction of pain were to be co-eval with the प्रागभाव of दुःख, every little suspension of worldly pain will be included in the definition of मोक्ष. For instance, if we are suffering from some pain, and if that pain is removed by some means, this cannot be called मोक्ष, inasmuch as this destruction of pain—दुःखध्वंस—has taken place at a time when the प्रागभाव of दुःख is still in us, i.e., we are still open to some future possibility of दुःख. This दुःखध्वंस to constitute itself into real मोक्ष must be final, must happen at a time when there is no possibility of any fresh दुःख occurring. Again the दुःखप्रागभाव, with which the दुःखध्वंस is required not to be co-eval, must be in the same place as दुःखध्वंस (स्व); otherwise while there is दुःखप्रागभाव at any place in the world, no individual can attain मोक्ष, and therefore the मोक्ष of persons (शुक्) frequently reported (in Scriptures) cannot be included in the definition (अव्याप्ति), inasmuch as the दुःखध्वंस is then not असमानकालीन, but समानकालीन with the दुःखप्रागभाव. But if the दुःखप्रागभाव and the दुःखध्वंस are not required to be together in the same individual, (i.e., at the place where the दुःखध्वंस occurs) the definition will be precise and correct. Hence स्वसमानाधिकरणदुःखप्रागभावसमानकालीनदुःखध्वंसो मोक्षः ॥




List of abbreviations used in the Notes.

न्या० को०	न्यायकोश.
मुक्ता०	मुक्तावलि.
सि० चं०	सिद्धान्तचन्द्रोदय.
कुसु०	कुसुमाञ्जलि.
नील०.....	नीलकण्ठी.
न्या० बो०	न्यायबोधिनी.
वाक्य०	वाक्यवृत्ति.
तर्क० सं०	तर्कसंग्रह.
तर्क० दी०	तर्कसंग्रहदीपिका.
दिन०	दिनकरी.
वेदा० सा०	वेदान्तसार.
अष्टा०.....	अष्टाध्यायी.
का० प्र०	काव्यप्रकाश.
कैय०	कैयट on पतञ्जलि.

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